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Preface 
Foreign direct investments in the food processing industries has been the focal 
point of my research interest since 1995, and I have been watching closely the 
course of privatisation events in the Hungarian food industries and the behaviour 
of foreign investors there throughout this period. 
During my postgraduate work I had the opportunity to study the food sector 
and foreign direct investment abroad. I became acquainted with the economics 
and main characteristics of food production at Purdue University in Indiana in 
1994 and with general aspects of the agrifood sector at Iowa State University 
under the instructions of Prof. William Meyers in 1997. A scholarship to Helsinki 
University in 1998-99 granted by CIMO (Centre for International Mobility) pro-
vided an opportunity to deepen my knowledge of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
theories and to start examining the motivational factors lying behind the penetra-
tion of an industry by FDI. I subsequently carried out research into foreign direct 
investments in the food sectors of the Baltic states at the Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute (MTTL) in Helsinki, a project which familiarised me with 
practical applications of some aspects of FDI theory. 
This dissertation is therefore the outcome of several years of research, a syn-
thesis in which observations on FDI determinants and FDI influence in the Hun-
garian food sector are organised thematically and chronologically in a systematic 
manner. One essential element in this systematisation has been the concept of 
FDI-concentration maps, conceived on the basis of Iines of argument related to 
FDI and industrial organisation and finally brought to life in the context of this 
dissertation by my further investigations into food industry FDI determinants in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
It is important to note in the case of such a rapidly changing field as that of the 
CEE food markets that data collection for the present work came to an end in 
March 2000. This nevertheless means that the history of the first full decade of 
liberalisation, privatisation and operation in the market economy is documented 
in the dissertation and the role of foreign direct investment is assessed, so that the 
long-term tendencies in the CEE food industries presented here make the findings 
extremely relevant at the present time. 
A full-length list of ali the professors, researchers and experts who assisted me 
in the various phases of accomplishing this work would be embarrassing, and I 
would hereby like to express my thanks to them ali. 
In particular, however, I would first like to take this opportunity to express my 
appreciation to ali the professors at the Budapest University of Economic Sci-
ences and Public Administration (BUESPA), who laid a solid foundation for this 
research with their lectures and seminars in the PhD programme. I am personally 
indebted to Professors Csaba Csåki, Csaba Forgåcs and Måria Sebesty6n-Kostyål 
of the Agricultural Economics Department for their continuous support and kind 
encouragement over the years of my studies, research and practical work in the 
agrifood sector. 
I wish to thank ali the people in a number of countries who helped me with 
consultations, information and data concerning food industry FDI in general and 
in Central and Eastem Europe in particular. Their contribution to the successful 
completion of this dissertation is gratefully recognised. 
I appreciate the constructive comments made by Prof. Jukka Kola at Helsinki 
University, who instructed me for a year at the beginning of my work and helped 
determine the position of the dissertation in the theoretical field. Prof. Urmas 
Varblane at the University of Tartu and Dr. Gåbor Hunya at WIIW provided 
valuable advice on research in the field of foreign direct investments, and I am 
also grateful for the useful ideas which I received from the researchers at MTTL 
in the initial phases regarding the concrete implementation of the analysis and 
narrowing down of the research theme. 
In Hungary, I greatly benefited from the help of Dr. Mårton Szabö, who shared 
his expertise on the food industry and foreign direct investments with me through 
a series of consultations and by providing background materials. I owe special 
thanks to Prof. Låszlö Hunyadi and Dr. Richård Bugnics for their counselling in 
methodological issues affecting the empirical analyses. The useful comments of 
the referees of the manuscript and later examiners of the thesis itself, Dr. Jözsef 
Alvincz, Dr. Gåbor Udovecz and Dr. Miklös Szanyi, provided an effective basis 
for reconsidering some aspects and incorporating the recommendations into the 
final version. I should emphasise above ali the generous assistance given by my 
instructor, Prof. Jdzsef Töth, who provided me with valuable guidance through-
out the entire research and proved to be a real patron of my dissertation in many 
practical aspects. 
The public presentation and defence of the PhD thesis took place at BUESPA 
on May 10, 2001, and I am grateful for the questions and comments put forward 
by the examining committee of BUESPA professors and by Dr. Lionel Hubbard 
from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, and for the active participation by 
the audience in the discussion. 
My return to the Economic Research department of MTT Agrifood Research 
Finland (MTTL) in the summer of 2001 has provided me with an excellent and 
inspiring working environment in which to continue investigations into food in-
dustry FDI. I would like to thank the director, Prof. Kyösti Pietola, for including 
my PhD thesis in the institute' s series of Publications. I would also thank 
Malcolm Hicks for his highly professional and thorough revision of the English 
text. The final editing of the manuscript was done with care and competence by 
Jaana Ahlstedt. 
Finally, I thank my parents for their wise attitude on life, and most particu-
larly, I wish to express my gratitude to my wife Johanna, whose love, patience 
and perpetual encouragement constituted an invaluable background and support 
for me during the writing of this dissertation. 
Helsinki, May 2002 
Csaba Jansik 
Agfifood Research Finland 
Economic Research (MTTL) 
Luutnantintie 13, FIN-00410 Helsinki, Finland 
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Determinants and Influence of Foreign Direct Investments 
in the Hungarian Food Industry in a Central and Eastern 
European Context 
An Application of the FDI-Concentration Map Method 
Csaba Jansik 
Abstract. The food processing sectors of the Central and Eastem European countries 
were a scene of unprecedented institutional and economic refomis during the post-social-
ist era of the 1990s. The ownership changes aroused the interest of foreign investors. 
Hungary had nearly two-thirds of its food processing capital in foreign hands by 1998, 
the highest proportion of any country in the region for this sector. Hence it serves excel-
lently as an object for detailed investigations into the foreign direct investments. 
The dissertation is centred around three major objectives. The first is to identify the 
motives behind food industry FDI in Hungary, the second is to assess the influence it has 
had. Since foreign investors have expressed greatly differing levels of interest in the vari-
ous food processing industries not just in Hungary but in the entire CEE region, a third 
objective is to reveal and compare the motivating forces behind such investments in a 
group of countries comprising Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
The motives behind FDI were searched for by means of a regression model and clus-
ter analyses of the national food industries. Based on preliminary results, a new methodo-
logical concept, the FDI-concentration map, was developed to trace trends in foreign 
direct investments in particular industries over time and to refine the intemational com-
parison of FDI motivations in a demonstrative way. The influence of FDI was examined 
by calculating the dynamic performance gap between domestic and foreign food pro-
cessors in Hungary. 
The findings obtained from the analyses and the FDI-concentration maps confirm 
that foreign investors were clearly driven by the market power attainable in the CEE food 
industries. The concrete implementation of privatisation slightly modified the main ten-
dency country by country. As for the influence of FDI in Hungary, the superior perform-
ance of foreign-owned companies relative to domestically owned ones was shown to be 
in evidence by the late 1990s, but the overall performance of the food industry was im-
proving steadily. 
The results indicate that foreign investors attempt to maximise future profits by con-
quering market shares. This is a macro-regional manifestation of the world-wide tenden-
cies crystallised in the global FDI-concentration map, which implies that the food indus-
tries are becoming globalised at different rates. It is concluded that food industry FDI 
may bring joint benefits both to the investors and the CEE food industries upon the 
accession of these countries to the EU. 
Index words: foreign direct investments, food industry, FDI-concentration maps, 
Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
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1. Introduction 
The reforms that took place in the early 1990s brought dramatic changes to the 
food processing industries of Hungary and the entire Central and Eastern Euro-
pean region. State-owned companies were restructured and privatised, economic 
freedom and new regulations encouraged the establishment of new enterprises, 
and the result was a reshaping of the ownership and production structure of these 
industries. Foreign investments affected and participated in these fundamental 
structural changes in ali the countries concerned, although with varying inten-
sity. 
1.1. Objectives and Scope of the Research 
The privatisation of food processing generated fierce debates in Hungary during 
the early 1990s, and particularly concern was raised by the high proportion of 
foreign ownership, although the minds of the public have been set at ease now 
that the substantial structural changes have been completed. The fact that com-
panies that once lived in the midst of stormy institutional, economic and legal 
reforms have now resumed regular manufacturing indicates a consolidation of 
the operating environment, corporate forms and ownership. 
The process of capital reallocation in the food processing industries has been 
completed. The amount of existing national assets affected the emerging configu- 
ration of capital ownership, in which foreign involvement constituted the most 
powerful force. By 1998, foreign investors owned nearly two-thirds of the equity 
in the Hungarian food processing sector, an extraordinarily high share in the 
Central and Eastern European context. 
Our understanding of the process involved has broadened considerably since 
the completion of privatisation in the food industry in 1997. A great deal of in-
formation and data have accumulated, facilitating a comprehensive and unpreju-
diced analysis of the determinants and influence of foreign direct investments. 
Since no industry-specific, empirically supported retrospective analysis has 
been made of the determinants and influence of foreign capital in the Hungarian 
food sector, this dissertation sets out to fill the gap. 
The dissertation also investigates the era of transitions in the food processing 
sectors of other Central and Eastern European countries that have followed a 
similar path to that of Hungary, with special emphasis laid on discovering the 
reasons for the widely differing levels of foreign capital participation. In order to 
maintain an appropriate depth of analysis, the present international comparison 
covers five countries that are representative of the diversity of food sectors in the 
region both in terms of their restructuring and privatisation history and in terms 
of output volume. The other countries selected for the comparative analysis are 
Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
23 
This investigation into particular industries within the food sectors of the se-
lected countries was designed to reveal the preferences and motives of foreign 
investors in Central and Eastern Europe. It addresses the question of how politi-
cal directions and the initial status of the food sector in each country affected the 
investors' priorities among the individual food processing industries. The inter-
national comparison has two objectives: 
to delimit the ways in which Hungary stands out from other coun-
tries in the region in the context of the international environment, 
and 
to state hypothetical general tendencies for Central and Eastern 
Europe based on common patterns observable in these countries. 
The objectives of the dissertation can be summarised by delineating three 
primary research areas: 
The first objective is to analyse the motives behind the inflow of 
foreign capital into the Hungarian food processing sector, with 
special emphasis on market structure and industry profit rates. 
The second objective is to place the situation described for 
Hungary into its Central and Eastern European context. 
The third objective is to measure the impact of FDI by comparing 
the economic performance of Hungarian food processing compa- 
nies with predominantly foreign and domestic ownership. 
The objectives can be rephrased into questions, which in turn also form 
the basis for five theses. Answers will be sought to the following main questions: 
What are the main motivational factors that attract foreign cap-
ital into the Hungarian food processing sector? 
Li What are the reasons for the differing preferences of FDI 
among the food processing industries? 
How do the determinants identified as driving .the choices of 
food industry FDI in Hungary affect the situation in other CEE 
countries? 
Is there a significant gap between the performance figures of 
foreign-owned and Hungarian-owned food processors? 
The analysis will be introduced and justified by means of a review of the 
relevant economic literature and theoretical framework, and of previous scien-
tific and empirical results. Since it is not possible to achieve full coverage of the 
extremely rich and multitudinous literature in one, work, efforts were con-
sciously focused on reviewing the main theoretical directions that provide an 
essential background for the dissertation. 
The dissertation is strictly an analysis of facts, and does not intend to take a 
stance on political, social or emotional issues. Econornic procedures that have 
been heavily influenced by politics, such as privatisation or compensation, will 
similarly be assessed from a purely economic point of view. 
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The lessons and conclusions arising from this dissertation will provide 
useful information for a number of groups of domestic and foreign eco-
nomic actors and for politicians. Participants in the Hungarian agrifood 
.chain, and food processors in particular, will definitely gain the most explicit 
knowledge. The detailed international chapter is designed to furnish foreign in-
vestors who have already settled down in the region or pian to do so later, actors 
in food processing chains across Central and Eastern Europe and national 
policy rnakers with concrete information. Each group can learn from the results 
and lessons from the dissertation regarding foreign direct investments in the Hun-
garian, Polish and Baltic food sectors and draw the necessary conclusions. 
1.2. Theses Put forward in the Dissertation and Methodology 
Employed 
The issues delineated in the above research objectives and the questions to he 
resolved by means of the dissertation may he embodied in five concrete theses. 
We will look here at the five theses and review their theoretical basis and the 
databases and econometric and statistical methods used in support of each. 
Thesis I: The primary determinants which have motivated foreign cap-
ital inflows into the Hungarian food processing sector are favourable 
natural endowments, food processing traditions and FDI-enhancing gov-
ernment policy. 
The Porter diamond, initially developed to analyse the competitiveness of na-
tions or industries, is employed to identify the motives lying behind foreign di-
rect investments in the food processing sector in Hungary. In support of Thesis I, 
a Central and Eastern European (CEE) component will he added to the detailed 
Porter diamond as previously extended by Scandinavian researchers. 
Thesis II: The industrial preferences and choices of foreign investors 
within food processing have followed the tendencies observed in Central 
and Eastern Europe in general: the uneven penetration level of FDI in the 
various industries has been driven by the attainable market power and 
profit expectations. 
One of the weightiest elements in the dissertation can be found in Thesis II, in 
which the allocation of FDI among industries is examined using a multivariant 
regression model. Indicators such as market concentration, profitability, export 
opportunities and the industry' s share of total food manufacturing sales are used 
to explain foreign participation in the individual food processing industries. The 
method employed is stepwise modelling, in which the presumed group of FDI 
determinants is narrowed down through the gradual removal of insignificant vari-
ables. 
The data on the individual food industries are grouped for use in the analysis by 
means of international classification categories, which in turn facilitates consistent 
comparison at the CEE level. 
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Thesis III: The Hungarian food processing industries are highly diver-
gent in terms of their concentration rates and proportions of foreign cap- 
ital., and they also form distinct groups on other market and performance 
criteria. They follow four typical routes in terms of concentration and their 
penetration by foreign capital. 
The first sections devoted to Thesis III rely methodologically on cluster 
analysis, by which the food processing industries are grouped by reference to the 
two dimensions investigated here: market concentration rate and participation of 
foreign capital. Due to the limited number of industries, the application of a hier-
archical clustering algorithm was most appropriate. The data used for the cluster 
analysis in testing Thesis III are equivalent to those employed in the context of 
Thesis II. 
Given the close correlation between market concentration ratios and the pro-
portion of foreign capital in individual industries established in connection with 
the confirmation of Thesis II, the direction of the causal link is then tested under 
Thesis III, by means of the Granger causality test. 
Thesis IV:  The examples taken from selected Central and Eastern Euro-
pean food processing sectors verify the industry preferences of FDI. The 
choices of foreign investors in the food processing industries of the entire 
region are driven by a pursuit for market power. 
The principal scientific achievement of the dissertation is the developing of 
the concept of FDI-concentration maps and its application to the food process-
ing sectors of the Central and Eastern European countries. These maps are based 
on the two dimensions of investigation used in the cluster analysis. 
Although foreign direct investments in the food processing sectors of Central 
and Eastern European countries are being studied in a number of well-known 
research institutes throughout Europe, the scope and depth of these research 
activities are hindered by the confidential nature of the company data and the 
varying levels of reliability of the sources of second or third-hand information on 
which the national data are based. 
One of the virtues of the research methodology adopted in this dissertation is 
that the analysis is built upon a large body of first-hand information collected 
directly from companies, development institutes, product councils and national 
statistical offices in the course of the author' s research trips to Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania. This accumulated experience allowed a thorough, insightful exami-
nation to he made of the Hungarian and Baltic food processing sectors. The 
Polish data originate partly from second-hand sources such as research reports 
and official publications and partly from research performed on site by colleagues. 
Thesis V:  FDI has contributed to reinforcing the International competi-
tiveness of the Hungarian food industry and has consolidated the position of 
the agrifood chain in the national economy. The performance of the pre- 
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dominantly foreign-owned food processors differed significantly from that 
of the predominantly domestically owned food processors in the second 
half of the 1990s, surpassing them in ali the important efficiency and per-
formance categories. The major tendency hos been for the performance 
gap between the two groups to widen since the mid-1990s. 
The research procedure involved in the demonstration of Thesis V starts with 
a grouping of the Hungarian food processing companies on the basis of their 
majority owners and continues with a comparison of the two major groups. The 
economic performance of the companies in each group is measured by means of 
indicators that are familiar from accounting and auditing, combined with data 
from the related international literature. 
The concept of performance gap is applied in order to capture the dynamic 
pattems of differences between the foreign and domestically owned food 
processing companies. Dynamic changes in the size of the performance gap are 
examined in terms of company data for 1995-1998. 
1.3. Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into ten chapters, each thesis being discussed in one or 
two chapters. The structure of the dissertation and the relations among its compo-
nents are set out in the form of a comprehensive overview chart in Figure 1. 
Chapter 1 explains the research objectives, and delimits the area to be studied. 
It includes a description of the five theses, the methodology employed and the 
structure of dissertation. The division of the discussion among the five theses and 
ten chapters is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Chapter 2 is designed to set the stage for the subsequent detailed analysis of 
FDI flowing into the food processing sectors of Hungary and Central and Eastem 
Europe. It is devoted to sketching the international, regional and national setting 
and maun trends observable in globalisation and the international flow of capital. 
Chapter 3 lists the theoretical foundations. The approach adopted in this re-
search can be placed within the field of industrial organisation theory. Selected 
parts of its teuninology and causal relations which are indispensable for illumi-
nating the position represented by the dissertation in the field of industrial or-
ganisation will be touched upon in this explanation. Chapter 3 defines the SCP 
paradigm and the major causal relations prevailing among its three components. 
It also rephrases the research objectives of the dissertation and places them into 
the causal framework of the SCP paradigm. 
The literature on foreign direct investment will be surveyed in two aspects. 
First, the main FDI theories presented in the international literature will be re-
viewed, and research into foreign direct investment flows into Central and East-
ern Europe, and particularly Hungary will be discussed. 
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Chapters 4 to 7 are concemed with the motives behind foreign investments in 
the food processing industries in Hungary, beginning with a survey of the forces 
attracting investment in the food industries in general in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 examines the reasons for the uneven distribution of foreign capital 
among the individual food processing industries and identifies the major FDI 
determinants at the industry level and measures their explanatory power over the 
past decade. 
Chapter 6 is a detailed exarnination of the Hungarian food processing indus-
tries in terms of the further development of the market-seeking aspect of foreign 
investments. The chapter seeks to typify the food industries by means of a cluster 
analysis. The same chapter contains a discussion of the causal direction of the 
relationship between industry concentration ratios and the influx of foreign cap-
ital. 
A definition of FDI-concentration maps and a detailed description of their dy-
namic extension in the form of industry life-curves are provided in Chapter 7. As 
well as explaining the general driving forces affecting FDI-concentration maps, 
this chapter lists the four major types of life-curve and provides detailed analyses 
of specific examples from the Hungarian food industries. 
Chapter 8 presents a detailed comparative analysis of foreign direct invest-
ments flowing into the food processing industries of Central and Eastem Europe 
through the medium of a selected group of representative countries: Hungary, 
Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This chapter, the longest in the disserta-
tion, highlights the importance of a regional outlook. It reports first the main 
trends in the food processing sectors of the five selected countries over the past 
decade and gives a summary of the important features of FDI in the context of 
the food industries. After an explanation of the forces goveming the disposition 
of national FDI-concentration maps, the food processing sectors of the five se-
lected countries are compared within this analytical framework. The differences 
between the national maps are accounted for by a detailed review of the privati-
sation of the food industries in the countries concemed and of general attitudes 
towards FDI. Common rules and discrepancies are detected by running a cluster 
analysis of the food processing industries for each country. 
Chapter 9 addresses the influence of foreign direct investments on the food 
industries. Section 9.1 places the impacts into the context of the food chain and 
weighs up the costs and benefits associated with the presence of foreign food 
processors from the viewpoint of the various strata involved in the chain: the 
agricultural producers, the domestically owned food processors and the consum-
ers. It also discusses the implications for the state budget and the regional impacts 
of foreign-owned food processors. 
The influence of foreign capital within the food processing sector is then ex-
amined in section 9.3, in which companies are analysed according to their owner-
ship structure and economic performance, measured by the performance gap 
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method. The impact of FDI within the individual food processing industries is also 
discussed. 
Chapter 10 provides a concise summary of the major scientific results, new 
findings and conclusions. 
The structure of the dissertation is illustrated in Figure 1, in which rectangles 
indicate theoretical foundations and concepts, while ovals contain brief identifi-
cations of the theses (Roman numbers) and chapters (Arabic numbers). The posi-
tions of the ovals denote inter-linkages and the relations of the theses to the theo-
retical foundations. The rectangles with rounded corners encompass segments of 
the dissertation, defined either on a common geographical basis — the world 
economy, the CEE region, Hungary — or on the basis of the same methodological 
approach — such as the use of FDI-concentration maps. 
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2. Determining the Context — Geographical Aspects of 
Foreign Direct Investments in General and in the Food 
Industry 
2.1. Definitions 
Before detailing the background, it is relevant to review the basic definitions and 
terminology concerned with foreign direct investments and food processing that 
will be in use throughout this work. 
2.1.1. Definitions of Foreign Direct Investments 
The international flow of capital is a significant constituent of the global integra-
tion of the world' s economy, i.e. the increasing intemational activities of eco-
nomic players, or in one word, globalisation.1 International production, produc-
tion of goods and services that is controlled and managed by foreign enterprises, 
is at the core of the globalisation process. Another definition approaches interna-
tional production in terms of the summed activities of transnational corpora-
tions.2 
A transnational corporation consists of a parent enterprise and foreign affili-
ates, where the parent enterprise controls the assets and holds partial or full title 
to the equity of other companies located in other countries. Internationally, own-
ership over 10 percent of a foreign company' s equity is regarded as FDI. Foreign 
affiliates are enterprises in which a foreign owner has a share that exceeds 10 
percent (UNCTAD 1999, p. 465). The rate of transnationality is measured by a 
composite index3 calculated on the basis of the proportion of foreign assets, for-
eign sales and foreign employment controlled by a particular company. The Har-
vard definition of multinationality considers an enterprise multinational when it 
has more than six foreign affiliates (Borsos-Torstila 1999, p.• 21). 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are concrete manifestations of the integra-
tion of multinational enterprises across national borders. M&As involve one 
company acquiring another, or two companies concurrently trading shares in 
each other' s equity. 
1 	A more detailed definition of globalisation will be presented in section 8.2.1.1 on pages 159- 
164. 
2 "Multinational enterprises" is a widespread equivalent for transnational corporations, and the 
two terms will be used as synonyms here. 
3 The accurate formula for the transnationality index is the arithmetic mean of three rates: (1) 
foreign-based assets as a proportion of the company's total assets, (2) foreign sales as a pro-
portion of total sales revenues, and (3) foreign employment as a proportion of total employ-
ment (UNCTAD 1999, p. 80). 
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Internationally approved definitions of foreign direct investment have been 
set out by both the OECD and WTO, and the two do not materially differ. The 
alternative given by the World Trade Organisation defines foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) as a transaction through which an investor based in one country (the 
home country) acquires assets in another country (the host country) with the 
intent to manage these assets. This management dimension explains the "direct" 
aspect of FDI, distinguishing it from portfolio investments in foreign stocks, 
bonds and other financial instruments (WTO 1996). 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) pub-
lishes annually an encyclopaedic work called the World Investment Report, 
which features a detailed definition of FDI. "Foreign direct investment is defined 
as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting inter-
est and control of a resident entity in one economy (parent enterprise) in an 
enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor 
(foreign affiliate)" (UNCTAD 1999, p. 465). 
Foreign direct investment flows constantly from resident countries to host 
countries, a characteristic that explains its flow-based interpretation. These 
flows comprise capital mobilised by the investing company for the use of the 
recipient company, or received by the host company from the investor. FDI in-
ward and outwardflows are distinguished based on the direction of analysis. FDI 
has three components: equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company 
loans, or intra-company debt transactions (UNCTAD 1999, pp. 465-466). FDI 
flows are interpreted within the scope of one economic period, usually one cal-
endar year. The indicator measures the amount of foreign direct investment that 
flowed into or out of a particular country in a given year. 
The accumulation of foreign direct investment flows is a stock measure, and 
foreign direct investment stock may also he interpreted in two ways according to 
the direction of investigation: the total foreign capital investments of companies 
headquartered in the resident country — outward FDI stock — or the cumulated 
sum of capital infusion received by companies in a host country from foreign 
enterprises — inward FDI stock. 
2.1.2. Definitions of Food Processing 
Food processing is a branch within the manufacturing sector of a national 
economy. It is part of the agrifood chain, which encompasses the various stages 
that convert agricultural inputs into food items and convey them to consumers. 
The linkages between the individual segments within the chain are illustrated in 
Figure 12. The notion of agrifood sector is employed in this dissertation to cover 
the combined production of agricultural raw materials and their processing into 
food. 
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As food processing is one branch in the secondary, or processing sector, it 
will usually be referred to here as the food processing industry or shortly food 
industry.4 The concept is defined precisely in the NACE classification,5 where it 
comprises divisions 15 and 16, including the manufacture of food, beverages and 
tobacco. This definition will be used both in the verbal discussions contained in 
this dissertation and in the empirical calculations. The same approach is em-
ployed widely in the intemational and Hungarian literature on the food process-
ing industry. 
Special emphasis is laid on the further classification of food processing by 
reference to specific groups of products. The food industries, or segments within 
the overall food processing industry, represent markets possessing homogenous 
characteristics with respect to identical products, similar groups of products, or 
the use of similar raw materials. The exact definition of the food industries or 
segments concemed comprises the set of groups and classes contained in divi-
sion 15 of NACE, Rev. 1.6 In the same approach, division 16, the manufacture of 
tobacco, is looked on as a separate segment. Annex 1 gives the detailed statisti-
cal definition of food processing including a full list of groups and classes of 
division 15. 
The most frequently quoted characteristics of individual food industries will 
be market concentration — a definition of the CRk concentration ratio can be 
found on page 86 — the proportion of foreign ownership, which is the stake that 
foreign enterprises have in the aggregate registered capital of the industry, and 
the profit rate, which is the gross profit margin7 for the particular industry in 
accounting terms, i.e. the ratio of profit before taxes to sales revenues. 
4 	In some cases the term offood processing sector may also be used for the food industry. 
5 NACE, Rev. 1 (Nomenclature g6n6ra1e des Avtivit6s 6conomiques dans les Communaut6s 
Europ6ennes), is a statistical classification of economic activities drawn up and applied by the 
European Union. It consists of sections denoted by alphabetical codes and divisions denoted 
by numerical codes. Further divisions are made into groups (three-digit numerical codes) and 
classes (four-digit numerical codes) (Eurostat 1996, p. 147). The NACE system was launched 
in the 1970s and revised in the early 1990s, since when the revised version has become a wide-
spread statistical classification for the whole of Europe. The primary concept and concrete 
classification approach to the manufacturing sector is equivalent to the ISIC (International 
Standards of Industrial Classification) system observed by the United Nations, which used to 
be in use in Hungary in earlier times (KSH 2000a, p. 8). 
6 In order to avoid confusion between NACE 15 and NACE 15xx, the food industry will be 
taken to refer to the entire sector (NACE 15), while foodprocessing industries will denote the 
individual segments within food processing (NACE 15xx). 
7 Profit margin is regarded as a basic indicator of profitability, its most frequent form being 
profits as a proportion of net sales revenues. International standards use the expression Return 
on Sales (ROS) for the profitability indicator. Several versions of ROS are known, based on 
the concrete accounting specification in the numerator (136hm 1998, pp. 309-310). The formu-
la used in this dissertation includes profit before taxes in the numerator. 
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2.2. World Economic Background 
2.2.1. Foreign Direct Investments in the World Economy 
International capital flows increased to unprecedented magnitudes by the late 
1990s, FDI outflows reached a peak of USD 649 billion in 1998, while inflows 
amounted to USD 644 billion (Table 1). This expansion in capital flows 
occurred despite a number of unfavourable factors such as the recession in Asia, 
the shaky financial markets in Russia and the Latin American countries, the 
decrease in world trade, the decline in certain raw material prices, retardation in 
privatisation activities and a slowing down in world economic growth. FDI out-
flows increased by 39 percent in 1998 relative to the previous year, while the 
growth in FDI inflows reached 37 percent. These growth rates were the highest 
recorded since 1987. The world' s foreign direct investment stock exceeded USD 
4 trillion in 1998 (Table 1). 
The most dynamic increase of all was in the value of mergers and acquisi-
tions, which amounted to over USD 400 billion in 1998, a rate of expansion of 
70 percent relative to the year before. The proeess also continued into 1999, as 
the total value of mergers and acquisitions had already exceeded the 1998 level 
in the first half of the year, reaching USD 574 billion. 
Table 1. Indicators of foreign direct investment flows and international produc-
tion, 1986-1998. 
Value at current prices 
(billion dollars) 
Annual growth rate 
(percent) 
1996 1997 1998 1986-1991- 1996 1997 1998 
1990 1995 
FDI inflows 	 359 464 644 24.3 	19.6 9.1 29.2 38.8 
FDI outflows 380 475 649 27.3 	15.9 5.9 25.0 36.6 
FDI inward stock 	3,086 3,437 4,088 17.9 	9.6 10.6 11.4 18.9 
FDI outward stock 3,145 3,423 4,117 10.5 	10.7 8.9 8.8 20.3 
International mergers 
and acquisitions 	163 236 411 30.2 	15.5 45.2 44.8 74.2 
Indicators of foreign affiliates 
- sales revenues 	9,372 9,728 11,427 10.7 	11.7 3.8 3.8 17.5 
- assets 	 11,246 12,211 14,620 13.8 	8.8 8.6 8.6 19.7 
- exports 1,841 2,035 2,338 13.1 	-5.8 10.5 10.5 14.9 
- employment 
(in thousand) 	30,941 31,630 35,074 5.6 	4.9 2.2 2.2 10.9 
Source: UNCTAD (1999, p. 9). 
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International production — the aggregate production of parent companies and 
their foreign affiliates — has become significant factor in the world economy in 
the course of the 1990s. The significance of transnational corporations had been 
increasing rapidly, so that by 1998 there were 60,000 parent companies operat-
ing half a million foreign affiliates ali over the world. 
Although the transnational corporations include small, medium-sized and 
large companies, they are highly concentrated, the 100 largest accounting for 15 
percent of the total assets of the 60,000 companies in 1997, and 22 percent of the 
sales. Over 90 of the 100 largest companies have originated from the United 
States, the European Union or Japan. 
International production has expanded at almost as rapid a rate as foreign 
direct investment over recent years. The production output, value of assets and 
labour force of the foreign affiliates of transnational corporations having 
increased spectacularly in 1998 (Table 1). 
2.2.1.1. Trends in International Production 
Trends in international production and their significance are summarised in the 
World Investment Repo rt under the following major points (UNCTAD 1999): 
1 	Transnational corporations contribute one-fourth to the world' s total produc- 
tion, out of which one-third originates from the capital recipient countries as 
the combined production of foreign affiliates. The foreign and domestic sales 
of affiliates reached USD 11 trillion in 1998, while world trade in goods and 
services amounted to only USD 7 trillion in the same year. In the supply of 
external markets with goods and services, international production and for-
eign direct investments have surpassed traditional world trade in their signi-
ficance. 
Technology flows are important phenomena accompanying international pro-
duction. The overall value of expenditure on patents, know-how payments, 
and licensing has steadily grown since the mid-1980s, and the process has 
accelerated particularly in recent years. The accent within the sectoral struc-
ture of foreign direct investments is moving towards technology-intensive 
branches. 
The high expenses of innovation and R&D activities compel firms to make 
use of ownership advantages internationally. There is a general tendency for 
innovation and development activities to be typically concentrated at corpo-
rate headquarters. Parent companies spend much more on research and devel-
opment than their foreign subsidiaries. 
International production and international trade are tightly interrelated. On 
the one hand, international trade is reinforced by intra-company trade among 
the segments of transnational corporations, while on the other hand, world 
trade impediments are among the pflmary factors that drive the expansion of 
international production. 
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Global FDI stock (1997)  
outward stock: USD 3,423 billion 
inward stock: USD 3,437 billion 
Global FDI tlows (1997) 
outfiows: USD 475 billion 
inflows: USD 464 billion 
al Figures in parentheses are calculated as shares in global FDI stoc 
International production generates additional employment, which can he of 
utmost importance, particularly in host countries suffering from acute unem-
ployment. 
The financial resources needed for international production — i.e. for the es-
tablishment, acquisition or expansion of foreign affiliates — may he procured 
internally by the transnational corporation itself. The capital may originate 
from the parent company, or it may take the form of internal debt or rein-
vested earnings of the foreign affiliate. Alternatively, the source of financing 
can be external capital mobilised by the transnational corporation in the host 
country or on the international capital market. 
2.2.1.2. Geographical Distribution of Global Foreign Direct Investment 
Stock 
Global foreign direct investments are characterised by extremely pronounced 
geographical concentration, the 10 principal resident countries accounting for 
United States 
FDI stock°  
outward: 861 bn $ (25,1%) 
inward: 682 bn $ (19,8%) 
369 	
102 
36 
285 
European Union 
FDI stock' 
outward: 1,511 bn $ (44,1 %) 
inward: 1,230 bn $ (35,8 %) 
 
13 
 
Japan 
FDI stock' 
outward: 272 bn $ (7,9 %) 
inward: 27 bn $ (0,8%) 
   
 
53 
 
Figure 2. Significance of the Investment Triad in the world's foreign direct 
investment flows and stock in 1997 (UNCTAD 1999, pp. 22, 479, 483, 489, 495). 
36 
four-fifths of the world's FDI outflows. Foreign direct investment flows and 
stock are in fact centralised on the developed countries, with the United States, 
the European Union and Japan constituting an investment Triad which handles 
the majority of. global FDI flows (Figure 2). 
The dominant position of the developed countries can be ascribed to the ex-
traordinary rate of growth in mergers and acquisitions (Table 1). As a result of 
the liberalisation of global trade, intensifying competition has induced the emer-
gence of global industries. The principal means of market consolidation has been 
the merging of existing assets. 
The extent of foreign direct investment flows and stock among the developed 
countries is explained by the nature of mergers and acquisitions: 
The largest transactions rarely involve real capital infusion, since 
they can be resolved with the simple exchange of shares. 
Acquisitions typically entail the attaining of a share in the owner- 
ship of an existing company, which is not necessarily followed by 
capacity growth. 
The developed countries that account for the majority of the foreign direct 
investment flows almost without exception shed more capital than they absorb. 
The difference ends up in the developing countries, for which foreign direct in-
vestment inflows make up the most important source of development funds. In 
fact, the developing countries have been engaged in a constant race for the re-
mainder of global FDI. The host countries are continuously changing their set of 
investment preferences, while the market perspectives of each region also 
change from year to year. 
The figures in Table 2 provide information on the origin and distribution of 
foreign direct investment inflows. Developing regions are primarily recipients of 
Table 2. Regional distribution of the world's foreign direct investment flows 
between 1995 and 1998 (in percent). 
FDI inflows FDI outflows 
1995 1996 1997 -1998 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Developed countries 63.4 58.8 58.9 	71.5 85.4 84.2 85.6 91.6 
Developing countries 32.3 37.7 37.1 	25.8 14.5 15.5 13.7 8.1 
out of which: Africa 1.3 1.6 1.6 	1.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 
Latin America 10.0 12.9 14.7 	11.1 2.1 1.9 3.3 2.4 
Asia 20.4 22.1 18.9 	12.0 12.3 13.0 9.6 5.3 
Other 0.6 1.1 1.9 	1.5 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.3 
Central and Eastern Europe 4.3 3.5 4.0 	2.7 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.3 
World total 100 100 100 	100 100 100 100 100 
Source: UNCTAD (1999, p. 20). 
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capital, while the magnitude of their capital outflows is negligible. Developing 
countries attracted over one-third of ali global capital up to 1997, but their share 
dropped dramatically in 1998 Similarly, Central and Eastem Europe received a 
notable proportion of global capital flows, but this had diminished considerably 
by 1998. 
The reason for the structural realignment is the above-mentioned dynamic 
growth in mergers and acquisitions in the developed countries. The decline of 
the developing countries in this respect is therefore primarily a proportional 
matter. The absolute value of capital flowing into the developing countries 
decreased only minimally between 1997 and 1998, from USD 190 billion to 
USD 183 billion (UNCTAD 1999). 
2.2.2. Foreign Direct Investments in the World's Food Economy 
The sectoral distribution of global capital inward stock indicates a predominance 
of services, which attracted nearly half of total foreign investments in 1997. The 
most popular branches of the tertiary sector were financing, including banking 
and insurance (14.4 percent), trade (10.2 percent), real estate (7.3 percent) and 
business services (6.8 percent). Within the secondary sector, the chemicals in-
dustry (7.5 percent) proved to be the most appealing branch, while basic metals, 
metallurgy and machinery manufacturing each accounted for approximately 
3 percent. The most important branch in the primary sector was mining, with 
5.6 percent. 
The food processing sector did not account for a particularly notable 
proportion of the global capital inward stock, scarcely reaching 3 percent in 
1997 (Table 3). Agriculture achieved a greater weight within the total foreign 
direct investment stock in the developing countries than in the developed ones, 
but its overall FDI appeal remained rather weak. Food processing, on the other 
hand, was a more popular investment target in the developed countries, which is 
definitely attributable to the greater purchase power, higher relative prices of 
foodstuffs and more advanced level of processing. 
Of the top 100 transnational corporations in the developed countries in 1997, 
nine were food processing companies (compared with 12 in 1996), and seven 
food processors were in the top 50 in the developing countries, whereas there 
were only two such companies among the top 25 in Central and Eastem Europe.8 
The headquarters of the largest food industrial companies are ali located in the 
developed countries, only two of the top 30 being located outside the Triad 
(Annex 2). 
8 The list of transnational corporations ranks the companies based on the intensity of foreign 
activities, that is the transnationality index (see footnote 3 on page 31), and not on absolute 
figures such as total sales or total assets. 
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Table 3. Sectoral distribution of foreign direct investment inward stock in 1997. 
Developed 	Developing 
countries 	countries 	Total a 
Value 	Share 	Value 	Share 
billion $ 	% 	billion $ 	% 
Value 	Share 
billion $ 	% 
Total economy 1,849.9 100 990.7 100 2,840.6 100 
Primer sector 141.2 7.6 37.5 3.8 178.7 6.3 
of which: Agriculture 3.0 0.2 16.3 1.6 19.3 0.7 
Secondary sector 617.7 33.4 589.0 59.5 1,206.7 42.5 
of which food processing 65.7 3.6 16.5 1.7 82.2 2.9 
Tertiary sector 1,033.4 55.9 343.5 34.7 1,376.9 48.5 
Other (not specified) 57.6 3.1 20.7 2.1 78.3 2.8 
Source: UNCTAD (1999, pp. 424-425). 
Without the figures of Central and Eastem Europe. 
Of the largest 90 mergers and acquisitions in 1998, ali valued above USD 1 
billion, only four transactions were concluded in the food processing sector 
(UNCTAD 1999, pp. 436-437). Food processing accounted for 3.4 percent of 
the world' s total M&As and 9.7 percent within the secondary sector (UNCTAD 
1999, p. 534). These figures demonstrate two facts: 
Mergers and acquisitions in the food industry are smaller than 
those in other industries, even though their combined share may 
be considerable. 
The consolidation of food processing companies is proportional 
to the contribution of food processing to the global FDI inward 
stock. 
Technology diffusion9 plays an important role in driving foreign direct in-
vestments in the food industry, as in most other processing branches. Capital 
flows among the developed countries within the food industry are characterised 
by two-way technology flows and mutual licensing contracts, while FDI flows to 
the developing countries and to the CEE region typically imply a one-way diffu-
sion of technology. 
Intellectual pro‘ perty, know-how and research and development take on spe-
cial emphasis in the food processing industry, where the pursuit of the maximum 
possible retums on high innovation costs is one of the major driving forces be- 
9 Technology diffusion is the distribution or transfer, usually through M&As, of innovative and 
intellectual capital accumulated by the investing and/or recipient companies. 
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hind 1-1n (Henderson 1996). In other processing industries, areas of technology 
development may occasionally he delegated to the foreign affiliates, but food 
processing investors tend in particular to centralise innovation and R&D activi-
ties at their headquarters. The transfer of existing knowledge, know-how and 
technology plays a key role within FDI in the food processing sector. 
2.3. Regional Background — Central and Eastern Europe 
2.3.1. Foreign Direct Investments in Central and Eastern Europe 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe started to break out from their 
former isolation in 1989. The system of foreign trade relations, which had been 
directed and controlled centrally, changed at the beginning of the reforms, and 
the liberalisation of trade in goods and services played a role of crucial impor-
tance in the development of the transition economies, so that the new trade op-
portunities had repercussions for the profile of the economy and helped to shape 
its structure. 
The opening up of the markets for goods and services was followed by the 
liberalisation of the capital market, which was of no less significance. During the 
command economy era the Central and Eastern European countries had re-
mained outside the mainstream of international capital trading and had been re-
stricted to managing their own accumulated national capital. The international 
influence of working capital had been an unknown phenomenon in the region. 
The reforms that took place in the early 1990s brought about fundamental 
changes in economic conditions, prominent among which was ownership re-
forrn. The mies and institutional framework for property redistribution and the 
rights and entitlements of the new owners were determined according to differ-
ent sets of priorities in each country. The laws and regulations in question were 
the outcome of long political debates and resulted in a turbulent period in terms 
of ownership relations in the entire region. Companies were put to the test in the 
international arena that had suddenly opened up, and many of them were found 
too weak to survive. Due to their inferior levels of competitiveness and techno-
logy relative to companies in the developed countries, they faced tough competi-
tion even on their domestic markets. In addition, the trade mechanisms that had 
formerly existed in Eastern Europe collapsed, and many companies lost their 
markets. The majority were driven into a state of serious crisis, as they did not 
have the resources for accumulating working capital. Consequently, the national 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe were characterised by an acute short-
age of capital, deepened by the inexperience of the banking sector and the re-
duced levels of sectoral development funding obtainable from the state budgets. 
The liberalisation of the capital markets induced a one-way flow from the 
developed countries to the transitional economies (Figure 66, page 264). Capital 
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Table 4. Balance of föreign,Wireet,jnye stmentflows, .Central (Ind .Eastern 
Europ&..between1987,and1998.(milliön. USD): 
-average.får 
991 1993 1994 1 995 -1996 :1997 -1998 
FDI inflows, 
of which: 
1,576 6,757 5,932 14,266 12,406 18,532 17,513 
Poland 183 1,715 1,875 3,659 4,498 4,908 5,129 
Czech Republic - -533 b 653 868 2,561 1,429 1,301 2,540 
Russia 1,211 640 2,016 2,479 6,243 2,183 
Romania 61 C 94 342 420 265 1,229 2,063 
Hungary 675 2,339 1,146 4,453 1,983 2,085 1,935 
Bulgaria 34 b, 40 '105 - 90 109 505 401 
Lithuania 30 31 73 152 355 926 
Ukraine 200 159 267 521 .624 743 
Slovakia 91 b 168 245 195 251 177 466 
Estonia -162 214 201 -151 267 581' 
Latvia 45 214 180 382 521 274 
FDI outflows 44 292 286 460 1,105 3,425 d 1,903 
Source: UNCTAD (1999, pp.'480,-486). 
Total regional figures (FDI Outflows and:inflows) is calculated summing the data of the follow- 
ing countriesn Albania, .13e1Qrussia, ,Btilgaria-,.Czech .Republic, Estonia„ Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania; Poland;Moldavia,, Romania; RuSsia, Slovakia, Ukraine. 
13/ Average of .years 19904992. 
C/ Average of years .1991-1992. '  
Three-f0OrthS of the-retord capital export in 1997 was registered by Russia. 
imports intensifi&d:..froru- 	mid;,,1990s., ronwards and,..,apprbached- the. level 
USD 20 billion annually.,Adl'eSame,,tirrie;.capitalxportsfromthe:CEE:region 
remained 
Foreign investors.:_attained positions.lir-CentraUarid.Easterh,EurbpeTredorni- 
nantly through 'priyatisatioW.Thetoprecjpient capitaLia-terms.- of .cumulate 
FDI stock :until-1•.996-was, Iluugary,..-Where, the...speedtWthe..:reform^:instigated 
foreign capital,part1cipatiofi,drivehby.privåtisation;,-althougkgr.een-fiekFihvest-
ments became.,ipredorninantinthe::4ast yearsotlhe.decade'.:Thus,,theTrbp9ttion: 
of non-privatistionbased foteigh.investments.,,leachecl:-94..percent--in: .1998; 
having beeu.34..percent in4995The example:OEI-kingary_May,serve.a.s.:aprodic, 
tion of the. future-routes.:of Other,:coUntrie&.:;Explöitation,:oftbeTrivatisation,op-
portunities,..opening. up in'Poland; the:.:Cech.."RepUblicSIOvakia:; Romaniwand 
the Baltic. .States',.:culminate:,- In4997:2903.:4.nd:AhQ eale'.1S.: anticipatect-to ,:occur 
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Table 5. FDI inward stock (1999) and its proportion of GDP (1998) in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
FDI stock a 
(billion USD) 
FDI stock/capita 
(USD/capita) 
FDI stock as a % 
of GDP b 
Poland 26.6 689 11.6 
Hungary 22.5 2,184 34.7 
Russia 10.3 70 3.2 
Czech Republic 7.6 738 22.8 
Romania 2.8 123 10.4 
Slovenia 2.4 1,200 12.1 
Croatia 2.1 438 7.5 
Latvia 1.9 779 23.0 
Estonia 1.4 966 24.5 
Slovakia 1.4 259 8.2 
Lithuania 1.0 270 10.9 
Bulgaria 1.0 119 9.4 
Source: ai Business Central Europe, December 1998/January1999, p. 65. Note: beginning of 
1999. I)/ World Investment Report, UNCTAD 1999, pp. 519, 522-523. 
much later in the CIS countries.1° Hungary's role of leading capital recipient was 
taken over in 1997 by Poland, where the privatisation of services provided the 
chief motivation for foreign investments by the end of the decade. The dramatic 
drop in capital inflows into Russia in 1998 is associated with the financial crisis, 
while foreign capital inflows into the Czech Republic and Romania increased 
considerably in 1998. Provided the Central European countries enjoy further sta-
bilisation of their political and economic environment, their FDI stock will 
reflect their economic potential and purchasing power in the long run. 
The leading four countries, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Russia, 
accounted for 80 percent of the total foreign direet investment stock of USD 83 
billion in 1998 (Table 5). 
The weak FDI attraction of the remaining countries was the main reason for 
their low level of FDI stock as a proportion of GDP in the early 1990s. FDI stock 
as a proportion of GDP in the CEE region increased from 6 percent in 1996 to 
8.4 percent in 1998, but still remains well below the 10.5 percent average for the 
developing countries and the 16.6 percent average for the developed countries. 
10 The FDI opportunities created by privatisation are understood here in their extended sense, 
covering the acquisition of any existing and operating capacity. They also include transactions 
in which foreign investors acquire already privatised companies from their new private owners 
(employees, corporations or other private persons), as has occurred in the Baltic countries. 
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On the Other hand, there is a significant discrepancy in the per capita figures 
between the individual CEE countries, as foreign direct investments reach not-
able proportions of GDP in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Estonia, 
while the proportion can be considered around average in Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia and Estonia. 
The European Union accounted for 61 percent of total inward foreign direct 
investment stock in the Central and Eastern European countries in 1998, the 
most active countries having been Germany (19 percent), the Netherlands (15 
percent), Austria (7 percent), the United Kingdom (6 percent) and France (5 per-
cent). The largest investor outside the European Union was the United States, 
which supplied 15 percent of the region' s inward FDI stock. Annex 3 includes 
the geographic distribution of Central and Eastern European inward foreign di-
rect investment stock by origin of major regions and by the host CEE countries. 
2.3.2. Foreign Direct Investments in the CEE Food Industries 
Foreign direct investments flow predominantly into manufacturing and services 
(Annex 3). The primary sector has attracted only four percent of the foreign cap-
ital, whereas the secondary sector has absorbed altogether 41 percent and the 
tertiary sector 47 percent. Food processing was the most significant recipient 
among the various branches of the secondary sector, as it soaked up 11 percent 
of the total foreign direct investments. 
Since food production is traditionally a weighty segment in the economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe, foreign capital may be said to have favoured one of 
the most important manufacturing sectors. Besides ensuring a domestic food 
supply and processing the raw materials generated by agriculture, it also contrib-
uted to improving the balance of foreign trade in numerous countries. As a result 
of the restructuring and economic reforms, however, food processing in the 
region was driven into a deep recession, and the shortage of capital became the 
primary impediment to modernisation and productivity growth. 
The food processing sector absorbed 5-15 percent of the total FDI stock in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Figure 3), whereas food processing did 
not reach three percent of the world' s total foreign investment stock (Table 3). 
The explanation is to be found in several factors: 
Sudden opening of the markets. Economic liberalisation in the CEE region 
shifted the attention of Western European food processors from the saturated 
home markets to new investment and market perspectives. 
Privatisation. Ownership changes in the manufacturing industries were usu-
ally implemented earlier than the privatisation of other economic branches 
such as energy, telecommunications or banking. Food processing was one of 
the very first sectors to be put on the privatisation agenda in many CEE coun-
tries. 
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Foreign capital entering the food industry did not favour ali the target coun-
tries evenly, as also happened in the case of total FDI, in the sense that the food 
sectors of certain countries proved to be more popular than those of others. Due 
to the greatly differing sizes of the transition economies, the relative "per capita" 
figures carry more important information than those for the absolute FDI stock, 
as they indicate the real power of attraction among the national food sectors 
(Figure 3). 
The remarkably high attractiveness of Hungarian food processing is evident 
in Figure 2, and further investigations show that the large markets have had a 
low relative capital appeal. This applies particularly to Russia and Romania, but 
even the indicator for Poland was fairly modest in 1997. The figures suggest a 
gradual and reserved penetration of the large markets by foreign capital. A po-
tentially rapid increase in foreign involvement was impeded by the high risk in 
the case of the CIS countries, the slowly growth in purchasing power in Russia 
and Romania, and the protracted process of privatisation in Poland. The relative 
capital appeal of a large country typically grows at a slow pace compared with 
that of a very small country such as Estonia or Latvia, where even smaller invest-
ment projects resulted in high relative foreign capital influence. Nevertheless, 
this may be regarded as a temporary anomaly, as it is predicted that the inequal-
ity will fade with time as the large countries gradually come to attract more 
foreign capital. 
2.4. The National Level — Hungary 
2.4.1. Foreign Direct Investments in Hungary 
Hungary was the most popular target country in the region for foreign direct 
investments until 1996, and was still the leading one in terms of relative foreign 
billion USD 
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Figure 4. Growth of foreign direct investment stock in Hungary between 1988 
and 1999 (MNB 1996, p. 90; BCE 1995-2000; KSH 2000b, p. 10). 
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investments per capita even in January 1999. Hungary alone absorbed one-fourth 
of the region's inward foreign direct investments, and its FDI stock exceeded 
USD 20 billion by the end of 1998 (Table 5).12 
Foreign capital participation had not been entirely unknown even before 
1990, though it was limited to a few joint ventures at that time. Foreign capital 
influx accelerated from 1991 with the start of privatisation, and the FDI stock 
rose dynamically over the whole decade. As indicated in Figure 4, the end of 
privatisation did not break the trend in FDI inflows. 
The majority of foreign investments in the early 1990s concerned the manu-
facturing sector, while the second half of the decade saw spectacular growth in 
the service sector. This can partly he ascribed to the privatisation schedule, since 
this affected energy generation, telecommunications and banking only from the 
mid-1990s onwards. The proportion of registered company capital in foreign 
ownership, which may he considered an indicator of foreign influence, is de- 
Table 6. Foreign investments as proportions of the registered capital of enter-
prises in selected branches of the Hungarian economy between 1995 and 1998 
(in percent). 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 4.9 6.1 5.9 7.5 
Manufacturing, 
of which: 
45.9 52.5 56.6 59.7 
Food processing 53.2 51.4 61.4 61.8 
Textile and leather 41.6 47.8 47.8 51.4 
Wood, paper, and publishing 41 42.5 47.9 47.1 
Chemicals 38.7 51.1 54.8 55.6 
Non-metallic mineral products 67.8 69.2 71.3 68.8 
Metallurgy and basic metals 31.3 35 43.5 56.5 
Machinery and equipment 50 64.9 62.1 66.4 
Other manufacturing 29.5 28.1 33.5 38.7 
Energy 16.4 21.7 25.8 31.9 
Trade 32.9 36.5 40.9 43.3 
Transport, storage, communications 25.6 23.1 23.9 24.1 
Financial activities 33.1 46.6 50.2 57.2 
National economy total 27.9 32.3 34.9 37.9 
Source: KSH (1997, p. 9), (2000b, pp. 12, 34-35). 
12 According to the most recent data, for 1999 and 2000, intensive flows of capital into Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Romania had led to a decrease in the proportion entering Hungary 
(BCE 2000). 
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tailed for selected branches of the Hungarian economy in Table 6. The figures 
show an increase of 10 percentage points in this foreign influence between 1995 
and 1998, implying a proportional increase of 35 percent, and indicate a consist-
ent growth in foreign participation in almost ali branches. Nearly 60 percent of 
the secondary sector was owned by foreigners in 1998, and foreign involvement 
was above average in the manufacture of non-metallic mineral products and 
machinery and in food processing. 
The geographical distribution of foreign investment in the Hungarian eco-
nomy by origin reflects the regional trends in the foreign direct investment stock 
in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole: i.e. European investors account for the 
largest stake, followed by the United States (Table 7). 
Germany, taking advantage of its economic power and geographical proxim-
ity, ranked first among the European countries. Austria, which accounted for one 
fourth of inward foreign direct investment in 1992, saw its share drop to around 
10 percent by 1998. This illustrates the fact that geographical advantages can 
help a country to exploit investment opportunities rapidly, but a relatively small 
resident body of capital will inevitably result in a decrease in the proportion over 
the years. 
The participation of the United States is perceived through investments by its 
giant transnational corporations, while the presence of the European Union is 
reinforced by the activities of small and medium-sized enterprises alongside the 
large multinational companies. 
Table 7. Inward FDI stock in Hungary by investing countries (in percent of FDI 
stock). 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Germany 18.5 28.5 22.2 24.6 23.8 24.8 28.0 
Netherlands 8.9 5.6 11.1 10.5 9.5 14.6 15.5 
USA 12.4 21.0 14.3 16.0 17.1 15.2 12.2 
Austria 25.1 15.8 19.1 15.9 14.5 10.9 11.7 
United Kingdom 4.9 3.9 4.5 3.8 5.8 7.6 6.4 
France 5.1 4.8 5.1 8.1 7.8 5.8 6.1 
Italy 3.2 3.9 4.7 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.2 
Switzerland 4.3 2.0 3.9 2.9 2.3 2.6 2.9 
Belgium 2.9 3.2 2.1 3.1 2.6 2.9 2.7 
Japan 2.6 2.6 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.9 
Other 12.1 8.7 11.1 10.0 11.2 10.7 9.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: KSH (2000b, pp. 20-21). 
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Foreign investments are somewhat oriented towards Budapest, the capital 
city itself and the surrounding county of Pest having been the primary targets for 
investors. This region of Central Hungary had absorbed 62 percent of the coun-
try' s total FDI by 1998. Of the provincial territories, Western Transdanubium 
has been the most popular, while Southern Transdanubium and North-east 
Hungary received the least foreign capital (KSH 2000b, p. 21). 
2.4.2. Foreign Direct Investments in the Food Industry in Hungary 
Hungary attracted the .most foreign capital to its food processing sector, both in 
absolute and in relative per capita terms, of ali the CEE countries up until 1997, 
since when Poland took over the leading position - as it also did in terms of total 
FDI stock. The attractiveness of Hungarian food processing sector, measured in 
relative figures, was nevertheless still the highest in the region in the end of the 
1990s. 
The food processing sector was placed at the top of Hungary' s privatisation 
agenda in the early 1990s, and foreign investments were typically made through 
acquisitions up to the middle of the decade. Privatisation of this sector was virtu-
ally completed by 1997, by which time state ownership had shrunk to as low as 
one percent (Table 8), while the proportion of foreign capital had increased 
rapidly, to exceed 50 percent of the sector' s aggregate registered capital in 1996. 
The investment stock continued to grow with almost unchanged intensity after 
1996 as well, mainly in the forrn of expansions in capacity. 
Domestic ownership was centralised in the hands of certain companies, with 
domestic enterprises owning one fourth of the aggregate registered capital in the 
food processing industry in 1998. Private persons, who had acquired their stakes 
primarily under the compensation laws, had achieved a 8.4 percent stake by the 
Table 8. Ownership structure of the Hungarian food processing sector between 
1992 and 1998 (percentages of aggregate company capital). 
Form of ownership 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
State 49.3 28.3 17.5 12.4 6.2 1.1 0.9 
Foreign 34.8 43.2 48.0 53.0 53.2 60.4 62.6 
Domestic corporate 0.0 13.5 17.9 21.0 25.2 25.2 24.7 
Domestic private persons 12.0 7.3 7.8 7.6 9.7 9.1 8.4 
Cooperatives 18 3.8 3.9 1.8 2.1 1.2 1.0 
Municipalities 0.0 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.8 
Other 0.0 2.3 3.5 3.2 2.6 2.0 1.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: AKII (1998a, p. 57). 
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same year. The proportion owned by cooperatives had diminished to a minor 
level. 
The food processing industries had received 30 percent of the total foreign 
direct investment stock in the manufacturing sector by 1996, whereas they 
accounted for only 20 percent of total manufacturing sales. The Hungarian food 
processing sector absorbed USD 3 billion of foreign capital between 1990 and 
1998, out of which company acquisitions amounted to USD 1.2 billion. The 
remainder was spent on technology and other improvements (Eurofood 1998). 
The proportion of the total registered capital owned by foreign investors in 1998 
was as high as 62.6 percent. 
2.5. Closing Remarks to the Review of International Capital Flows 
The objective of the current chapter was to introduce the world-wide trends in 
foreign direct investments and to determine the position of Central and Eastern 
Europe and of Hungary in particular in this process. The CEE countries, which 
are engaged in liberalising their economies, have been actively involved in the 
pattern of dynamically expanding global foreign direct investment flows. Hun-
gary is one of the top countries in the Central and Eastern European region as far 
as its ability to attract FDI is concerned, and foreign influence can be considered 
significant at the level of the national economy. Foreign investors owned one 
third of the total registered capital of Hungarian enterprises in 1998, but over 
60 percent in the manufacturing sector. 
Although the food processing sector is not a significant FDI recipient in glo-
bal terms, it was a prominent one in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the 
1990s, absorbing over 10 percent of the total FDI inward stock of the region, a 
proportion four times higher Ihan the global average. Foreign ownership has 
been playing a dominant role in the Hungarian food sector for years, a fact that 
gives this country an extraordinary status not only in Central and Eastern Europe 
but also in the whole of Europe. 
The high proportion of foreign capital makes a detailed investigation into the 
characteristics of FDI in the Hungarian food industries relevant and necessary. 
The popularity of the CEE food sector for foreign investors has been fostered by 
the stabilising of consumption and purchasing power, the opening up of markets, 
privatisation and economic liberalisation. Moreover, the growth pressure ex-
erted by European-based multinational enterprises and small and medium-sized 
food processors has propelled investments in the same direction. Most CEE coun-
tries also have abundant agricultural raw materials and relatively low labour costs. 
There are a number of factors that may have motivated foreign direct invest-
ments in Hungary and in Central and Eastern Europe. The question is what have 
been the most important determinants and in what combination, and how 
intensely these factors have exerted their impact. The analyses in Chapters 4-8 
will provide detailed replies to this question. 
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3. Theoretical Framework for the Dissertation, 
Laying the Foundations 
3.1. Position of the Dissertation in the Theory of 
Industrial Organisation 
This research with its topic and objectives can be fully subsumed into the theo-
retical framework of industrial organisation. In order to place the topic into a 
wider context and comprehend the logic of the dissertation' s structure, it is use-
ful to review the theoretical antecedents that had led to the SCP paradigm and the 
evolution of the main streams of JO theory. 
3.1.1. Historical Review of Economic Theories 
3.1.1.1. A Brief Overview 
Written evidence confirms the existence of monopolies and economic players 
with market dominance way back in ancient history. Market power has rarely 
been divided equally among the ventures engaged in a particular market. 
The monarchies of the Middle Ages — as exclusive holders and beneficiaries 
of numerous economic activities — distributed monopolistic rights as gifts to the 
aristocracy and to companies or inventors. In fact, the pro-monopoly or "anti-
competition" approach was a substantial pillar of the mercantilist way of think-
ing (Galbraith 1987). 
The mercantilist policies of the monarchs, striving for restrictive and trans-
parent control, were broken down by the industrial revolution in Great Britain in 
the 1770s. This was the time when Adam Smith laid the foundation of classical 
economics with his work Wealth of Nations, which shifted the emphasis from 
mercantilism to free competition. From that time on, competition became the 
core issue and the focal point for classical economics, with monopoly remaining 
the only black sheep that failed to fit into the "harmonic settings". 
The revolutionary changes in the field of transportation, shipping and com-
munication that took place in the 19th century widened the local markets first to 
the national and then to the international level. Capital markets started to de-
velop and the sphere of public utilities emerged. Competition became more and 
more intense as industries developed and markets expanded. The railway and oil 
monopolies in the United States became consolidated, and at the same time there 
was an increasing public awareness of the market positions and unreasonably 
high profits enjoyed by the large corporations. 
Neo-classical economics began flourishing in response to the economic pro-
cess at the end of the 19th century. A theoretical system encompassing marginal 
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utility, marginal productivity and a consistent terminology was rapidly gaining 
in popularity, and equilibrium models based on a competitive environment be-
came the established means of performing economic analyses. The assumption 
that market procedures are constantly heading towards a social optimum was 
gaining in strength at that time. 
3.1.1.2. Merger Waves and the Resulting Economic Theories 
Economic and political events greatly influenced the evolution of economic the-
ories in the 20th century. Anti-monopoly and anti-trust opinions were loudly 
voiced during the economic recessions, while the attitude was more tolerant at 
times of economic progress, so that the anti-trust policy measures taken in the 
United States and the development of new directions in economic theory fluctu-
ated systematically as a function of these economic periods (Shepherd 1990). 
The major steps in the historical evolution of the respective economic theories 
will be reviewed below. 
The emergence of trusts marked the consolidation of business in numerous 
industries in the late 1800s, which was thought to happen through the adoption 
of predatory tactics by the market leaders, i.e. the acquisition of smaller compet-
itors (Clarkson and Miller 1982, p. 412). Thus mergers and acquisitions became 
a characteristic shaping force in the US economy. Greer (1992) identifies four 
major peaks in M&As in the 1900s: (1) at the very beginning of the century, (2) 
towards the end of the 1920s, (3) in the late 1960s, and (4) an extensive wave 
beginning in the 1980s. 
Three special phenomena coincided at the tum of the 19th and 20th centuries 
in the United States, at the time of the first M&As peak: 
the structure of the markets was moving towards monopoly and market ,dom-
inance, 
some basic concepts were outlined that served as a foundation for 10 theory, 
strict anti-monopoly regulations were enacted. 
The wave of mergers and the period of anti-monopoly measures was inter-
rupted by the First World War, after which the regulations retumed in a rein-
forced manner at the time of the world economic recession of 1929-33, when 
dominant or oligopolistic market structures were declared to have been the main 
reasons for the economic problems. Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) 
laid the foundations for the theory of oligopolistic prices in the 1930s (Niehans 
1990). Anti-monopoly policy gained ground again in the 1930s, but was allayed 
by the Second World War. 
During the war Schumpeter published his concept of protecting the monopo-
lies, arguing that "it was a necessary part of the creative process of competition, 
not a mere distortion from efficient allocation" (Shepherd 1990, p. 524). This 
line was continued by the Chicago school in the 1940s and 1950s, when its fol- 
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lowers published numerous studies demonstrating the advantages of monopo-
lies, which were said to stem from economies of scale and the minimal loss of 
wealth in society. 
Merger activities intensified in the 1960s, and then grew to an unprecedented 
level in the 1980s. Anti-trust policies and related regulations usually revived in 
response to vivid merger tendencies. The various periods in which particular 
economic theories enjoyed precedence had a great influence on the attitudes re-
flected in public policy and the means employed by it. The ambivalent shifts in 
the competition and antitrust policies made Machlup to comment on them sar-
castically: "govemments, apparently, have never been able to make up their 
minds, which they dislike more, competition or monopoly" (Greer 1992, p. 198). 
The most recent merger and corporate acquisition boom started in the 1990s 
and has continued up to the present, introducing a revolutionary leap in the his-
tory of M&As, a shift from the national levels to an international arena. Control 
has passed out of the reach of national legislation, and the recent wave of M&As 
has become part of a new world economic phenomenon, globalisation. 
As for economic theories, the tendencies that engender and accompany glo-
balisation can no longer be explained using the conventional toolkit of classical 
economics. This has tumed the attention of economists towards the theory of 
industrial organisation, which has deservedly been a frequent theoretical foun-
dation for economic analyses. 
3.1.2. History of Industrial Organisation Theory 
The economic theory of industrial organisation was conceived in the 19th century 
to provide a counterbalance to classical economics based on an idealistic com-
petition approach by recognising the phenomenon of imperfect markets. Its real 
emergence as a modern branch of economic science dates back to the 1930s, 
when tendencies which had been discovered earlier, such as concepts related to 
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets, were developed to formulate a coherent 
entity. The idea of market concentration and concrete calculations measuring 
concentration appeared concurrently in theoretical and empirical contexts, and 
the influence of market structure on the activities of economic players became 
commonly accepted. Shepherd (1990, p. 524) described the process that "the 
industry replaced the firm as the locus for economic thought and research", 
which marks a real milestone in the history of economic theories. Industries be-
came concretised as homogeneous markets that encompass certain groups of 
ventures and possess special features. The industry-level approach to research 
was strengthened by the industry case studies method developed by a group of 
scientists at Harvard University headed by Edward Mason in the 1930s. 
The work of Joe Bain (1956) stands out in the history of industrial organisa-
tion theory, as he improved the theory of oligopolistic markets and created the 
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concept of entry barriers for potential competitors. The theoretical constituents 
of market structure had crystallised by the 1960s into market shares, concentra-
tion, entry barriers, and vertical influence. A large number of empirical studies 
set the objectives of investigating the relations between these attributes of mar-
ket structure. 
Tirole (1990) called the above theoretical evolution the "Harvard tradition", 
taking it to include the logical connections between market structure and the 
behaviour and performance of firms in the particular market and the empirical 
evidence for such connections. He also identified a new wave of theoretical 
development that had started in the 1970s, in which concepts were formulated 
into a system of more rigorous and precise theories blurring the borders between 
industrial organisation and microeconomics. 
From the 1980s on, increased attention has been paid to the international 
aspects of markets and industries. Michael Porter, one of the most significant 
contributors to recent 10 theory, introduced a comparative concept of the com-
petitiveness of nations and industries.13 Some other ne-w hypotheses have also 
determined the directions of development prevailing in modern 10 theory; con-
cepts that apply to international economic activities, multinational enterprises, 
the growth of capital markets and intensifying globalisation.14 The FDI theories 
assuming imperfect markets to be elaborated in section 3.2.1.2 are components 
of the same theoretical system. 
3.1.3. Definition and Elements of the SCP Paradigm 
Industrial organisation (I()) surveys industries through the basic structure-con-
duct-performance (SCP) paradigm, which is widely accepted in the literature. 
The model for this relationship was first conceived by Mason in the 1930s, and 
later refined by several 10 scholars (Scherer and Ross 1990, pp. 4-5). The defini-
tions of the components are the following: 
Structure 	= (or market structure) incorporates the structural and 
market characteristics of a given industry, 
Conduct 	= encompasses the operational features or behaviour 
of manufacturers in the observed industry or sub-sec-
tor,15 
13 The most notable books by Michael Porter are Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyz-
ing Industries and Competitors (1980) and The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990). 
14 The influential work of Stephen Hymer, John Dunning and Richard Caves is definitely worth 
mentioning in this field. Their role will be reconsidered in detail in connection with FDI theo-
ries. 
15 The "Conduct" component is occasionally replaced with behaviour in the JO literature. 
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3.1.4. Major Causal Streams in the SCP Paradigm16 
Although economists had a wide agreement on the three basic elements, no clear 
consensus was reached in terms of the causal relations among them. The main-
stream school placed emphasis on the causal direction from structure towards 
performance (Figure 5). Market structure influences the decisions of companies, 
hence also their behaviour in the market. Market structure and company behav-
iour then have a joint impact on the performance of the industry, which is mani-
fested in the revenues, cost effectiveness and innovation activities of the indi- 
Figure 5. Underlying logic of JO theory (Shepherd 1990, p. 6). 
16  This section is largely built on the categorisation of major causal streams presented by William 
Shepherd in The Economics of Industrial Organization, Prentice Hall, 1990, pp. 6-9. 
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vidual firms. Naturally, the opposite causal relation also applies, marked in Fig-
ure 5 with dotted arrows: i.e. a company having good performance and high 
profits will most probably enjoy growing market shares. Mainstream scholars do 
not deny the existence of this opposing causal relation, although in their view 
market structure exercises the predominant and initial impact in the causation 
mechanism. These scholars, referred to as structuralists, build the research 
approach on the following logic: 
Profit ratei = f (Market sharei, Concentrationi, Entry barriers. 
where i denotes the corporate level and j the industry level. 
Figure 6 on the next page presents the major causition concepts that diverge 
from that of the mainstream school. 
The members of the Chicago school represent precisely the opposite direc-
tion. They argue that the performance of each firm determines its role and posi-
tion in the market, and regard ali market power, including that of a monopoly, as 
a result of the superior performance of certain firms. Their interpretation is a 
substantial modification of the mainstream view: 
Market shareii = f (Profit ratei, Behaviourf, External Conditionsi) 
The liberal views of the Chicago school also have serious political implica-
tions. Following the logic of their arguments, the extreme manifestation of mar-
ket power, monopoly, is not at ali harmful, but a deservedly gained and enjoyed 
dominant position on the market owing to superior performance relative to ali 
competitors. 
The behaviourists represent a peculiar variant in terms of causal relations. In 
their view, it is not market structure or performance, which is the ultimate 
driving force of the relations but the behaviour of companies. This applies 
primarily to companies with dominant market power, since the market structure 
will be substantially modified if its leaders collude, or if they engage in an 
aggressive market strategy. 
The followers of potential competition assert that the development of both 
market structure and performance is subordinated to a third factor: market entry. 
They emphasise that potential new entrants represent the major determinant, 
which is delimited only by entry barriers. If these barriers are low, then existing 
market shares and the behaviour of companies will not count for much, and new 
entrants will have the power to modify the prevailing conditions to an essential 
degree within a short period. 
Growth ratei), 
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Figure 6. Causation concepts diverging from the mainstream view of 10 theory 
(Shepherd 1990, p. 9). 
3.1.5. Research Directions Pursued in the Dissertation 
An overview of the above streams and schools of thought was indispensable in 
order to comprehend the theoretical foundations of the causal relations observed 
and tested in this dissertation. In the impact mechanisms of SCP paradigm, for-
eign direct investment will be considered an extemal factor which links up with 
each component of the SCP chain (Figure 7). 
One of the topics highlighted in this research is the power of the market struc-
ture as a factor that motivates the arrival of foreign direct investment. The re-
lated analysis can be found in Thesis II, and the causal relation in question is 
marked by the letter C in Figure 7. The impact of foreign ownership on perform- 
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Figure 7. Causal relations analysed in the dissertation. 
ance has a similar level of importance, and Thesis V includes the relevant analyt-
ical methods and calculations, indicated by the letter D in the figure. 
The literature of JO theory and FDI also contains a great deal of empirical 
evidence for causation operating in a direction opposite to the two major rela-
tions that are to be tested in the dissertation. The plot charts of the cluster ana-
lyses in Thesis III will raise this issue in a persuasive manner. An effort will be 
made in Thesis III to test which of the causal relations C and E is more signifi-
cant. Only passing reference will be made here to the causal relations marked by 
letters F and G (dashed Iines) and no attempts will be made to quantify them, 
since they do not represent significant or independent causal paths in the system 
with respect to FDI. 
Of the three components of the SCP paradigm, "Conduct" will be addressed 
only marginally in this dissertation, for two reasons: first, in the view of the dis-
sertation, its role is only one of transmitting the effects of market structure, and 
second, scarcely any corporate data are available on the classical aspects of 
behaviour such as advertising outlays or proportional R&D costs in the case of 
Hungarian food processors. 
/t is evident from the above that the point of view adopted in the dissertation — 
as reflected in the priorities set for the investigation as a whole — has cognate 
characteristics primarily with the "structuralist" and "potential competition" 
interpretations of the SCP paradigm. This research accepts the mainstream 
(structuralist) view on the causal relations between the SCP components as the 
ultimate base and starting point for analyses, while FDI is considered in the role 
of a new entrant into the market of the capital recipient country (potential 
competition). 
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3.2. Overview of the Literature on Foreign Direct Investment 
3.2.1. FDI Theories 
Foreign direct investment theories include many important branches, and several 
classification methods are employed in the literature. The broadest approach di-
vides the theories into two large groups: those concerned with the determinants 
and impacts of foreign investments.I7 
The following section is devoted to FDI theories relevant to the determinants 
of capital movement. Cantwell (1991) observes that empirical studies investigate 
the motivations for capital trade on three levels: 
macro-economic level: broad international and national tendencies, 
meso-economic level: interaction among companies from the view-
point of industries or sub-sectors, 
micro-economic level: foreign direct investment and growth of 
particular companies. 
 
I. Hypotheses Assuming Perfect Markets 
  
II. Hypotheses Based on Market Imperfections 
 
 
Differential Rate of Return Hypothesis 
Portfolio Hypothesis 
Output and Market Size Hypothesis 
 
Industrial Organisation 
Internalisation Hypothesis 
Eclectic Paradigm 
Production Cycle Hypothesis 
Hypothesis of Oligopolistic Reactions 
 
 
M. Hypotheses on the Propensity to Invest IV. FDI determinants 
  
       
 
Liquidity Hypothesis 
Currency Arca Hypothesis 
Other Determinant Variables 
  
Gravity Model 
Prices of Production Factors 
Political Instability and Risk 
Govemmental Incentives 
 
Figure 8. Classification of FDI theories. Note: the figure includes an adapta-
tion and development of the categories presented by Agarwal (1980), Lizondo 
(1993), and Borsos-Torstila (1999). 
17 The literature concerning the influence of FDI is, in fact, not a set of theories, but it encom-
passes a large body of empirical studies that quantify the impacts. 
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Studies in the first group rely on trade theories, research at the middle level is 
supported by industrial organisation (10), game theory, or innovation theory, 
while micro-level analyses are usually based on the theory of the firm. Detennin-
ing the level of analysis is an important aspect in the case of foreign direct 
investment research, since the methodology itself also shapes the way in which 
the problem is delineated. 
The most recent hypotheses make attempts to synthesise past theories, the 
emphasis being shifted from the national approach to the behaviour of industries 
or individual companies. Finn-specific advantages are considered necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for foreign direct investment (Caves 1996). 
The necessity of possessing intellectual assets can he postulated from the 
micro-economic attributes of FDI. Empirical studies have confirmed that 
companies with high technology or intensive research and development 
activities express a strong propensity to launch foreign production capacities. On 
the economic level above this, industries, which are characterised by intensive 
research and development, high marketing expenses, a large proportion of 
scientific and technical labour, product development and differentiation, would 
have a high probability of containing multinational enterprises. 
The classification in Figure 8 has frequently been adopted for reviewing FDI 
theories since the time when it was first proposed by Agarwal (1980). Group I 
embraces hypotheses which assume perfect or near-perfect competition on the 
markets for goods and production factors, while those in Group II take market 
imperfections for granted. An additional common characteristic is the assump-
tion that the investing company has to possess comparative advantages over its 
competitors in one or more aspects. FDI concepts conceived on the basis of in-
dustrial organisation theory are classified into Group II. Hypotheses in Group III 
address the investment propensity of a given country, industry or company, 
while Group IV is a collective category of hypotheses geared to FDI determi-
nants or motivational factors important to one host country or industry. 
3.2.1.1. Theories Assuming Perfect Markets 
The differential rate of return hypothesis originates in the profit maximisation 
strategy of companies. Firms assess where the highest return can he achieved 
with an additional unit of invested capital. If return expectations are higher than 
in the domestic economic environment, this will give incentives for foreign 
direct investment. 
The hypothesis flourished in the 1950s, when US investments in the 
European markets grew rapidly. At that time the return rates of European 
manufacturing industries were regularly above those in the United States. The 
hypothesis could not explain the events of the 1960s, however, when European 
rates of return fell below the US figures but investments from the United States 
continued to flow in with the same intensity. 
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The differential rate of return hypothesis received little empirical support, 
primarily due to the problems of measuring profit rates. It is extremely hard to 
gain access to data on future profit rates. The assumption of a homogeneous rate 
of return for one particular country is another shortcoming of the hypothesis. 
The concept of capital moving from a country with a low rate of return towards 
another country with a high rate of return cannot explain two-way capital trade, 
nor can it explain the unequal distribution of capital among various sectors and 
industries. This led Lizondo (1993, p. 87) to maintain that the concept of differ-
ential rate of return is not capable of giving an appropriate means of identifying 
FDI determinants. 
Since the rate of return by itself did not appear to provide a sufficient expla-
nation, attention was turned towards risk. The porolio hypothesis claims that 
the motivational power of the risk factor has an impact on the investments of a 
company beside return rate anticipations, leading it to divide its investments 
among several countries in order to alleviate the risks. In other words, the com-
pany sets up an international portfolio. Investments are influenced positively by 
return expectations and negatively by risks. Tobin and Markowitz formalised 
this theory in the late 1950s. As in the case of the differential rate of return hy-
pothesis, the portfolio hypothesis did not acquire sufficient empirical evidence 
either. Measuring risk is just as difficult as measuring future rates of return. 
As opposed to the rate of return concept, the portfolio hypothesis is neverthe-
less capable of explaining two-way capital flows between countries, but it still 
cannot cope with sectoral or industrial investment preferences. 
The output and market size hypothesis approaches the process of investment 
from both ends at the same time. The size of the investing company, based on its 
sales revenues, is consklered in terms of output, while the market size is the 
potential purchase power of a host country or industry. Although the theoretical 
foundations were not worked out fully, the size of the host country appears in the 
gravity model and several empirical studies to be a driving force for FDI flows. 
3.2.1.2. Hypotheses Based on Market Imperfections 
The hypotheses detailed so far have ignored potential distortions of markets. 
Due to the rapid changes in market structure in the 20th century, economic the-
ories tended to take the imperfections of production factors and commodity mar-
kets into consideration. 
As far as foreign investments are concerned, two kinds of market imperfec-
tions are of crucial importance: (1) imperfect market structures and (2) imperfect 
transaction costs (Lizondo 1993, p. 90). Imperfections in market structure 
strengthen the power of multinational enterprises. The advantages of economies 
of scales, know-how, distribution network and product differentiation form a 
background to their influence. Transaction costs motivate multinational enter- 
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1 
prises to incorporate external transaction costs into the internal activities of the 
company. The evolution of FDI theories based on market imperfections is illus-
trated in Figure 9. 
In his serninal dissertation, Hymer (1976) became the first to recognise the 
crucial role that market structure and corporate characteristics play in the inter-
national flows of foreign direct investment. The hypothesis based on industrial 
organisation was further developed by Kindleberger. These arguments originate 
from the fact that foreign investors are struck by numerous disadvantages in the 
forrn of rivalry on local markets: institutional, legal, cultural and linguistic dif-
ferences, distance, discrepant technical standards, consumer preferences or in-
sufficient information on local markets. Investors face great challenges in over-
coming these disadvantages. If a foreign company still decides to become in-
volved in investments, it should have strong advantages with which it can easily 
offset the disadvantageous factors, and in fact enjoy the position of competitive 
Market Imperfections 
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Figure 9. Evolution of IO-related FDI theories. 
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advantages. These advantages are typically characteristic of a particular com-
pany, and they are easily transferable within the company, even over long dis-
tances. The advantages may be embodied in the human resources of the firm, 
patents, procedures, specific technology and techniques or the company's repu-
tation, in addition to which superior knowledge and the practice of conventional 
management, marketing or logistic techniques may also carry advantages. 
Graham and Krugman (1989), using the industrial organisation approach to 
explain international capital flows involving the United States, asserted that U.S. 
companies surpassed their European competitors in terms of management and 
technology in the 1970s. Consequently, relatively little foreign capital flowed 
into the United States, while outflows were fairly pronounced. The tendency 
became balanced after two decades, when U.S. firms lost their superiority over 
the European companies and a more equal, two-way capital trade emerged. 
Firm-specific advantages provide an explanation for the competitiveness of a 
particular company on domestic and foreign markets, but they are unable to 
account for the choices of companies between exports, licensing agreements and 
foreign direct investment. Internalisation hypothesis made an attempt to uncover 
the reasons for choosing one of these three alternatives in preference to the 
others. 
The internalisation hypothesis explains the existence of foreign direct invest-
ment by the fact that firms "internalise" market transactions, i. e. they move ex-
ternal transactions to the borders of the company. According to the interpretation 
of Buckley and Casson, these corporate endeavours are motivated by the market 
imperfections of intermediaries and inputs. The internalisation hypothesis for 
FDI is closely related to the theory of the firm, which originates from the basic 
question "why do firms exist?". Certain transactions work much more efficiently 
within the framework of a company than when externally organised by the 
market. A modern business venture necessitates the successful operation of 
transactions of numerous other kinds besides production and/or services: e.g. 
marketing, research and development, training of human resources. These ali 
need certain inputs. 
In the case of foreign investments, firms virtually internalise the costly inter-
national transactions, a fact that also explains the emergence of multinational 
enterprises.18 Opponents of the internalisation hypothesis consider the theory 
too general and unable to support concrete research. Its empirical application has 
indeed been hindered by the problem of measuring transaction costs. 
18 It is worth noting that the internalisation hypothesis is an extension of the theory of the firm to 
an international level. In the 1930s, the emergence of the firm was postulated from its superior 
internal transactions compared with market transactions. Similarly, the appearance of multina-
tional enterprises is explained by internalising the expensive transactions of international mar-
kets. 
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Dunning integrated the statements contained in three hypotheses in order to 
overcome the shortcomings identified with each. He synthesised the elements of 
Hymer' s industrial organisation approach, the internalisation hypothesis and the 
locational concept into a new construct that has spread rapidly under the name of 
the eclectic paradigm. This is one of the most frequently cited and most popular 
theories in the recent FDI literature. Dunning (1985) identifies three advantages 
which are necessary conditions for the successful accomplishment of foreign 
direct investment: 
The investing company should possess specific ownership advan-
tages over competitors. 
Investment should be a more beneficial alternative for the company 
than exports or a licensing agreement (internalisation advantage). 
Exploitation of the above advantages by means of a combination of 
locally available production factors should result in more efficient 
production than with a corresponding combination of resident 
inputs, otherwise the foreign market could he supplied through 
exports (locational advantages). 
The eclectic paradigm is considered a sufficiently general concept to serve as 
a foundation for most research into foreign direct investment. Dunning adds that 
OLI advantages may alter as a function of time and location. 
The production cycle hypothesis is related to the work of Vernon (1966), who 
developed the concept to describe the international expansion of U.S. companies 
in the post-war period. The theory assumes that the life cycle of ali products 
starts with an innovation phase. Once the sales opportunities for a new product 
have been fully exploited on the domestic markets, multinational companies 
start redirecting production into foreign markets through foreign investments in 
order to counterbalance the potential domestic market loss. Agarwal (1980) 
mentions a whole list of empirical studies that verify the production cycle 
hypothesis by means of concrete Canadian, U.S., German and British examples. 
Although Vernon argued in his subsequent works for a generalisation of the 
concept and its extendibility to the inward foreign direct investment of ali devel-
oped countries, he admitted at the same time that the production cycle hypothesis 
narrows down FDI determinants to one single moment of decision and is there-
fore a rather simplified approach to capital flows (Vernon 1979). 
The oligopolistic reactions hypothesis, founded by Frederick Knickerbocker 
in his PhD dissertation, interprets the foreign investments of multinational enter-
prises as their reactive responses to the investments of competitors. Analysing 
the post-war investment activities of US-based multinational enterprises operat-
ing in oligopolistic industries, he found that investments in the same industries 
follow each other at short time intervals (Knickerbocker 1973, p. 192). In order 
to quantify this, he constructed "entry concentration indices" (ECIs) for 23 target 
countries. These are indicators of the concentration of foreign investments 
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within the same industry in terms of time and space. He then found a statistically 
significant correlation between home industry concentration values and ECIs 
and interpreted this as suggesting that a tendency for reactive responses is a char-
acteristic feature of oligopolistic industries. 
Knickerbocker' s hypothesis was also tested by Flowers with Canadian and 
European FDI flowing into the United States. His dissertation revealed a close 
correlation between foreign direct investment in a particular industry and the 
respective industry concentrations in the resident countries (Agarwal 1980, 
p. 753). Critics consider the major shortcoming of the oligopolistic reactions hy-
pothesis to lie in its inability to provide an explanation for the initial investment 
project of the first company, or market leader, which engenders the responses 
from its competitors. 
It is the FDI theories conceived on the basis of industrial organisation that 
have received the widest support and popularity. Lizondo (1993, p. 107) insists 
that a substantial attribute of foreign direct investment is an endeavour to man-
age the foreign subsidiary directly, which cannot be explained using the toolkit 
of FDI theories that assume perfect markets. Besides industrial organisation, the 
theory of firm provides solid ground for analysing foreign direct investment.19 
Since foreign direct iiivestment constitutes the subject of the current research, 
market imperfection-based theories that use the terminology of industrial organ-
isation will be of crucial significance hereafter. 
3.2.1.3. Hypotheses Related to the Propensity to Invest and 
FDI Determinants 
Due to the above weightings in this dissertation, only the major characteristics 
will be stressed for selected hypotheses in the remaining groups. The liquidity 
hypothesis explains investment propensity in terms of internally produced and 
available resources. The concept is based on the assumption that internal re-
sources are always cheaper for a company than external resources and are there-
fore used to finance investments. 
The currency area hypothesis assumes that the main reasons for foreign in-
vestments are to be found in the altering strength of foreign currencies. Although 
the concept may be useful for one-way capital flows, it cannot capture the 
reasons for two-way capital trade. 
FDI determinants are driving forces that motivate capital flows among 
national economies. Empirical studies are continuously being carried out to test 
assumed determinants, the explanatory power of which always depends on the 
19  It should be borne in mind, though, that foreign investments are made up of foreign direct 
investments and portfolio investments. Trends in portfolio investments may occasionally be 
more efficiently captured by other FDI theories. 
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time of investment, special characteristics of the host country, regional and 
world-scale economic circumstances and other factors. 
Of the Iines of research available for investigating FDI determinants, the 
gravity model is a coherent concept for analysing bilateral trade flows that was 
first mentioned in the work of Linnemann (1966). The concept rests on the basic 
observation that the weight of a country in intemational trade flows is deter-
mined by its size, economic power, population and distances from other coun-
tries. The tendency was proved for conventional trade in goods very early on; 
and the idea was then tested and proved to be applicable to empirical research 
into the geographical distribution of foreign direct investment (Brenton et al. 
1998). 
3.2.2. Literature Concerning FDI in the CEE Region 
The food sectors of the Central and Eastern European countries experienced dra-
matic changes in the 1990s, when the restructuring and privatisation of the state-
owned companies and liberalisation of the mies for founding enterprises — re-
shaped production and ownership structures in ali of these countries. Political 
end economic reforms of the 1990s generated an intensive one-way capital flow 
towards the post-socialist countries. Foreign capital has been an influential and 
powerful actor contributing to these fundamental structural changes. 
The conditions and characteristics typical of this capital transfer, which has 
been a unique economic manifestation of the historic constellation in the region, 
have been studied by a large number of researchers. Consequently, foreign 
direct investments in Central and Eastem Europe have inspired the birth of an 
extensive literature over the past decade. 
3.2.2.1. Classification of FDI Studies 
Various concepts have emerged to provide a classification of the multitude of 
FDI studies. Pye (1995) suggests a division into descriptive studies and surveys, 
while Szanyi (1998, pp. 28-29) sorts the literature into three large groups: 
(1) case studies, (2) questionnaire surveys, and (3) studies using national data-
bases. 
The above two classification approaches verify the importance of applied 
methodology in the categorisation of FDI-related research. In order to systemise 
the present overview, three groups of studies are distinguished, the classification 
being based on the methodology employed: 
1. Analytical-descriptive studies. This group is the most populous. 
National or intemational databases are used to document the 
dynamics of FDI flows and stock and to describe the geographical 
origin and sectoral destination of foreign direct investments. The 
65 
methodology applied is usually verbal explanation of economic 
tendencies. 
Survey research. Investors are sent questionnaires or interviewed in 
person to collect first-hand information on their motives and experi-
ences in Central and Eastern Europe. The researchers then process 
the information and publish average or overall figures in support of 
their initial hypotheses or principal conclusions. 
Empirical studies. Empirical analyses utilise databases at the mac-
ro-economic or rnicro-economic levels and apply statistical or 
econometric techniques or construct models to reach their results 
and conclusions. 
Although the methodology employed provides an important perspective for 
categorising studies of foreign direct investments in Central and Eastern Europe, 
further classificatory aspects such as geographical coverage, industry orienta-
tion and research topic may also help determine the nature and position of indi-
vidual studies within the body of FDI literature: 
Geographical coverage concems the choice of the host economy to 
he investigated, which may comprise (1) the entire CEE region, 
(2) a group of countries, or (3) one individual country. 
In terms of sectoral destinations, a study may specialise in a certain 
recipient sector such as manufacturing or services or even in partic-
ular industries, such as various manufacturing or service industries, 
for instance banking. Industry-specific analyses, as represented by 
the present dissertation, form a rare group within the literature of 
FDI into the CEE region, however. 
It is common for a study to investigate two aspects of FDI. In terms 
of the research topic, the primary objective may be to explore: 
the determinants, or 
the influence of foreign direct investments. 
FDI determinants can further he divided into fostering or impeding factors, in 
other words FDI motivations and FDI obstacles. 
Although the following overview will classify research primarily according 
to the methodology employed, their affiliation to certain categories defined by 
other grouping techniques may also he mentioned where the discussion requires. 
3.2.2.2. Analytical-Descriptive Studies 
Descriptive studies usually document annual foreign direct investment flows, or 
the value of the cumulative FDI stock. Their most frequent geographical cover-
age is the entire CEE region, their authors often being intemational organisations 
such as the World Bank, OECD, UNCTAD or IMF. The second largest group in 
terms of geographical coverage is national studies, often written by Western 
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European financial and investment institutions or the development agencies or 
govemmental bodies of Central and Eastern European countries. Research insti-
tutes in both the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe regularly pub-
lish analyses of foreign direct investment inflows. 
Countless studies have been written by independent researchers in Western 
and Eastern Europe, typically focusing on a narrower group of countries or one 
particular country.2° Analytical-descriptive studies usually rely on secondary 
information sources or databases in order to outline capital flows and geograph-
ical or sectoral distributions of FDI stock. They also provide information on the 
motivations or impediments affecting foreign direct investment. 
Unlike the capital trade among developed countries, the flow of capital into 
the Central and Eastern European region is characterised by its one-way nature. 
This necessarily results in a significant one-way pattem of technology diffusion. 
The impact of foreign capital in promoting economic progress has long been 
widely known in the developing countries, and the CEE region has had to com-
pete with these countries for the freely available direct capital in the world. 
Heinrich (1996) discusses the motives behind the foreign capital flowing into 
Central and Eastern Europe using Dunning's eclectic paradigm, and suggests 
that the attractiveness of the CEE countries is a sum of locational advantages in 
the eclectic paradigm, of which the most important are labour force and political 
incentives. 
The classification distinguishing the market, resource, efficiency and strate-
gic asset seeking aspects of foreign direct investment is frequently cited in the 
intemational FDI literature (Szentes 1999, p. 465) and has been employed by 
many authors, e.g. Nachum (1997), who used it to review FDI motivations in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Resource-seeking foreign direct investment concen-
trates on the former Soviet Union republics in terms of natural resources. Labour 
force is an important resource that is abundantly available in the entire region at 
a much cheaper price than in the developed countries. The market-seeking aspect 
is of extraordinary importance in Central and Eastern Europe, a fact that is veri-
fied in almost ali surveys and empirical studies. Nachum affirms that efficiency-
seeking foreign direct investment has so far been hampered by the relatively 
underdeveloped infrastructure in the region. 
In Nachum' s view, Knickerbocker' s oligopolistic reaction theses apply to the 
foreign direct investment flowing into the CEE region, and the explanatory 
power of this hypothesis is stronger than ever in the light of recent world market 
changes. Porter (1986) sees the globalisation of the world economy as fuelled by 
the emergence of global industries or sub-sectors. The transnational enterprises 
in most product groups already consider their positions to be defined by the glo-
bal markets, ali the segments of which are equally important. The opportunities 
20 For an exhaustive review of independent FDI studies written in early 1990s, see Pye (1995). 
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opening up for them are therefore extremely meaningful, to the extent that first 
mover advantage and responsive or reactive strategies have become more and 
more important, in the CEE region as elsewhere. 
Gabrisch (1993) classifies the negative determinants associated with estab-
lishing joint ventures, considering the rudimentary legal environment, high 
transaction costs and inflation to he the major impediments. The macroeconomic 
environment and economic risk also exert a significant impact on the geographi-
cal distribution of foreign capital. 
The type of privatisation is widely regarded as one of the major determinants 
in the FDI literature, since approximately half of the foreign capital has arrived 
in the region through privatisation. While privatisation has become the engine 
for foreign investments in Hungary, compensation-based or insider privatisation 
has restricted the arrival of foreign capital in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Russia (Hunya 1999). 
In the case of large recipients of foreign direct investment, country-specific 
analytical-descriptive FDI studies are typically geared to the search of motiva-
tional factors, as in the works of Csåki et al. (1996) and Durka (2000). Other 
authors have analysed the cases of countries that have attracted a low amount of 
FDI, tending to focus on FDI impediments, e.g. Dråbek (1993), Assonitis (1995) 
and Mukhetdinova (1995). Hunya (1998) asserts that the presence of foreign 
capital accelerates restructuring on both the micro and macro level in the host 
countries of the CEE region. FDI brings definite advantages by transferring fi-
nancial resources; technology, know-how, management methods and positive 
spillover effects. The high level of participation in intemational capital flows 
will assist the integration of large FDI recipients into the European Union. 
3.2.2.3. Survey Studies 
Survey studies constitute a significant group within the FDI literature concemed 
with the Central and Eastem European countries. Since surveys collect first-
hand information, they are particularly efficient tools for mapping FDI determi-
nants, so that their typical objectives are to identify the motives behind FDI and 
the obstacles to it. 
Some of the studies are prepared in the resident countries and are focused 
directly on the attitudes of investors, being characterised by direct contacts with 
corporate headquarters, while others investigate FDI determinants from the 
viewpoint of investors in one particular resident (home) country. Still other 
studies clearly focus on the other end of the investment chain, i.e. the host envi-
ronment of one particular country, surveying investors through the medium of 
their local subsidiaries. 
Most studies based on surveys set out from the objective of scanning both 
FDI motives and obstacles. Some concentrate exclusively on investigating mo- 
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tives or impediments. Investment attitudes has been surveyed by international 
organisations or consultant agencies, an early review of the literature being 
found in Lankes and Venables (1996, pp. 332-333). 
The survey of Zemplinerovå diverges from the conventional set up of studies 
that search for the motives of investors, as she inquires into the standpoints of 
development or investment agencies, civil servants in governmental institutions, 
local researchers and experts in eight CEE countries, with the aim of comparing 
the FDI incentives and impediments induced by governmental policies in the 
countries concerned. The resulting classification based on nine incentives veri-
fies the existence of a diverse FDI policy. General tendencies proved to be the 
shifts of FDI policy (1) from active to passive, (2) from automatic incentives to 
occasional incentives, and (3) from national FDI policy to a preference for 
regional FDI policy (Zemplinerovå 1997, p. 101). 
The work of Lankes and Venables (1996) stands out from the mass of publi-
cations due to its innovative classification, which has made it one of the most 
frequently cited surveys in the FDI literature. The authors distinguish two ulti-
mate FDI determinants, market and cost factors, and divide investing companies 
into three groups: (1) distributors, (2) local suppliers, and (3) export suppliers. 
They conclude that the investments of distributors and local suppliers are driven 
by market factors, while the decisions of export suppliers are mainly motivated 
by the low level of production costs. 
Borsos-Torstila (1999) further refined the classification of FDI determinants 
by differentiating three groups: (1) market factors, (2) production factors, and 
(3) institutional factors. Ali three included both motivating and impeding fac-
tors. Her research comprised the investments of Finnish multinational enterpris-
es in eight Central and Eastern European countries. Investors ranked market fac-
tors as the most significant determinants, followed by institutional factors, with 
production factors in third place. 
Beside motives, the other large group of FDI determinants comprises barriers 
to foreign direct investment, factors that have a negative influence on the geo-
graphical distribution of investments with respect to the host country. Some of 
the impediments are connected with the general socio-economic situation, while 
others are a consequence of active governmental policy (Zemplinerovå 1997, 
pp. 95-98). 
Amongst the analyses especially investigating impediments to foreign direct 
investment, the study published jointly by the OECD and the World Bank dis-
cusses a peculiar but relevant issue (Klavens et al. 1994). The survey concludes 
that environmental considerations in the host economies, such as environmental 
protection, regulations, popular movements and the state of the environment, do 
count for foreign investors. Thus 38 percent of the companies surveyed belonged 
to the pollution-intensive industries, and 41 percent of these regarded environ-
mental considerations as impeding investments. At the same time, 24 percent of 
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the respondents in the non-pollution industries pursued the same Iines of think-
ing. 
The work of Hazley and Hirvensalo (1998) is unique in its efforts to special-
ise exclusively in FDI obstacles. Geographically, it covers the Baltic Rim, in-
cluding Poland, the Baltic countries and the St. Petersburg area of Russia. The 
surveyed investors were similarly located mainly in Northern Europe. Two main 
groups of obstacles were found to hamper FDI in ali five countries: unclear or 
rapidly changing legislation and the shortage of qualified labour with manage-
ment, marketing, financial and language skills. Two-thirds of the managers sur-
veyed considered illegal economic activities and crime important impediments 
in ali the countries concemed. 
3.2.2.4. Empirical Studies 
Empirical studies followed the traditions of the logical analysis of two-way cap-
ital flows among the developed countries. In the early phases of the transition 
period, research was concentrated on identifying FDI determinants. Calculations 
were encumbered by the lack of adequate time series, which forced authors to 
resort to panel databases. Lansbury et al. (1996) identified the following FDI 
determinants in Central and Eastem Europe: power of the private economy, tax-
ation incentives and legal background, macroeconomic stability, trade relations, 
structural characteristics and strategic motives. They tested these assumed deter-
minants by means of a panel database, which included 126 observations.21  
Regression analysis confirmed the positive impact of historical bilateral trade 
relations, innovation, infrastructure and privatisation on the inflows of foreign 
direct investment. 
The problems of restricted databases are illustrated by the work of Wang and 
Swain (1995), who searched for the determinants of foreign direct investment 
flows into China and Hungary using time series data for the period between 1978 
and 1992. The authors incorporated 12 variables into their model. Their results 
were nevertheless sharply criticised by Måtyås and Körösi (1996) on the 
grounds of methodological shortcomings. The availability and access to data 
became a less serious problem in the later years of the transition period. 
Controversial results appeared in the FDI literature concerning the question 
of whether capital flows replace, complement or even reinforce traditional trade 
relations. Brenton et al. (1998), who tested the relation between bilateral FDI 
flows and bilateral trade on the basis of the gravity model, obtained empirical 
results that confirmed that capital flows do not significantly reduce the investing 
21  Investments from 14 OECD countries in Hungary, Czechoslovalcia and Poland between 1991 
and 1993 were examined, and combined data for the Czech Republic and Slovakia were used 
until their separation in 1993. 
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country' s export sales to the target country. Hence the relation between FDI and 
trade is rather of a complementary nature. 
Brock (1998) analysed the regional distribution of FDI inflows into Russia 
with a peculiar and innovatively structured regression model. Their assumed de-
terminants of foreign direct investment flowing into the 78 oblasts of Russia in-
cluded regional production output, which recalls the logic of the gravity model. 
The other set of variables incorporated other characteristics of oblasts: the pro-
portion of skilled labour, the proportion of the private economy, taxation and 
risk factors, level of development in transportation and communication, access 
to land for foreigners and the weight attached to crime. The results showed that 
two out of the three significant determinants, namely regional production output 
and crime were relevant variables explaining the regional distribution of FDI, 
while the third variable, the proportion of skilled labour was significant only 
under certain conditions. 
The work of Holland and Pain (1998) is one of the best-founded empirical 
analyses of foreign direct investment inflows into Central and Eastern Europe, 
estimating both determinants and impacts. In order to test the FDI determinants, 
the authors used a panel database that included data on 11 CEE countries cover-
ing five years. The scope of the assumed FDI determinants embraced the size of 
the private economy, trade relations, the price of labour and geographical fac-
tors. A special element compared with earlier empirical studies is the effort 
made to quantify the type of privatisation in an explanatory variable, which 
proved to be significant in ali versions of the model. This confirms the fact that 
beside the conventional FDI determinants mentioned in the literature, the type of 
privatisation (commercial-based, compensation-based or mixed) has a signifi-
cant impact on foreign direct investment inflows. 
3.2.3. Hungarian Aspects of the FDI Literature 
3.2.3.1. Hungarian Literature Concerning FDI Theories 
The theoretical discussions of international capital flows in the Hungarian litera-
ture also include without exception references to current foreign direct invest-
ment tendencies. Szentes (1999) reviews the theories of capital flows stretching 
back to the early phases in the history of economics including the preceding 
Marxist and neo-classical concepts. Out of the motives of capital export, he em-
phasises the endeavour to gain a higher return on capital investment in the case 
of portfolio investments and the growth of the aggregate profit or equity of the 
parent company, the desire to conquer the market and the geographical spreading 
of risks in the case of direct investments (pp. 450-451). 
Pitti (1997) discusses an interesting theoretical issue, namely the legitimacy 
of the frequently quoted term "second capital accumulation". He points out that 
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privatisation did not result in capital accumulation, since it only reallocated the 
existing capital. Decentralised privatisation may be seen as an effort to oppose 
the general tendency for capital concentration in the world economy. Capital 
accumulation may he detected only in the case of foreign investments, and the 
slowly developing concentration of capital in Hungary. 
Two analyses of international and CEE-specific regional tendencies in cap-
ital flows were published in the mid-1990s (Ärva 1994a and Hamar 1995). Both 
authors felt it important to mention the inability of classical and neo-classical 
economics to explain FDI flows. Hamar argued that classical and neo-classical 
economics usually regard ali production factors, including capital, as being mo-
bile in the national economy but immobile in the intemational economy (p. 49). 
Ärva considers the foreign direct investment flows into the CEE region primarily 
as investments generating foreign trade, in other words he assumes that the 
majority of foreign investors pursue the exploitation of cheap labour (p. 241). 
Szanyi (1997) also comments on recent Central and Eastern European events 
alongside his detailed overview of foreign direct investment theories. He points 
out that foreign direct investment flows, which coincide with trade liberalisa-
tion, cannot have substitutive characteristics, but rather are complementary in 
nature. Szanyi considers it important that principal attention has been devoted to 
industries supplying domestic markets both in Hungary and in the entire region. 
This fact signifies the market-seeking nature of such investments. 
3.2.3.2. Literature of FDI in Hungary 
Early writings recorded the comparative advantages of the country, the size and 
sectoral distribution of capital inflows, and the FDI-attracting impact of privati-
sation (e.g. Losoncz 1991, Ärva 1994b). 
Hungary became the most popular investment target in the region in the first 
few years of the transition period.22 Csåld et al. (1996) highlighted the rapid 
reforms, the pressing needs of state budget deficit and commercial privatisation 
among the comparative advantages of the country. The state budget deficit made 
the involvement of foreign direct investment inevitable in order to alleviate the 
balance of payments and the deficit.23 Another element of capital attractiveness 
22 An excellent review of the literature on FDI in Hungary is given by Szanyi (1998), who classi-
fies the existing work according to the following main aspects: motives for foreign invest-
ments, performance of foreign-owned companies, transfer prices and profit repatriation, 
restructuring and monopolies. 
23 Zemplinerovå (1997, p. 94) emphasises the fact that the Czech Republic did not have such an 
acute need for foreign investments in the early years due to its rnacroeconomic stability. The 
difference was reflected in differences in the set of FDI incentives between the two countries. 
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was the "investment engenders investment" principle, which Török (1995, p. 54) 
called the "synergy of positive externalities". 
Vissi (1995) attributed great importance to the evolving market structure 
among the factors motivating foreign direct investments, maintaining that the 
Hungarian subsidiaries of foreign .firms were definitely assisted by the govern-
ment' s privatisation and competition policy. Kaderjåk (1996) tested the hypoth-
esis of environmental pollution based capital inflows and found empirical 
evidence for its existence in Hungary. 
In connection with their recent classification of motivational factors, An-
talöczy and Sass (1998) pointed out that the future system of incentives should 
target investors in export and R&D-intensive industries. They explained that for-
eign direct investments in Hungary had reached a new phase, in which the pro-
portion of privatisation-driven investments had decreased while the intensity of 
capital inflows had not changed significantly. The intemal structure of invest-
ments had also been modified, in that the proportion of in kind contributions was 
now minimal, at the same time the proportion of intemal debt was increasing. 
Pitti (1997) pointed to a modest profit withdrawal in the middle of the decade, 
whereas the magnitude of repatriation had reached USD 1 billion, annually by the 
end of the decade. 
The impact of multinational enterprises that had settled in Hungary was ana-
lysed by Hamar (1995), who accented the "blue-chip characteristics of invest-
ments", referring to the fact that large multinational companies bring along addi-
tional investments concluded by their supplier and service groups. Hamar (1998, 
pp. 51-52) investigated four industries and.— with the exception of export and 
salary growth — found no positive impacts of foreign companies on economic 
performance. In fact, she was concemed about the growing indolence of multina-
tional enterprises without an appropriate economic policy. åtetö (1998), on the 
other hand, reported a definite positive impact of foreign direct investments. 
Analysing the performance of ali foreign-owned companies in 23 manufactufing 
industries, she noted that the initial difference in performance indicators in 1994 
and 1995 showed a significant superiority on the part of foreign-owned compa-
nies by 1996. Although their impacts on research and development could not be 
fully verified, their contribution to rising exports was unquestionable. 
The balance of inw.ard FDI in Hungary can be declared positive in the light of 
the literature reviewed here. Beneficial impacts are identified primarily on the 
macroeconomic level, in that investments have so far assisted the international 
integration of the Hungarian economy. 
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3.2.4. Literature on FDI in the Food Industry in the CEE Region and 
in Hungary24 
Researchers extended the frequently used classification of FDI aspects (page 67) 
to the food industry. Traill (1996, p. 397) distinguished the following motiva-
tional aspects for food processors: 
resource-seeking (access to natural resources, agricultural raw 
materials, e.g. special products favoured by climatic conditions) 
market-seeking (new markets for the company's products) 
efficiency-seeking (exploiting economies of scale) 
strategic asset-seeking (access to intellectual property that has ac-
cumulated in the host country, or access to specially skilled labour, 
R&D results, and transfer of these advantages to the entire opera- 
tion of parent company). 
The resource-seeking aspect can rarely be encountered in the CEE region, 
and is not typical of the food processing sectors in Central Europe. Strategic 
asset seeking is a motivational factor that usually characterises investments 
among countries with similar levels of development. Thus, out of Traill' s 
categories, it is the market-seeking and efficiency-seeking aspects that may 
ultimately have motivated the flows of foreign direct investment into the food 
industry. 
The statistical data in Chapter 2 reflected the importance of food industry in 
the FDI inward stock of CEE countries. The food industries of the individual 
countries attracted very different amounts of foreign direct investments 
(Figure 3, page 44), a fact which Traill (1999, p. 260) attributes to the type and 
pace of food industry privatisation. This statement complies with general and 
empirical results of other studies (Holland and Pain 1998). The influence of pri-
vatisation in attracting foreign direct investment will be addressed in Chapter 8. 
The food industry' s proportion of total FDI stock exceeds the proportion of 
food processing output in the total GDP in almost ali the CEE countries. The 
most popular food processing industries on the regional level in 1997 were 
sugar, confectionery, tobacco and soft drinks (Eiteljörge and Hartmann 1999, 
p. 204). Empirical analyses of FDI in the food industry are rather scarce, and 
country-specific studies usually tackle the size of the foreign direct investment 
stock, its geographical origin and its sectoral distribution. 
Hungary has been one of the principal beneficiaries of inward food industry 
FDI in the region. The main determinant of this rapid, abundant foreign partici- 
24 Since the theoretical introductions to the subsequent chapters include detailed summaries of 
FDI literature and respective studies of food industry FDI inflows, only a few selected studies 
are mentioned in this brief review. 
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pation was definitely the commercially based privatisation approach. In the early 
phases of transition, nearly half of the privatisation revenues originated from the 
food industry (Kiss 1995, p. 24). By the mid-1990s, however, it was difficult to 
identify any positive impact of privatisation on corporate performance, and 
experts in food economics were urging the refinement of privatisation policy and 
the limiting of foreign investors' opportunities to acquire ownership in food 
processing (Alvincz 1994). 
Lakner (1994) evaluated the early phase of privatisation and foreign direct 
investment inflows in the context of concurrent tendencies in other countries, 
pointing out that the level of concentration in the Hungarian food processing 
industries was at the international avernge and that an increase could be antici-
pated in the future. He provided empirical evidence in support of the statement 
that the foreign investors had been motivated by market power and profit oppor-
tunities. The major conclusion that he spells out is that the stable domestic 
market prospects were the primary attractive factor for FDI in the Hungarian 
food industry. 
Boeckenhoff and Moeller (1993) classified the motives of FDI inflows into 
the Hungarian food industry, and revealed the fact that foreign capital was 
primarily geared to acquiring concentrated industries. This was subsequently 
restated by Vissi (1995). 
Since a large number of the investors in the food industry were multinational 
enterprises, it was no wonder that the behaviour of such companies and their 
impact on corporate and industrial performance received special emphasis in the 
second half of the decade. Hamar (1995) attributed the dynamic development of 
the food industry to these multinational companies, but noted that their presence 
had contributed towards the freezing of some of the dominant market positions. 
Lehota and Szlics (1998) examined the vertical relations and R&D activities 
of a sample of 69 multinational food processors and showed that foreign compa-
nies had played an active role in the promotion of raw material production, while 
had carried out minimal or no research and development work. 
In the most recent investigation into the impact of multinational companies, 
Szabö (2000) affirms that foreign-owned food processors are superior to their 
domestically-owned competitors in terms of nearly ali performance indicators, 
and thus they contribute significantly to the improving results achieved by the 
industry. 
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FIRM 
STRATEGY, 
STRUCTURE 
AND RIVALRY 
4. Motives for FDI in the Hungarian Food 
Processing Industry 
Thesis I: 
The primary determinants, which have motivated foreign capital inflows 
into the Hungarian food processing sector, are favourable natural endow-
ments, food processing traditions and FDI-enhancing government policy. 
The statistical data in Chapter 2 illustrated the Hungarian food industry's 
power of attraction for FDI in relation to the corresponding sectors in other 
Central and Eastern European countries. The factors screened in this chapter are 
those that have motivated and attracted foreign food processors to invest in 
Hungary. 
4.1. Theoretical Framework for Determining Motives 
One tool available for identifying the motives of foreign investors is the Porter 
diamond. In his seminal work The Competitive- Advantage of Nations, Porter 
(1990) pointed to the need for a new paradigm and condensed the core of his 
FACTOR' 	 DEMAND 
CONDITIONS CONDITIONS 
• 
RELATED AND 
SUPPORT1NG 
INDUSTRIES 
Figure:10.' The'Pörter diamond25 in its initialform (Porter 1990,- p. 127). 
25 The diamond has been often employed as a. theoretical and classificatory basis for country-
specific studies or-as a starting point for theoretical or empirical analyses (Fanfani and Lagne-
vik 1995; Lagnevik and Kola 1998). 
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theory into one single diamond-shaped chart (Figure 10). The analytical frame-
work was designed to ascertain the competitive advantage factors associated 
with national economies, and its scope of application initially covered research 
into corporate competitive advantages in a given industry or country, although 
Porter himself raised the question of its applicability to the new economic envi-
ronment created by the international investments of transnational companies. 
The formal extension in this direction and the inclusion of the FDI segment, 
however, was only accomplished later by Dunning (1997). 
The diamond was refined and supplemented in the course of time in terms of 
details applying to certain segments. The public policy component was elabo-
rated by investigations into individual policy segments by Scandinavian re-
searchers (Kola 1997; Hyvönen and Kola 1998). 
An appropriate classification of FDI-attracting features in the Hungarian food 
processing industry necessitates a further extension of the diamond by means of 
Figure 11. The Porter diamond extended in the policy direction. 
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a CEE policy segment. The final version of the diamond as employed here is 
shown in Figure 11. The extended diamond is suitable for reviewing the major 
components of the new economic environment facing foreign investing compa-
nies. An emphasis on the consideration of detailed public policies is relevant for 
two reasons: 
First, public policy directions usually play an important role in 
attracting foreign investments. 
Secondly, public policy has typically undergone substantial reforms 
in ali transitional economies over the past few years. Political 
mechanisms, legislation as a whole, and many basic laws have been 
fundamentally altered and new public policy directions have been 
formulated and adapted. Certain policy elements — by their special 
nature — characterise only transitional countries. 
4.2. FDI-Attracting Factors in the Hungarian Food Processing 
Industry 
The Hungarian food industry may be screened for FDI-attracting features by 
taking the major components of the extended Porter diamond one by one. 
4.2.1. Related and Supporting Industries 
The segments of the agrifood chain, which were interrelated and linked to each 
other throughout the central planning era, ali suffered from a severe lack of 
working capital after 1989, so that the old linkages disintegrated and ownership 
structures changed dramatically. Agriculture undoubtedly suffered the most in 
the early years of the transition, primarily due to protracted political debates and 
inconsistent policies regarding ownership and land restitution. 
Foreign investors have not shown equal interest in all components of the agri-
food chain (Figure 12), presumably because profitability is usually considered to 
be higher in processing, wholesaling and retailing than in basic agricultural pro-
duction. 
Political regulations, such as the prohibition of foreign land ownership, also 
explain the low interest in agricultural production. In the prevailing economic 
environment, foreign companies had an opportunity to establish vertical rela-
tions and gain a controlling position in the agrifood chain starting from the food 
processing and trading segments. Experience proves that they did indeed take 
this opportunity in many cases (Gow and Swinnen 1999). 
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Figure 12. Foreign ownership in the Hungarian agrifood chain.27 
4.2.2. Factor Conditions 
Three production factors, agricultural raw materials, the labour force and the 
existing production capacity contributed greatly to attracting foreign capital into 
the Hungarian food sector. 
Agricultural raw materials are plentifully available in Hungary, as agricul-
tural production is based on favourable climatic conditions and the country' s 
most notable natural resource, the abundance of fertile arable land. 
In terms of human resources, the relatively inexpensive sldlled labour avail-
able in the processing industries makes an attractive factor. 
Also, the scope of existing food processing capacities was very important 
among the advantageous production factors. The technical state of fixed assets 
throughout the food processing industries and among individual companies was 
rather heterogeneous, but the processing capacity, which was geared largely to-
wards western exports, represented reasonable value for investors in technical 
terms. Some food processing companies constituted a favourable starting point 
for foreign parent companies entering a new market. 
4.2.3. Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
Hungarian companies had been gaining increasing independence from the mid-
1980s onward, when the food processing companies had entered first into a 
"gentle" state of competition that had later intensified rapidly. A new market 
situation then emerged in the 1990s, in that corporate restructuring, privatisa-
tion, a growing number of bankruptcies, and also a large number of newly estab-
lished small and medium-sized enterprises constantly kept the markets and the 
range of competitors chancy and volatile. The rivalry question was therefore 
26 The categories refer to the following ranges of equity: low - 0-20%; medium - 21-50%; high - 
over 51%. 
27 The rate of foreign ownership varies by segments of agri-food chain within the given range 
and may exceed the boundary values in the case of individual companies. 
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hard to predict for investors. On the other hand, the investing companies them-
selves modified and considerably affected the state of competition. Their most 
serious competitors often appeared to be the same rivals as on their home 
markets or in the international arena. 
The type of market structure largely influences corporate strategy, and is thus 
a major determinant in the SCP paradigm (Figure 5, page 54). Four major types 
of market are distinguished in the international economic literature: pure mono-
poly, market dominance, oligopoly and competition. The Hungarian food mar-
kets have now assumed a new structure and clear rivalry positions have emerged. 
The Hungarian food industries can be classified into the latter three of these four 
categories (Figure 19, page 115). The corporate strategy of a particular foreign 
firm is subject to the specific market position it has achieved. 
4.2.4. Demand Conditions 
The proximity of consumer markets is of crucial importance to foreigners in-
vesting in the Central and Eastern European countries. Although investors in 
most of the manufacturing industries look on the region as one large, homo-
genenous market, the motives of food industry investors differ slightly from that 
approach: their first priority is the market of the target country, while export 
sales are of secondary importance. The Hungarian market — albeit smaller than 
that of Poland — still represents considerable sales prospects within the atomising 
national markets of the region. In terms of purchase power in the 1990s, its rela-
tive attractiveness surpassed that of large food markets such as Russia, the 
Ukraine and Romania. 
4.2.5. Key Public Policy Elements 
Governments can give additional impetus to FDI by means of numerous public 
policy measures, which are examined in two major groups below: policy direc-
tions characteristic of the post-socialist economies, and general investment in-
centives. This classification of public policy elements is illustrated in Figure 11. 
4.2.5.1. Specific Transitional Policy Directions 
The post-socialist — or transitional — economies had to introduce substantial 
changes in order to build up free market economies. Of the political, economic 
and legislative reforms, three policy directions can be directly related to corpo-
rate reforms: restructuring, compensation and privatisation policy. Corporate re-
structuring determined the investment environment and opportunities in the CEE 
countries. The attitude towards restructuring, compensation and privatisation 
policy varied considerably among the individual CEE countries and resulted in 
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distinct discrepancies in their attractiveness to FDI. Privatisation policy was un-
doubtedly the most important policy element in attracting FDI to the transitional 
economies. The more liberally and commercially privatisation was carried 
through, the more foreign capital flowed into that particular country (Holland 
and Pain 1998). 
Hungary was a forerunner in corporate restructuring (Csåld and Nash 1998), 
as the reform of its legal framework had already started in the late 1980s. At the 
same time, trusts and monopolies were decentralised. Hungary was among the 
first countries to enact a law on bankruptcy, which was one of the toughest in the 
region. A separate investment act covered foreign investments, ensuring the 
same rights for foreigners to establish companies and pursue business activities 
that domestic firms enjoyed (Alvincz and Tanka 1997). 
Hungary favoured the commercial type of privatisation — the direct sale of 
companies — as opposed to compensation-based privatisation. Food processing 
companies were among the very first ones offered for sale. More than 50 percent 
of the food industry had been privatised by 1994, and privatisation was practic-
ally complete by 1997 (Table 8, page 48). Hungary was the most consistent of ali 
the CEE countries in applying this policy in its food industry. 
4.2.5.2. General Policy Incentives 
One important step in making Hungarian competition policy compatible with in-
ternational standards was the establishment of the Economic Competition Office 
(ECO) in 1990. The Competition Act (1990), however, allowed supervision only 
over those companies that were registered in Hungary. This legal nuance re-
moved the "redundant obstacles" of competition control from the acquisition 
thrusts of foreign investors. By the time privatisation of the food industries was 
complete, foreign firms were allowed to buy Hungarian food companies freely 
and gain monopolistic or dominant market positions in the course of this privati-
sation.28 The Competition Act in its 1990 form was an important contributor to 
the FDI incentives. On the other hand, once the foreign companies were regis-
tered in Hungary, they immediately became subject to strict competition control, 
and the ECO did in fact intervene in a number of cartel cases even in the early 
1990s. The Competition Act served two purposes at a time, it indirectly fostered 
FDI and facilitated supervision. 
Trade policy stimulated FDI in the food industry by means of duties and tar-
iffs. Although trade in general was liberalised in the early phase of the reforms, 
agriculture and the food industries remained highly protected sectors. The high 
28 The Competition Act was modified in 1996, when the jurisdiction of the ECO was extended to 
ali private and legal entities that carried out business activities on the Hungarian market. 
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import duties on food products were even increased further by means of an extra 
import duty in 1995, a situation which lasted for an 18-month period. At the 
same time, imports of technology, including equipment and processing Iines, 
was enhanced through a general liberalisation of imports. This fact also contrib-
uted to the FDI influx and to the modemisation of the Hungarian food industry. 
Since the country was badly hit by unemployment in the 1990s, employment 
policy benefits and subsidies were granted to firms that either created or retained 
job opportunities. Nearly ali the foreign companies took advantage of these 
employment incentives. 
Taxation policy was designed to encourage the influx of foreign capital 
investments. Companies established with at least 30 percent foreign ownership 
enjoyed significant tax concessions —40 to 100 percent of taxes — for a period of 
up to five years. Consequently, hundreds of foreign-owned companies were 
registered in the food industry. This benefit was removed for companies 
established after January 1, 1995. Simultaneously, the corporation tax rate was 
reduced from 36 percent to 18 percent, which is a very favourable rate even by 
international standards. The early tax benefits offered to foreigners contributed 
to the fact that over 90 percent of the present foreign-owned food processing 
companies were registered before 1995. 
Some tax benefits are currently used for the purposes of regional develop-
ment policy. Total tax exemptions for up to five years are offered to new invest-
ments that target less developed regions or regions that have over 15 percent 
unemployment. These tax benefits also aim to even out the geographical distri-
bution of foreign investments. Budapest and north-west Hungary have received 
two-thirds of ali FIA, and this regional inequality also applies to food process-
ing, although foreign-owned food manufacturers are scattered throughout the 
country. 
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5. Industry-Specific Motives for Foreign Direct Investments 
Thesis 
The industrial preferences and choices of foreign investors within food 
processing have followed the tendencies observed in Central and Eastern 
Europe in general: the uneven penetration level of FDI in the various indus-
tries has been driven by the attainable market power and profit expecta-
tions. 
5.1. Industrial Distribution of FDI in CEE Food Processing 
The food economy of Central and Eastern Europe has increasingly been inte-
grated into the globalising food industries by virtue of FDI inflows over the past 
decade. Although the popularity of food processing in the region is obvious, in-
dividual food processing industries are not at ali homogeneous in their power of 
attraction. This fact applies to the food sectors of ali Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. The different FDI penetration levels are usually captured by the 
proportion of foreign ownership in the aggregate registered company capital. 
Pursuant to international experience, foreign investors tend to prefer the follow-
ing industries: 
traditionally popular food processing industries on international 
markets (confectionery, tobacco, soft drinks, beer), 
industries affected by strict production control in Europe (primarily 
sugar and to a less extent dairy processing), 
"luxury" high value added, highly processed expensive food arti-
cles (coffee, tobacco, confectionery, soft drinks, spirits and certain 
dairy products), 
industries with good domestic market prospects (usually vegetable 
oil, tobacco and sugar), 
industries with good export opportunities (export-oriented food 
processing industries vary from one country to another in the CEE 
region). 
Low foreign interest and involvement in individual food processing indus-
tries can similarly be explained in the following terms: 
moderate market opportunities (on both domestic and export mar-
kets), 
raw material supplies that are subject to stringent political interven-
tion or are problematic and function badly, 
slow restructuring and privatisation, 
low value added, inexpensive basic foodstuffs, 
administrative obstacles in certain food industries, 
marginal significance within the food sector of the host country. 
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Although the basic factors attracting or discouraging FDI and the directions 
of public policy are usually similar in a particular host country in general and its 
entire food sector, there are certain industry-specific discrepancies even in the 
case of determinants. The question thus arises as to what ultimately drives the 
decisions of foreign investors to choose certain food processing industries as 
opposed to others. 
5.2. Distribution of FDI in the Hungarian Food Industry 
The priorities of foreign investors related to certain food processing industries 
have been prominently expressed in the uneven penetration of FDI (Figure 13), 
which apparently followed the general trends that prevail in the CEE countries, 
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Figure 13. Proportions of foreign ownership of registered company capital in 
the Hungarian food processing industries (AKH 1997; 1998a). 
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as set out above. There are two phenomena that especially characterise the 
Hungarian food processing industry: 
The speed of foreign acquisitions. Owing to the rapid start to pri-
vatisation, the distilling, starch, confectionery and vegetable oil in-
dustries were acquired by foreign capital as early as 1992 (Figure 
13). Consequently, foreign investors owned one-third of the aggre-
gate registered company capital in the food industry by the end of 
that year. 
The relatively high foreign ownership in internationally "less popu-
lar" fields such as meat, fruit and vegetable processing and the ani-
mal feed industry. 
5.3. Regression Model for the Industrial FDI Determinants 
The uneven penetration of foreign investments repeats the earlier question for 
Hungary: upon what grounds did the foreign firms prefer some industries to 
others in the food processing sector? 
In order to resolve this problem, it is necessary first to identify a possible set 
of FDI determinants. The international literature suggests that market structure, 
market size, sales opportunities and profit rates can he presumed to he respons-
ible for uneven FDI penetration levels. These assumptions can he tested by 
constructing a regression model based on the following relation: 
FDI = f (profit rate, market structure, market size) 
The patterns of two-way capital flows in the developed countries suggest that 
foreign investments are primarily attracted by future profit rates and the markets 
attainable in the individual industries. In order to make sure that this rule also 
applies to the food industries of the CEE countries, in which they were operating 
under unique conditions in many respects in the 1990s, a formal verification is 
required. 
5.3.1. Market Concentration Indicators 
Since concentration plays a major role throughout this dissertation, it is worth 
going into the details of how the related indicators are calculated.29 There are 
29 Theoretical models generally incorporate imported products into the calculations of concentra-
tion indicators (CRk or HHI) as one player on the market. Empirical studies of food processing 
(e.g. Naumann, Böbel and Haid 1985; Stalhammar 1991; Field and Pagoulatos 1996) regu-
larly ignore this requirement, however, partly due to the poor availability of data and partly 
because domestic production is predominant anyway. The current analysis is also restricted to 
domestically operating food processors. 
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three alternatives for calculating the degree of concentration of an industry. CRk , 
the concentration ratio, is the combined market share of the first k firms in the 
industry. Its formai specification is the following: 
where 
is the sales revenues of the ith company (sales figures of 
individual companies: X1, X2, ... X, are ranked in descend-
ing order), 
k 	is the coverage of the concentration ratio, and 
n 	is the total number of companies in the industry. 
CRk ratios are the indicators most frequently employed in the literature to 
measure the concentration of an industry, the maun figures used being CR3 , CR4 , 
CR6 and CRI0 (Shepherd 1990, pp. 109-111). Of the above concentration ratios, 
CR4 was finally incorporated into this model, in view of the following two facts: 
four-firm concentration ratios are used most often in research into 
the food industry,3° 
4, CR4 proved to possess a robust explanatory power in the estimates 
given by the model. 
Another indicator that measures the concentration of an industry is the Her-
findahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of ali the companies in a particular industry: 
HHI=MS ±,2 
where MS is the market share of the ith company. The value of HHI is be-
tween 1/n and 1,31 with higher values signifying a higher degree of concentration 
in the industry in question.32 Since this indicator is very sensitive in reacting to 
30 This fact can be observed in the literature concerning both foreign and Hungarian food 
processing. See, among others, Oustapassadis and Vlachvei 1994; Banterle et al. 1995; Hy-
vönen and Kola 1998; Girg2diene et al. 1998; Orbånnå-Nagy and Szabö 1996. 
31  Practical applications are based on the market shares expressed as percentages, which result in 
a theoretical maximum value: HH/(max) = 10,000. 
32 HHI is commonly considered and applied by national competition offices. The Statistical Of-
fice of the United States has published official HHI figures since 1982 (Field and Pagoulatos 
1996). According to widely approved standards, competition is ensured if its value is under 
800 points. If it rises above 1,000 points, there is a danger of over-concentration, and a value 
over 1,800 points is usually regarded as a clear sign of over-concentration (Kopånyi 1993). 
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changes in the number of firms, it is suitable for predicting the potential changes 
in market structure after planned mergers or acquisitions. Because the market 
shares of ali the companies are included in the calculations of HHI, it presents a 
finer picture of concentration in an industry than do CRk concentration ratios. Its 
disadvantage is the requirement for a total database, which in concrete cases is 
rarely available for an industry. 
The third indicator used for demonstrating market concentration is the entro-
py coefficient (EC), which also takes the market shares of ali enterprises into 
account (Bevan et al. 1999, p. 12). The formula is based on the natural logarithm 
of the reciprocal of the market shares: 
EC = MS 1°4 	1  
MS, 
The higher the values of EC, the less concentrated the industry is shown to be. 
As can be seen from the formula, the entropy coefficient is a function of the 
number of enterprises in the given industry. In order to obtain a common basis 
for the comparison of various industries, EC is "standardised" i.e. divided by the 
potential maximum value postulated from the number of enterprises. This rela-
tive value will lie between 0 and 1, where unity represents a monopoly. 
Of the three concentration indicators, the data available here was sufficient 
only to support the computation of CRk ratios when required to cover the entire 
decade and ali the food processing industries. Another advantage of the CR4 ra-
tio is its wide international availability. The latter fact was crucial for the sub-
sequent geographical comparative analysis, since its utilisation ensures consist-
ency when contrasting national market concentration characteristics throughout 
the CEE region. 
5.3.2. Results Obtained with the Model 
The relation introduced earlier in the beginning of section 5.3 may now be esti-
mated with a linear regression function: 
(FD/i )= a0 ,+ al . (Pi )+ a2 (CONCi )+ a3 .(EXPi )+ a4 .(MS E )+ ei 
where a0...a4 are the coefficients of the equation, and e is the error term. The 
database includes figures applying to 17 food processing industries. The depend-
ent variable (FDI) is foreign-owned registered capital as a proportion of total 
industrial registered capital. The number of explanatory variables was limited by 
the content of the data set, and more importantly, by the small number of food 
processing industries. The following explanatory variables were eventually 
incorporated into the model: 
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Pi 	the profit rate of the ith food processing industry, 
CONCi the concentration ratio CR4 of the ith food processing in-
dustry, 
EXP 	exports as a proportion of the total sales of the ith food 
processing industry, 
MSi 	contribution of the ith food processing industry to the out- 
put of the Hungarian food processing sector as a whole. 
The industrial concentration ratio CONC was designed to quantify market 
power, or market structure. The size of the market is captured by the variables 
EXP, exports as a proportion of the total sales of the given industry, and MS, the 
contribution of the given industry to the total output of the Hungarian food 
processing sector. The model is constructed by a step-wise method that involves 
the gradual removal of non-significant variables.33  
The other basic assumption in the calculations was the time-consuming na-
ture of making foreign direct investments. This is supported by the following 
reasoning: the period between the decision and completion of the investment is 
extended on account of the geographical distance between the resident and host 
countries and the problems entailed in the physical implementation of the invest-
ments (construction, development, installation of technology and equipment). In 
the case of the CEE region, however, the most serious delays were brought about 
by the characteristic features of corporate restructuring, privatisation and the ac-
companying phenomena (bureaucracy, bidding processes). The time lag for real-
ising the investments is estimated to he from three to five years in the case of the 
food industries in Central and Eastem Europe. As demonstrated in Figure 13 and 
assumed in Thesis IV, privatisation of the food industry was launched earlier and 
proceeded faster in Hungary than in many other countries in the region. The for-
eign investors made their decisions between 1990 and 1995, and as Figure 13 
shows, penetration of FDI into the industry can reliably be perceived from as 
early as 1992 onwards, although the FDI figures for the time after 1994 are more 
appropriate for this purpose. The latest available data are from 1998. The formal 
specification of time lags in the regression is the following: 
)= ao + al • (Pi,j_k )+ a2 (CONCi ,t _k )+ a3 • (EXPij_k )+ a4 • (MS,,,_k )+ 
where t is the year of observation and k is the length of the time lag. The model 
was run with the 1994, 1996 and 1998 figures for foreign capital penetration 
(FDI) and three and five-year time lags. Applying k for under three years 
appeared to he illogical in economic terms, since it would leave too a short time 
for investment decisions to mature. 
33 The software used for estimating the regression functions consisted of E-Views 3.0 and SPSS 
7.5. 
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Table 9. Estimates obtained with the regression model using the 1994 and 1996 
figures for the proportions of foreign ownership in the industries (FDIi ). 
t=1994 t=1996 
k=3 k=5 k=3 
M(4) M(2) M(4) M(2) M(4) M(2) 
c constant 0.2916 0.2200 0.2473 0.3184 -0.1142 0.1018 
standard err. 0.2065 0.1306 0.1957 0.1218 0.2300 0.1162 
t-value 1.4124 1.6847 1.2635 2.6143 -0.4963 0.8766 
prob. 0.1.832 0.1142 0.2304 0.0204 0.6287 0.3955 
2.6650 2.0827 3.2784 0.4605 -0.1798 -0.0020 
standard en. 1.2639 1.0633 1.1978 0.1963 0.7692 0.7312 
t-value 2.1086 1.9588 2.7369 2.3455 -0.2338 -0.0028 
prob. 0.0567 0.0704 0.0180 0.0343 0.8191 0.9978 
CONC 0.3687 0.5789 0.3464 2.2948 0.9335 0.7761 
standard en. 0.2387 0.2105 0.2262 0.9917 0.2383 0.1740 
t-value 1.5447 2.7499 1.5312 2.3139 3.9177 4.4612 
prob. 0.1484 0.0156 0.1517 0.0364 0.0020 0.0005 
EXP 0.7360 0.9290 0.1465 
standard en. 0.6136 0.5816 0.4021 
t-value 1.1995 1.5973 0.3644 
prob. 0.2535 0.1362 0.7219 
MS -1.3327 -0.3508 1.6970 
standard en. 1.1174 1.0590 1.6578 
t-value -1.1927 -0.3313 1.0236 
prob. 0.2560 0.7461 0.3262 
R2 0.5639 0.4414 0.5397 0.4289 0.6261 0.5876 
R2 (corrected) 0.4185 0.3616 0.3862 0.3473 0.5014 0.5287 
Standard error 
of the regression 0.2346 0.2458 0.2223 0.2292 0.2004 0.1948 
F-value 3.8788 5.5306 3.5171 5.2573 5.0230 9.9750 
Prob. 0.0302 0.0170 0.0403 0.0198 0.0130 0.0020 
Note: coefficients and test results that are significant (on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level) are high-
lighted with bold letters. 
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The results of regression equations estimating the 1994 and 1996 penetration 
levels of foreign capital are shown in Table 9. Retrospective data of three years 
on the explanatory variables were available for 1994, and the 1996 foreign cap-
ital penetration could be estimated with both k=3 and k=5. 
The results indicate a distinct trend. The variables P (profit rate) and CONC 
(concentration ratio) are already significant or almost significant in the four-
variable versions, and after removing the much less significant share of export 
sales EXP and the relative size of the industry within food processing MS, both P 
and CONC become significant explanatory variables for the proportion of for-
eign ownership in the narrowed two-variable models. 
The results in Table 9 are in full compliance with ecohomic anticipations and 
earlier statements of FDI theories. The corporate strategy of foreign investors is 
logical, in that they evidently take profit rates and attainable market power into 
consideration when they make investment decisions and form preferences 
among the industries. 
The insignificance of the other two variables leads to interesting conclusions. 
The elimination of the variable MS proves that the market-seeking attitude of 
foreign investors involves primarily a search for market dominance, while the 
magnitude of industries or the absolute sizes of markets appear to be of secon-
dary importance. 
The elimination of the variable EXP verifies a fairly common view in the FDI 
literature: that foreign investments in the food industry are primarily geared to 
acquiring domestic markets rather than export opportunities. 
The estimates obtained with the most recent data yield even more interesting 
results, as they feature temporal variations in the set of significant variables for 
FDI determinants (Table 10). These changes in the explanatory power of the 
variables over time reflect the consequences of the economic reforms and the 
recession in the Hungarian food processing industry that took place in the transi-
tion period. 
The inclusion of the k=7 time lag serves mainly demonstrative and compara-
tive purpose, although it may also offer a meaningful interpretation: the model 
captures how the assumed FDI determinants in 1991 affected the penetration of 
FDI in the food industries in 1998. The explanatory power of both the profit rate 
and the concentration ratio is high, so that their t-values are significant at the one 
percent level in the reduced M(2) version of the model. 
The estimates obtained using the time lags k=5 and k=3 result in dramatic 
changes. The explanatory power of the profit rate declines almost to zero in the 
case of the k=5 estimate, leaving MS exceptionally, in the two-variable reduced 
version, although it was not significant even then. On the other hand, the 
explanatory power of CONC grew to a more significant level than ever before. 
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Table 10. Estimates obtained with the regression model using the 1998 figures 
for the proportion of foreign ownership in the industries (FDI). 
t=1998 
k=7 
M(4) 	M(2) M(4) 
k=5 
M(2) M(4) 
k=3 
M(2) 
c constant 0.1844 0.3385 -0.0503 -0.0717 0.2529 0.2834 
standard err. 0.1838 0.1103 0.2426 0.2200 0.2512 0.1204 
t-value 1.0031 3.0687 -0.2071 -0.3261 1.0065 2.3542 
prob. 0.3356 0.0083 0.8394 0.7492 0.3340 0.0337 
3.4281 2.5171 0.1593 -2.3259 -2.3610 
standard err. 1.1252 0.8984 0.8112 1.2032 1.0836 
t-value 3.0468 2.8019 0.1964 -1.9331 -2.1788 
prob. 0.0101 0.0141 0.8476 0.0772 0.0469 
CONC 0.4808 0.4759 0.9070 0.9044 0.5663 0.5382 
standard err. 0.2125 0.1779 0.2513 0.2324 0.2448 0.1764 
t-value 2.2626 2.6757 3.6092 3.8909 2.3136 3.0510 
prob. 0.0430 0.0181 0.0036 0.0016 0.0392 0.0086 
EXP 0.7160 -0.1554 -0.0288 
standard err. 0.5463 0.4241 0.4571 
t-value 1.3106 -0.3665 -0.0631 
prob. 0.2145 0.7204 0.9507 
MS 0.5478 2.1012 2.1238 0.3104 
standard err. 0.9947 1.7484 1.5923 1.7101 
t-value 0.5507 1.2018 1.3338 0.1815 
prob. 0.5919 0.2526 0.2036 0.8590 
R2 0.5748 0.5094 0.5646 0.5586 0.5551 0.5537 
R2 (corrected) 0.4331 0.4394 0.4195 0.4955 0.4068 0.4899 
Standard error 
of the regression 0.2088 0.2077 0.2113 0.1970 0.2136 0.1981 
F-value 4.0557 7.2694 3.8903 8.8573 3.7426 8.6829 
Prob. 0.0263 0.0068 0.0299 0.0033 0.0336 0.0035 
Note: coefficients and test results that are significant (on the 1, 5 or 10 percent level) are high-
lighted with bold letters. 
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The results obtained with k=3 are even more astonishing, since P became 
significant again, but with a negative sign. A similar phenomenon can be ob-
served for the t=1996 model when employing a three-year time lag (Table 9). 
The fact that the coefficient became negative is definitely attributable to the tur-
bulent economic environment in the early 1990s. Even at the beginning of the 
transition, between 1989 and 1991, the relations of the food processing firms to 
the state budget were already loosening, but production continued in a "windless 
economic environment" characterised by the old traditional banking and busi-
ness relations and close ties within the agrifood chain itself. The restructuring 
and privatisation of the food processing companies, the rapidly changing exter-
nal economic environment and the uncertainty about the future upset the conven-
tional profit performance figures, so that even the most successful companies of 
previous times did not necessarily achieve high profits at the beginning of the 
decade. More than half of the food processing industries produced negative 
profit rates in 1993. In view of these circumstances, the non-significance of 
profit rate is not that surprising. 
Researchers investigating FDI motivation have reservations with regard to 
the use of economic or financial indicators in the case of "non-equilibrium" or 
transitional economies that are suffering from recession. It is evident that foreign 
investors make their decisions primarily on the basis of internationally prevail-
ing standard profit rates in the individual food processing industries. Such profit 
rates were not available for the current research, but domestic profitability in 
1991, exceptionally, proved to serve as a relevant "proxy" variable. 
The negative result obtained for the profit rate points to an interesting para-
dox and prompts us to draw a partly speculative conclusion. Foreign investors 
may have preferred industries with low or negative profit rates, since they were 
able to make their best deals in precisely those cases where poorly performing 
companies were offered for sale cheaply through the privatisation process. 
The fact that the variable CONC retained its significance throughout the dec-
ade while the explanatory power of the profit rate fluctuated widely proves the 
permanent appeal of attainable market positions for foreign investors. Some 
theoretical experts question the actual ability of profit rate to measure corporate 
performance even in the environment of a private economy, and often see per-
formance as being embodied in other indicators such as market positions (Martin 
and Parker 1997, p. 53). Following the same train of thought: the prioritising of 
market positions may have been a means for achieving the ultimate goal. In other 
words, foreign companies investing in the leaders on the Hungarian food market 
anticipated long-run returns on their investments even though profit rates 
appeared to continue to be negative.34 
34 It is interesting to note that no fast or spectacular improvement in profit rates could be detected 
— even recently — in the FDI-intensive industries. This raises the issue of profit repatriation and 
transfer prices, which will be addressed in detail in section 9.1.2. 
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5.4. Summary 
The purpose of the empirical analysis was to identify the industry-specific deter-
minants of foreign direct investments in the Hungarian food processing sector. 
Foreign influence was represented by the proportion of foreign ownership in the 
registered company capital of the industries. The explanatory variables incorpo-
rated into the model were industry profit rate, proportion of exports among total 
sales in the industry, and contribution to the total food processing output. The 
regression equations were estimated with a time lag in order to capture the time 
span over which foreign investments are implemented, due to the characteristics 
of the CEE food industry and for technological reasons. 
The results presented in Tables 9 and 10 indicate the suitability of the model. 
The value of R2 exceeded 50 percent in most of the specifications, a value that is 
considered very good for cross-sectional analyses. The F-tests of R2 in the case 
of the t=1998 M(2) narrowed models are significant at the 1 percent level, and 
this level of significance is also approached in the t=1996 and t=1994 estimates. 
The results unequivocally verify the explanatory power of the models. 
The model leads to the conclusion that the uneven distribution of FDI in the 
food processing industry was determined primarily by market concentration and 
profit rates. Of the two variables, the explanatory power of the profit rate proved 
to vary with time, since the changing economic structure and environment, the 
recession and the effects of privatisation detracted from corporate profitability in 
the early 1990s. The explanatory power of market concentration remained 
stable, and even became robust in the late 1990s, which suggests that foreign 
investors expected the market positions to ensure a long-term return on their 
investments. 
The variables of MS (contributions of the industries to the food output) and 
EXP (export sales) did not become significant in any of the model specifications. 
These findings suggest two conclusions: (1) Market power is more atiractive to 
foreigners than the magnitude of the industries. (2) Foreign investments in 
Hungarian food processing were primarily motivated by the domestic market as 
opposed to export opportunities. 
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6. Relation of Market Structure to Foreign Capital in 
the Hungarian Food Processing Industries 
Thesis III: 
The Hungarian food processing industries are highly divergent in terms of 
their concentration rates and proportions of foreign capital, and they also 
form distinct groups on other market and performance criteria. They fol-
low four typical routes in terms of concentration and their penetration by 
foreign capital. 
6.1. Literature on the Relation of Market Structure to Foreign Capital 
6.1.1. Concentration and FDI in the International Literature 
The market structure component is of utmost importance within the causal rela-
tions defined in the SCP paradigm. The identification of factors determining 
market structure is held up as the central research objective in numerous studies. 
Dunning (1958) recognised at an early stage the relation between foreign invest-
ments and industry structure, when he discovered in an analysis of manufactur-
ing industries in the United Kingdom that two-thirds of the foreign-owned sub-
sidiaries were operating in highly concentrated industries. Since then, broad 
agreement has been reached on the fact that this relation prevails, but economists 
have been divided in their opinions on its causal direction. Some researchers 
accentuate the impact of foreign capital on concentration, while others assert 
that it is the structure of industry that attracts foreign direct investment. 
Caves (1996, pp. 83-85) postulated a relation between FDI and market struc-
ture on the grounds of the existence of entry barriers. In his view, concentrating 
markets and high entry barriers induce the emergence of multinational enterpris-
es. They have to possess significant advantages over local competitors in order 
to overcome the entry barriers. Consequently, "the height of entry barriers and 
the extent of foreign-investment activity should be highly correlated. And be-
cause entry barriers mostly deteinilne an industry' s level of seller concentration, 
we expect foreign investment and seller concentration to be closely associated". 
More recently, Ratnayake (1999) tested empirically "the correlation between 
entry barriers and concentration in New Zealand, and found that foreign owner-
ship in a particular industry — among other factors such as size of the industry, 
import competition and economies of scale — is a determinant of concentration. 
In his survey of the literature, Ratnayake mentions two hypothetical types of 
impact that foreign direct investment can have on concentration: 
1. Foreign influence may imply company acquisitions and the deterio- 
ration of domestic processors, causing increased concentration. 
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2. Foreign companies may be able to break the influence of local oli- 
gopolies, and — provided they appear on the market in large num- 
bers — they can intensify competition and reduce concentration. 
Caves (1996, pp. 89-90) states that foreign investments influence the devel-
opment of an industry' s concentration, but the direction of the impact cannot be 
generalised upon with certainty. The impact of market structure on foreign direct 
investment seems to be more unequivocal in the literature. The topic was argued 
theoretically in Knickerbocker's oligopolistic reactions hypothesis, and a study 
at Harvard University analysing US investments in Canada found that concentra-
tion in the resident country' s industries had a closer correlation with FDI than 
did that in the host country (Caves et al. 1980). The impact of industry structure 
on foreign direct investment has been confirmed by a series of empirical studies. 
Considering manufacturing sector in the United Kingdom, Steuer (1973) found a 
significant correlation between the concentration of particular industries and 
sales of foreigri-owned companies. Later Fishwick (1981) reported a high corre-
lation between industry concentration and foreign investments in the United 
Kingdom, Germany and France, a trend that was confirmed in a number of coun-
tries at various levels of development, such as New Zealand (Deane 1970), Aus-
tralia (Parry 1978), the United States (Pugel 1978) and Mexico (Blomström 
1989).35 The range of countries and the results of the above-mentioned studies 
suggest that the correlation between the degree of concentration of an industry 
and foreign direct investment prevails regardless of the country' s level of devel-
opment, provided the govemment does not impose any administrative barriers. 
As far as the food processing industries are concerned, Traill (1998) exam-
ined these in several Western European countries and found that there was a 
great involvement of multinational companies in the concentrated industries and 
less involvement in the medium-concentrated ones, while no involvement was 
mentioned in the case of industries with low levels of concentration. 
6.1.2. Relations Between Concentration and FDI in 
the Hungarian Literature 
A dynamic concentration of capital has fuelled the acceleration of globalisation 
in the 1990s. Multinational enterprises consider each sub-market equally impor-
tant, since they have to succeed in the competition in ali markets at the same 
time. The entry of globally growing multinational enterprises has redrawn the 
35 The examples are listed and assessed by Caves (1996, p. 85), who also mentions an empirical 
study that came to a different conclusion, that of Baba (1975) on the Japanese economy, where 
the author did not find any correlation between concentration and foreign direct investment. 
The main reason for this was identified in the special policy of the Japanese government, 
which is aimed at protecting domestic enterprises. 
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market structure and increased concentration in the industries of the European 
transitional economies (Szanyi 1997). 
The fundamental changes that have taken place in Hungarian manufacturing 
provide an ideal basis for testing the theory and the intemationally observed ten-
dencies. Kaderjåk (1996), looking for the motives of foreign investors, with spe-
cial emphasis on polluting investments, noted that concentration had to be 
among the assumed determinants but found no relation between this and indus-
try-specific FDI. His results were surprising, even in the light of the fact that his 
research covered the whole range of manufacturing industries in Hungary. 
Empirical efforts have remained scarce in the literature on Hungarian food 
processing. One of the very rare exceptions is the work of Lakner (1994), who 
made an interesting analysis of the distribution of FDI between industries in the 
early phase of privatisation. His calculations showed that concentration was a 
key determinant of profit, which was also found to be a function of domestic 
sales in the industry concemed. His results are in close conforfnity with those 
obtained in the previous chapter of this work. 
Boeckenhoff and Moeller (1993) noted that foreign direct investments tend to 
flow into the more concentrated industries of the Hungarian food processing sec-
tor, and this was confirmed by Vissi (1995) in his analysis of the competitive 
environment in the Hungarian food processing industries. Even so, recognition 
remained an intuitive assumption without any empirical support. An effort was 
made in the regression analysis presented in the previous chapter to fill this gap. 
This line of research will be continued here in Chapters 6 and 7, where the main 
objective will be to analyse the relation of FDI to the degree of concentration in 
the Hungarian food processing industries. 
6.2. Cluster Analysis of the Food Processing Industries 
The econometric model provided empirical evidence for the assumption that 
market power was the most significant determinant of FDI in the food industries 
in Hungary. The evidence indicates that FDI penetration and concentration 
within an industry are interrelated factors. In order to find additional motives for 
the behaviour of foreign capital, the next step involved a cluster analysis based 
on two correlating attributes of the food industries,36 the measures for which 
continue to be foreign participation in the registered company capital of the 
industries and the concentration ratios CR4. 
The dendrogram in Figure 14 demonstrates the agglomerative clustering pro-
cedure in which ali the observation points start out as independent items, and 
36 The cluster analysis was conducted using SPSS 7.5 statistical software. Due to the small 
number of observations (17), the hierarchical clustering algorithm presuming Euclidean dis-
tances and average linkages was applied. 
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Figure 14. Dendrogram for a cluster analysis of the Hungarian food processing 
industries in 1997. 
successive manoeuvres of combining the two closest groups into one aggregate 
cluster are performed. 
The beer, tobacco and confectionery industries formed a tight group in the 
early phase of the clustering process and drew the vegetable oil industry along 
with it a few steps later. The group then incorporated the pairs consisting of 
sugar and starch and of other processing and soft drinks. A second cluster con-
sisted of the meat and fish, fruit and vegetables, animal feeds, distilling and dairy 
industries. Wine making and the bakery industry became connected in the 
middle of the process, and the milling industry joined them later. Thus a third 
cluster was formed, to which poultry was connected only at the three-cluster 
level. Poultry processing diverges from the rest of the industries in terms of the 
attributes considered here, being left as an outlier that made up a totally separate 
cluster for a long time, up to the four-cluster level. 
6.2.1. Graphical Approach 
Since the clusters were defined on the grounds of the proximity of observations 
to one another (Hair et al. 1995), the positions of cluster members and the rela-
tions between them can also be illustrated graphically. Each observation point 
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Figure 15. Scatter plot of a cluster analysis of the Hungarian food processing 
industries in 1997. 
formed by the two variables was plotted on a chart in order to verify the clusters 
derived from the formal application of the analytical procedure (Figure 15). The 
scatter plot confirms the relevance of the three or four-cluster grouping of the 
Hungarian food processing industries. Poultry processing is situated far away 
from both adjacent clusters, and constitutes an "independent cluster" up until the 
four-cluster level. 
6.2.2. Description of Clusters 
The following verbal interpretation of the clusters demonstrates that the three 
and four-cluster levels provide the most appropriate classification for the Hun-
garian food processing industries. 
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6.2.2.1. Cluster 1 — High Foreign Ownership and High Concentration 
Cluster 1 includes highly concentrated industries in which over 70 percent of the 
capital is in foreign ownership. Ali of these industries had small shares in the 
total output of food processing in 1997 (one to five percent). Although their indi-
vidual weights seem insignificant, their summed proportion was well over one 
quarter of the food industry output (Figure 16). They have either a dominant firm 
(starch, vegetable oil) or an oligopolistic market structure (coffee, tobacco, 
sugar), or else they are characterised by the co-existence of a few large com-
panies and dozens of small-scale enterprises (beer, confectionery, soft drinks, 
paprika). The majority of the Cluster 1 industries produce "luxury", highly pro-
cessed and relatively expensive food items. 
These advantages, good sales prospects coupled with excellent intra-industry 
market positions, resulted in the fact that these industries were among the first to 
be privatised and were rapidly acquired by foreign investors, almost as "a matter 
of urgency", before 1993. 
Figure 16. Contributions of industries to the total output of the Hungarian food 
processing sector in 1998 (Source of data: ..FOSZ 1999). 
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6.2.2.2. Cluster 2 — Average Foreign Participation and 
Average Concentration 
Cluster 2 includes the largest industries, which together account for half of Hun-
gary' s total food production. With the exception of distilling, each contributed 8 
to 17 percent of the total output of the food sector in 1997. Although these indus-
tries consist of several huge processing companies, their market structure is 
more even than that of the industries in Cluster 1. Their output is a range of basic 
foodstuffs. 
Since these branches are involved in first-stage processing and rely heavily 
on agricultural raw materials, they were badly hit by the market crisis in agricul-
tural products in the early 1990s, which resulted in a shortage of raw materials. 
The processing companies were left struggling with over-capacity and outdated 
equipment, which slowed down their restructuring and privatisation. Exports 
had always been an important strength of these industries, but these sales needed 
to he redirected to new markets after losing their foothold in the traditional east-
ern outlets. 
Foreign companies penetrated these industries cautiously, making their ap-
pearance relatively late, between 1993 and 1996. Their objective was to acquire 
the most prosperous companies, possibly with some extra advantages such as a 
high level of technology, good geographical location or excellent market posi-
tion. The main FDI motivating factors in Cluster 2 were the large domestic mar-
kets and good exporting opportunities. This cluster consists of industries with 
good growth prospects, and therefore the proportion of foreign capital is ex-
pected to increase, which should in turn result in greater concentration among 
the companies in these industries. This means that the industries in Cluster 2 are 
expected to move towards Cluster 1 in the medium term. 
6.2.2.3. Cluster 3 — Low Foreign Participation and Low Concentration 
Cluster 3 also includes fairly small processing industries, which contributed 
from two to seven percent of the output of the food sector in 1997. The structure 
of these industries is rather scattered, and there are numerous processing units of 
similar sizes competing with each other. Since the baking and wine producing 
companies are not very large, it was hard for foreign investors to acquire signifi-
cant market positions in these industries. With the exception of a few large com-
panies operating on huge markets such as Budapest, bakeries in Hungary usually 
supply a tiny local market. 
Winemaking is closely tied to basic agricultural activity. The fact that for-
eigners were not allowed to buy or own agricultural land in Hungary has hin-
dered their involvement in winemaking. The milling industry — like winemaking 
— is also closely connected with the production of agricultural raw materials. 
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Besides the sugar and dairy industries, it was one of the areas that was designed 
to be transferred to the ownership of agricultural producers through privatisa-
tion, and although foreign investors soon purchased the sugar and dairy indus-
tries despite these political intentions, the milling industry did not arouse their 
interest on account of its poor market prospects and weak profitability. The low 
participation of FDI in Cluster 3 can therefore be explained by the scattered 
structure of these industries and discouraging administrative circumstances. 
6.2.3. Common Characteristics of the Clusters 
As previously indicated in the cluster profiles, the member industries show a 
resemblance in many more aspects than the proportion of foreign capital and 
degree of market concentration. The characteristics of the food processing indus-
tries at the three-cluster level are summarised in Table 11. The poultry process-
ing industry mainly shares the characteristic features of Cluster 2, although in 
terms of foreign capital penetration it is closer to Cluster 3. The distilling indus-
try, in Cluster 2, converges towards Cluster 1 in terms of market size and types 
of products. A combined indicator of domestic market size and export capability, 
showing the contributions of cluster members to the total output of the Hunga-
rian food sector is provided in Figure 16. 
Table 11. Summary of characteristic profiles of clusters. 
Attribute of food industries Cluster [1] Cluster [2] Cluster [3] 
Number of processing industries 
Share of registered company capital 
owned by foreign investors (%) 
Concentration ratio CR4 (%) 
Domestic market size (in USD 
million) 
Export sales (in USD million) 
Productivity 
(in thousand USD/employee) 
Number of firms 
8 
over 80 
over 60 
40-260 
10-150 
60-300 
7-187 
6 
40-60 
25-60 
350-1,000 
50-400 
40-100 
84-282 
3 
10-30 
under 35 
80-420 
25-75 
20-70 
122-594 
(cluster average in brackets) 	 (73) 	 (116) 	(303) 
Type of products 
"luxury" items, 
beverages, high 
value added 
	
basic food 	basic food 
items and 	items and 
intermediary intermediary 
products 	products 
Source: own calculations based on AKII 1998. Note: data are from 1997. 
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Analysis of the content of the cluster summary table reveals additional inter-
esting phenomena regarding the behaviour, motives and performance of foreign 
investors. 
Foreign investors feel most comfortable in relatively small food processing 
industries with a high level of market concentration and a low number of parti-
cipants. The product groups in Cluster 1 offered the best prospects for growth in 
demand once income levels start to grow significantly in Hungary and the other 
CEE countries. Also, productivity is by far the highest in these industries, which 
is a distinct result of rapid modernisation and capital infusion. 
Foreign investors have also become increasingly active in the industries 
making up Cluster 2, taking advantage primarily of the sizes of the domestic and 
export markets. Modemisation of these industries has been a slower process, 
partly because privatisation started later and partly because financially strong 
foreign-owned companies only account for approximately 50 percent of produc-
tion in the cluster. 
The example of the industries in Cluster 3 indicates that foreign investors are 
not particularly interested in capturing companies with modest shares in small 
markets. Productivity figures in these industries are among the lowest in the 
entire food sector. 
Number of clusters in the agglomeration procedure 
Figure 17. Dendrogram of Hungarian food processing industries in 1998. 
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Industry codes used in the 
table 
Code 	Industry 
1 	Meat and fish 
2 Poultry 
3 	Fruit and vegetable 
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5 Dairy 
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9 Bakery 
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6.2.4. Clustering Results for Subsequent Years 
The clustering was run again with the 1998 data in order to check the changes 
relative to 1997. The resulting dendrogram, shown in Figure 17, has the indus-
tries connected in a slightly different order, and there are also minor changes in 
the composition of the clusters. 
Dendrograms illustrate primarily the cluster combine order, the accurate data 
of the clustering algorithms for 1997 and 1998 are presented in Table 12, where 
the connecting industries on the various level of cluster combination procedure 
can be identified by the attached numeric codes for the industries. The columns 
of coefficients include the distance between the two combined industries. 
The most significant difference between the two years is that the manufactur-
ing of other foodstuffs was connected with Cluster 2 in 1998. Poultry processing 
again remained an independent industry for a long time and was joined to Clus-
ter 2 only at the four-cluster level, and as it continued to be an outlier, its position 
scarcely affected the composition of the other clusters. The industry denoted as 
"other foodstuffs" includes a heterogeneous set of enterprises and product 
Table 12. Summary table of the clustering procedure of the Hungarian food 
processing industries. 
Agglomeration order 
1997 
Combined 
Coeffi- clusters 
cients 
C1.1 	C1.2 
Agglomeration order 
1998 
Combined 
Coeffi- clusters 
cients C1.1 	C1.2 
7 10 5.56E-04 11 16 7.67E-04 
15 17 1.89E-03 3 8 1.75E-03 
3 8 3.98E-03 15 17 5.83E-03 
11 15 8.54E-03 4 15 6.83E-03 
3 5 1.45E-02 7 10 1.08E-02 
9 14 1.46E-02 3 5 1.44E-02 
12 16 1.59E-02 9 14 1.94E-02 
4 11 1.87E-02 4 11 2.24E-02 
1 3 2.26E-02 1 3 3.72E-02 
4 12 4.63E-02 12 13 4.32E-02 
6 9 4.86E-02 6 9 5.40E-02 
1 13 5.88E-02 4 7 5.97E-02 
4 7 8.43E-02 1 12 0.124 
2 6 0.111 1 2 0.206 
1 2 0.115 1 6 0.212 
1 4 0.523 1 4 0.500 
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groups, and its shift from Cluster 3 to Cluster 2 did not cause any great surprise. 
Ali the other industries preserved their previous positions in the clusters, and in 
this sense the 1998 cluster analysis confirms the permanence of the three clusters 
given by that for 1997. The minor changes between the two dendrograms 
explained in Figure 18. 
As noted earlier, the only significant change in the composition of the clus-
ters between the two years is the shift of "other manufacturing industry" from 
Cluster 1 to Cluster 2. The reasons for this become apparent from Figure 18: 
Cluster 1 forms a tighter group with the concentrating soft drink industry in 
1998, whereas foreign participation in the manufacturing of other foodstuffs had 
decreased. The move implies certain distinct events in the background, notably a 
greater concentration and an increase in FDI within some large industries in 
Cluster 2 (mostly distilling, animal feeds and dairy processing), which dragged 
the "other foodstuffs", a collective category of heterogeneous companies, 
including a large number of newly established enterprises mostly in domestic 
ownership into Cluster 2. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
proportion in registered company capital in foreign ownership 
Figure 18. Clusters of Hungarian food processing industries in 1997 and 1998. 
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63. Testing the Causality Directions Between Concentration and FDI 
The main causal relations and their directions to be tested in the dissertation are 
summarised in Figure 7 (page 57), which also illustrates how the FDI segment is 
linked to the causal mechanism of the SCP paradigm. The tests of causal direc-
tions C and E are performed in the following section (Figure 7). 
The problem to be tested could be translated into the terminology of food 
economics as follows: does concentration determine penetration by foreign 
direct investment or is the level of concentration attributable to foreign direct 
investment in the industries? 
The close relation between the two dimensions is indisputable in the light of 
the cluster analysis, but the question is a relevant one: what is the direction of the 
causal relation between the proportion of foreign ownership and concentration 
in the industries of the Hungarian food processing sector? 
The method used for testing the direction of causality was that developed by 
Granger (1969), who constructed restricted and non-restricted regression equa- 
tions in order to decide whether Y is really dependent on X. The restricted equa-
tion estimates the independent variables with its own lagged values. The formula 
is the following: 
Y 
	
E 
where Y is the independent variable, t is the time of observation and k is the 
extent of the time lag. The non-restricted regression also incorporates the lagged 
values of the explanatory variable to be tested: 
+ 	13iX t-i +E 
where X is the explanatory variable. The extended equation [2] is compared with 
the restricted equation [1] by means of an F-test, which immediately indicates 
whether adding the variable X increases the explanatory power of the estimate 
significantly or not. 
Symmetric use of the non-restricted regression relation is usually employed 
as a means of testing the presumed impact of two variables on each other 
(Pindyck and• Rubinfeld 1991). The Granger causality test is primarily used for 
time series, and •since the causal relation to be tested here includes cross-
sectional data available for ,a short period, the test is applicable only in slightly 
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modified forms. Due to the special nature of the database, the analysis consists 
of three approaches.37 
The first test is the closest in concept to the initial form of the Granger test. 
Both the proportion of foreign ownership and concentration were explained by 
independent series of regressions with the lagged values of both variables. In the 
first approach, the causality test was performed on the basis of the following 
formula: 
FDI t =1‘ ai FDI f_t 	 + E 
i=1 	 i=1 
and similarly for the direction of FDI = CR: 
CRt =liatCRt_t +IP i FDI t_t + ei 
The value of k, which signifies the length of the time lag, was 1, 2, and 3 in 
the case of each t, in other words causality was tested with three time lags in each 
year of observation. 
The results of the first approach are summarised in Table 13. The classical 
approach of the Granger method raises a number of problems in our case. Owing 
to the special characteristics of food processing, 2-3 years of time lag would be 
relevant, since, as previously noted, years pass between investors' decisions and 
actual implementation of the investments in Hungary. This means that a relat-
ively long time is also required for the potential impacts of foreign capital on the 
development of the structure of industry to be felt. However, any further stretch-
ing of the time lag is hampered by two factors: 
The industry-specific data on food processing can be compared in 
retrospect only between 1991 and 1998. 
The incorporation of one additional year of time lag would reduce 
the initially rather low degree of freedom by two, which would 
render the test results methodologically questionable. 
The results of the calculation in Table 13 do not point to any dramatic differ-
ence in the impacts of the two variables on each other. The null hypothesis can 
be rejected in ali instances. The calculations of the first approach suggest that the 
foreign ownership that has evolved in the individual industries, albeit to a very 
minor extent, has influenced their concentration, rather than that the concen-
trated market structure has attracted inflows of the foreign direct investment into 
the particular industries. 
37  The regressions were solved by linear ordinary least square methods in ali three approaches to 
the causal tests, employing SPSS 7.5 software. 
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In the second approach, the independent variable was tested exclusively as a 
function of the lagged values of the explanatory variable. In this way the degree 
of freedom in the regression equations was increased and the measured impact 
could be fully attributed to the explanatory variable. The force of attraction 
exerted by the degree of concentration in an industry, determining the influx of 
foreign capital, is measured in the following way: 
FDI, 	 ei 
The reverse causality direction can be tested analogously. As in the first 
approach, the time lag was set at k = 1, 2, 3. The results in Table 14 already 
enable some tentative conclusions to be drawn. 
The null hypothesis has to be approved for the direction of FDI = CR in the 
case of k = 1 and for k = 2 in 1992, since the foreign direct investment does not 
explain much of the concentration that took place in the industries. The F-values 
also confirm the weak explanatory power in the above two cases. The causal 
direction CR = FDI was nevertheless significant in the same period, in that con-
centration evidently detennined the inflows of foreign direct investment. The 
data series with a three-year time lag indicates an interesting regularity: as with 
the results of the first approach, both causal directions are significant in ali the 
years of observation, although the results for 1993-1995 indicate a stronger in-
fluence of industry concentration, while those for 1996-1998 suggest the oppo-
site, a stronger determining force on the part of foreign direct investment. 
The results suggests that industry concentration rates were powerful determi-
nants of the initial foreign direct investment flows, whereas no distinct direction 
of causality can be detected for the second half of the decade. 
The lengths of the time lags were sustained in the third approach, but only 
one year's figures were incorporated into the equation at a time. The formula 
used for testing the relation CR = FDI is modified in the following way relative 
to equation [5]: 
FDI t ,i = aiCR+si 
where i = 1, 2, 3. The FDI = CR direction is tested pursuant to the symmetric 
version of equation [6]. The results of the third approach are in compliance with 
the main tendencies unveiled in the second approach. In the two-year time lag 
columns in Table 15 only the direction CR FDI is shown to have been signi-
ficant in 1992 and 1993, and the same outcome is obtained for 1993 and 1994 in 
the case of i = 3. No clear causality was unveiled for the rest of the decade. 
The objective of the causality test was to determine the causal direction of the 
close correlation between industry concentration and foreign capital involve- 
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Table 15. Causality test results of the third approach. 
t = 1998 
t = 1997 
t = 1996 
t = 1995 
t = 1994 
t = 1993 
t = 1992 
Null hypothesis 
110: CR 	FDI 
H0: FDI 	CR 
H0: CR 	FDI 
Ho: FDI 	CR 
H0: CR 	FDI 
H0: FDI 	CR 
H0: CR 	FDI 
H0: FDI > CR 
Ho: CR 	FDI 
Ho: FDI 	CR 
H0: CR 	FDI 
Ho: FDI 	CR 
Ho: CR 	FDI 
Ho: FDI 	CR 
i=2, N=17 i=3, N=17 
R2 
0.4273 
0.3767 
0.4555 
0.3309 
0.3600 
0.5239 
0.4903 
0.5648 
0.4726 
0.5605 
0.6198 
0.1224 
0.6910 
0.1062 
F (1,15) 
11.2 
9.1 
12.5 
7.4 
8.4 
16.5 
14.4 
19.5 
13.4 
19.1 
24.5 
2.1 
33.5 
1.8 
p 
0.00443 
0.00878 
0.00296 
0.01570 
0.01089 
0.00102 
0.00175 
0.00050 
0.00229 
0.00054 
0.00018 
0.16869 
0.00004 
0.20173 
R2 
0.4408 
0.3650 
0.4458 
0.4366 
0.4517 
0.5848 
0.3939 
0.5233 
0.5101 
0.1113 
0.7095 
0.1572 
F (1,15) 
11.8 
8.6 
12.1 
11.6 
12.4 
21.1 
9.7 
16.5 
15.6 
1.9 
36.6 
2.8 
0.00365 
0.01022 
0.00340 
0.00388 
0.00312 
0.00035 
0.00699 
0.00103 
0.00127 
0.19064 
2.21E-05 
0.11505 
ment, using data for the period from 1990 to 1998. The major outcomes of the 
investigation can be summarised as follows: 
During the early phases of restructuring in the food industry, con-
centration was a significant detenninant of foreign direct invest-
ment inflows. 
Neither variable was superior over the other in terms of explan- 
atory power during the subsequent period, although both causal 
directions remained statistically significant. 
The results implying such a "mutual causality" raise an important question of 
interpretation. In the case of time series, mutual causality would automatically 
suggest that both variables examined were determined by an external independ-
ent third factor, which would mean that the original causality test was invalid. 
This is not entirely the case here, however. First, the current causality analysis 
includes cross-sectional data, and secondly, one of the two variables (FDI) had 
only zero observation values before 1990. This train of thought may eventually 
lead to two very different final conclusions. 
One interpretation emphasises mutual causality. This standpoint ignores the 
determining power of a third force, arguing that it cannot concurrently result in 
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one variable being consistently zero while the other obtains values between 0 
and 1. This reasoning appears to hold good especially in the early years of the 
observation period. 
The other standpoint would highlight the immediate overall influence of an 
exogenous third factor as soon as artificial barriers to FDI inflows are lifted. 
Such an independent factor may be entry barriers, for instance, as suggested by 
Caves (see section 6.1.1. on p. 94), or it may just as well be privatisation. Since 
the launching of the economic reform coincided with privatisation, this may be a 
relevant conclusion. The lack of quantifiable measures, however, does not allow 
testing the impact of these potential independent factors in the context of the 
Hungarian food processing industries. 
In summary, the results of the causality analysis suggest the following eco-
nomic reasoning: the large, concentrated food processing markets in Hungary 
initially had a strong appeal for foreign investors, but once the investments ma-
tured and the investors were able to consolidate their market positions, the pro-
portion of foreign ownership has also had repercussions for future concentra-
tion in the industry.38  Exogenous factors or attributes of the industries, such as 
the pace of globalisation, entry barriers and privatisation are suspected to affect 
both concentration and FDI penetration levels. 
38  This is not necessarily equivalent to a constant increase in concentration. Concentration in fact 
decreased in a number of industries over five years from 1993 onwards. The starting point for 
the causality analysis was the divergent concentration levels among individual industries. 
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7. Industry Life-Curves in the Hungarian Food 
Processing Sector 
7.1. Extending the Directions of FDI-Concentration Maps 
The scatter plots summarising the results of the cluster-analysis based on the two 
indicators of the structure of the food processing industries demonstrate the sta-
tus of the entire food processing sector (Figures 15 and 18). The two industry 
attributes facilitate further interesting investigations. In order to simplify the ex-
planation, the scatter plots with coordinates representing the proportion of for-
eign ownership and concentration will hereafter he referred to as FDI-concentra-
tion maps. By definition, an FDI-concentration map is a snapshot of the status 
of the food processing sector, including the positions of individual industries in 
a given year, by market concentration and FDI penetration. 
The use of FDI-concentration maps can now he extended in two directions 
according to the dynamic and comparative approaches adopted: 
1. The dynamic approach  examines the route taken by a given food 
processing industry until it reaches its position in the final observa-
tion year. These routes, or FDI-concentration industry life-curves, 
reveal several interesting turning points in the history of the indus-
tries over the past decade. They also provide information on the 
intemal structural changes taking place in individual industries, 
since they take two distributions into account: 
the distribution between foreign and domestic owners, and 
the distribution between the largest processors and the rest of 
the processors, or more accurately, the distribution of their 
contributions to the industry' s output. 
2. The comparative approach  extends the FDI-concentration maps in 
a geographical direction. The method includes construction and 
comparison of national FDI-concentration maps for the food 
processing sectors of other Central and Eastem European countries, 
by which important conclusions can be drawn regarding the effects 
of differences in privatisation and restructuring policies in the 
region. The comparative approach is elaborated in Thesis IV 
(Chapter 8). 
7.2. Tendencies in the Composition of Market Types in 
the Hungarian Food Industry 
Before proceeding to the dynamic extension of FDI-concentration maps, it is 
necessary to describe long-term changes within the composition of market types 
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in the Hungarian food industry by monitoring retrospectively the changes that 
have taken place over the past two decades. These categories are widely em-
ployed in JO theory, and the concrete definitions below are based on the specifi-
cations of Shepherd (Table 16).39  Using the categories set out in the table, the 
division of the output of the Hungarian food industry by market types is shown 
in Figure 19. The proportions of the market types are calculated by summing the 
weights of the individual industries in the given category. Application of the 
traditional market type categories of market economies to the period of a com-
mand economy may seem paradoxical at first sight. Yet, inspection of the market 
type composition during the 1980s can also be relevant and demonstrative, since 
the categories provide information on the degree of state control and changes in 
this with time. 
The concise history of the past twenty years in Hungarian food processing 
provided in Figure 19 will help us trace ali the fundamental changes which have 
left their mark on the composition of market types. 
The typical market structure for a Hungarian food processing industry in the 
early 1980s was a state monopoly, or "trust form". In some industries, geograph-
ically scattered processing facilities were fused administratively under the um-
brella of one institution, often called a trust. These trusts ensured transparency 
and easy control for the state. Some of the industries which included trusts be- 
Table 16. Definitions and boundaries of the market types. 
Market-type 	Definition 
Pure monopoly 	One company controls 100 percent of the market. 
Dominant company 	The leading company has a 50-100 percent market share, 
with no close competitors. 
Tight oligopoly 	CR4  amounts to 60-100 percent, and collusion between the 
market leaders cannot be excluded. 
Loose oligopoly 	CR4  is in the range of 40-60 percent, and collusion between 
the market leaders is practically impossible. 
Competition 	CR4  is under 40 percent and typically no one company has 
a market share over 15 percent. The number of companies 
exceeds 30. 
Source: Shepherd (1990, p. 14). 
39  Shepherd's definitions were originally drawn up for the economy of the United States, and 
some slight changes have been required to make them applicable to the Hungarian food 
processing industries. 
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longed to the pure monopoly market type, since one company accounted for 
100 percent of production. Other significant industries such as meat, poultry and 
dairy processing also contained state-owned trusts that enjoyed dominant posi-
tions, contributing 85-100 percent to total output of the respective industry, with 
the rest of the production originating from cooperatives or other small-scale 
processors. The only industry in which competition could he said to have existed 
on the basis of its concentration figure was bakery. Yet, this was not character-
ised by real competition, either, since state-owned or municipally-owned compa-
nies and cooperative bakeries supplied products to strictly demarcated market 
areas, so that they were in geographical terms the sole actors in their particular 
sub-markets. 
Some changes can be identified in terms of market types by the late 1980s, as 
the trusts or state monopolies were removed as organisational forms from a 
number of industries such as sugar, poultry, distilling, soft drinks and canning 
(Raskö 2000), and independent processing companies concurrently appeared in 
the statistical registers.4° Thus the concentration ratios in the food processing 
industries typically decreased in the late 1980s. The trusts had been entirely dis-
persed by the end of the decade, the Meat Trust being terminated at the end of 
1986, the Grain Trust at the end of 1989 and finally the Dairy Trust at the end of 
1990 (Böjti and Vörös 1991). The end of the decade also brought other essential 
changes, including the consolidation of the cooperative-based and private pro-
cessors. 
The vertical dashed Iines in Figure 19 signal the milestones in the history of 
Hungarian food processing, such as the beginning of restructuring and the priva-
tisation of food manufacturers in 1990. The effects of competition in a free 
market were immediately perceived in the food industry. 
The category of pure monopoly disappeared entirely. The last state-
owned monopoly, which enjoyed a 100 percent market share in the 
vegetable oil industry, received its first newly established private 
competitors in the early 1990s. 
The proportion of "dominant company" industries diminished, as 
the abolition of ali the food industry trusts between 1982 and 1990 
left just three dominant companies, in the vegetable oil, starch and 
pasta industries. These leading companies have sustained their 
dominant positions up to the present time. 
40  The change in the market structure was only ostensible at that time, since the continuously 
dominating state-run companies did not gain in real independence. The state as an owner did 
not relinquish the control that it exercised over such companies, as it was only the structure of 
the industries that was modified. 
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3. The market shares of the large processing companies, which used to 
supply one market area, usually one county, decreased to 2- 
10 percent along with the dispersal of the trusts. Consequently the 
majority of industries, including those with the largest output, were 
classified in the categories of a loose oligopoly or a state of free 
competition. 
The events of the 1990s can also be traced accurately in Figure 19. As a con-
sequence of the decentralising efforts through the privatisation in the largest 
food industries, the output of those industries classified into the competition cat-
egory reached its peak in 1992-1993 and continued to predominate until 1996. 
Newly established privately owned enterprises sprang up like mushrooms in 
nearly ali industries over the period of 1990-1996, and the only industries that 
Figure 19. Distribution of market types in the Hungarian food processing 
industries over the period from 1982 to 1998, based on the industries' shares of 
total food industry output. 
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were exceptions to this rule were those which have traditionally had high entry 
barriers, such as sugar and tobacco. The high number of newcomers did not 
modify the power of the leading companies in the confectionery, beer, vegetable 
oil, pasta or soft drink industries, and consequently these continued to be classi-
fied in the oligopolistic market types, whereas several hundreds of new enter-
prises entering the wine and bakery industries drove these permanently into the 
competition category. The distribution of market types that had evolved by 1992 
remained fairly stable until 1996, by which time the privatisation of the food 
industry was virtually completed and an entirely new production and market 
structure had emerged. 
The second half of the decade brought a new turning point. A unique reverse 
tendency has been observed in the structure of the Hungarian food processing 
sector in recent years, with a substantial decline in the competition category in 
favour of the oligopoly categories. This tendency, referred to as re-concentration 
in Figure 19, has had the following driving forces behind it: 
A large number of small spin-offs from the former state-owned 
companies have been eliminated from the market in the face of 
fierce competition, on account of the weak capital base of their new 
owners and their large amounts of redundant capacity. 
The newly established private processors have not been able to con-
solidate over the recent years, leaving a bipolar structure in many 
oligopolistic industries that apparently could not be altered by small 
enterprises. 
The food processing industries in almost all countries are becoming 
concentrated, which is a manifestation of the worldwide phenom- 
enon of globalisation. After the completion of privatisation, the 
effects of globalisation could be felt in the Hungarian food industry 
primarily through the aggressive market policy of foreign compa- 
nies. 
In summary, the headway made by the competition market type in the mid-
1990s can be regarded as a transient phase, and the present tendency for re-
concentration of food processing in Hungary will continue in the future, so that 
the industry will be dominated by oligopolistic market types. The composition of 
the industries will shift primarily from the competition category to loose oli-
gopoly, and there is a smaller probability that the oligopolies may be strength-
ened to such an extent that they could move into the tight oligopoly category.41  
The likelihood of the emergence of new dominant companies, which would con-
trol entire industries, is minimal in the case of an efficient competition policy. 
41  Although such a move can be assumed in the dairy industry and later in the meat processing 
industry. 
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7.3. Dynamic Extension of FDI-Concentration Maps: 
Industry. Life-Curves 
The definition of industry life-curves as a dynamic approach to FDI-concentra-
tion maps has already been introduced in section 7.1. The next section is devoted 
to reviewing the driving forces that move industries from one period to 
another.42 
7.3.1. Driving Forces Affecting the Industry Life-Curves 
Before reviewing the forces affecting industry life-curves, it is expedient to de-
termine the probability domains in which food processing industries may be lo- 
cated. The results so far predict that a high level of concentration will involve 
increased foreign participation. The most probable zone of location of the food 
processing industries is marked in Figure 20 by a light grey area bordered with a 
dashed line. 
Let us now examine the hypothetical extremes of the industries locations in 
the system of coordinates of FDI and concentration in a given year t in Figure 20: 
Points Yt and Zt  embody the extremes that lie in the probability 
zone of the main trend, and therefore have a high likelihood of 
occurrence. 
Point Xt  and its surrounding area imply a high concentration and 
low level of foreign ownership. This position has a low chance of 
occurrence in the case of commercially conducted privatisation and 
free movement of capital. As will he explained in the chapter con-
taining the intemational comparison, the position Xt is not imposs-
ible in the case of administrative barriers that impede acquisitions 
by foreign investors. 
Finally, let us examine the probability of V. The emergence of 
point Vt  infers an atomised market structure and high foreign pene-
tration.43  It would imply dominant foreign ownership in several 
dozens or hundreds of processors having equally small market 
shares within a given industry. This can hardly ever occur for many 
reasons. The large multinational enterprises, which account for the 
42  Both sectiön 7.3.1 and section 8.2 review the forces effective in FDI-concentration maps, the 
essential difference between them being in 'the aspect from which they examine these, as sec-
tion 7.3.1 analyses the forces that move one particular industry between consecutive observa-
tion periods, while section 8.2 introduces factors that detennine the array of food processing 
industries in a given country during a given year. 
43 The areas surrounding points V. and Zt  in Figure 20 presume a market concentration of over 
10 percent. In the light of European and worldwide figures for the food processing industries, 
the actual level of concentration ratios as measured by CR4 do not descend below that value. 
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majority of foreign direct investment in the food industry, do not 
acquire companies with small market shares in the Central and 
Eastern European food sectors. If they are forced to purchase small 
processors, they immediately consolidate their production and 
strengthen their market power, so that the industry soon leaves the 
zone of point Vt. Foreign influence originating from scattered in-
vestments in small and medium-scale enterprises in nearby devel- 
oped countries is conceivable in principle, but their mass presence 
in one particular industry is somewhat unrealistic. 
In order to reveal the driving forces behind the industry life-curves, let us 
assume that Qt is the initial location of the ith food processing industry in year t. 
The major directions that the industry may follow to reach its new position in 
year t+/ are marked with vectors. The following section elucidates the content 
of each hypothetical vector and cites concrete examples from the Hungarian 
food processing sector. The vectors for t=1997 in the case of ali Hungarian food 
processing industries are shown in Figure 18. The examples given in section 
7.3.4 will provide further illustrative cases.44 
The most probable shift in the position of food processing industries is de- 
noted by yt 	that is increasing concentration with a concurrent increase in for- 
eign ownership. The spiral effect, which propels this move, is a chain of causal 
relations. Let us start with vector 
common direction for industry life-curves: foreign investors raise their share in 
an industry through company acquisitions. Investments mature in the next 
period(s), the technological, management, marketing and financial superiority of 
the companies concerned is quickly manifested in increasing market shares, and 
hence the presence of large foreign companies reinforces concentration, and the 
industry reaches the position Q.  In the third period, the industry moves along 
vector 2,22, , which implies growing foreign ownership through increases in 
capital or new acquisitions by foreign investors. The spiral effect also works in 
the reverse order of components in the causal chain, which is marked with dotted 
arrows in Figure 20. In this case, the industry moves from point Qt to point Qt+3 
by dint of increased concentration in the first period. This is followed by acquisi-
tions of companies by foreign investors or increase in capital in the existing affil-
iates, which again induces concentration growth. 
Although the spiral effect can he decomposed into three purely theoretical 
constituents, its elements appear concurrently in reality, resulting in vector 
As shown in Figure 18, the food processing industries of Cluster 2, such as dairy, 
animal feeds and distilling, followed that direction from 1997 to 1998. 
44  The concrete examples demonstrate that the vectors in the current explanation are purely the-
oretical cases derived from practical instances which do not necessarily occur with the exact 
slopes presented in Figure 20. 
in Figure 20, which represents the most 
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Figure 20. Probabilities of location and major directions of movement of the 
food processing industries on the FDI-concentration map. 
The opposite direction from vector y is labelled t±i. This vector shows the 
direction of market fragmentation with declining foreign influence. As the initial 
position for a given industry, Zt may he considered a common case, but as a 
vector — denoting declining power on the part of foreign investors — it has very 
limited chances of occurrence. Despite the fact that it occurs rarely, its possibil-
ity cannot he entirely excluded. Such a situation may be caused by the rapid 
emergence of a large number of domestic processors, whose joint entry and ac-
tivities can reduce the proportion of foreign ownership in an industry, even 
though the registered capital owned by foreign investors may not change in abso-
lute terms. Two examples of vector z +1  among the Hungarian food processing 
industries in different clusters are contained in Figure 18: wine production in 
Cluster 3 and "other food processing" in Cluster 1. In both cases the entry of a 
large number of recently established domestic food processors prompted the 
shift. 
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Vector x 	represents a special and exceptional direction: a growth in 
market concentration accompanied by a decline in the influence of foreign 
capital. Vector xt 	constitutes a hypothetical case in which it is envisaged that 
domestically owhed companies might gain in strength on account of the presence 
of foreign-owned companies, increasing their market influence and promoting 
concentration within the industry. Only one industry progressed in this direction 
in 1998, the heavily concentrated and oligopolistic case of tobacco 
manufacturing. This exceptional move can be explained by a change in 
ownership structure in one of the biggest tobacco manufacturers, with a notable 
quantity of shares being acquired by domestic owners. Nevertheless, the 
occurrence of vector x remains a rare phenomenon in Hungary and in the whole 
Central and Eastern European region. 
Vector vt r+1  represents decreasing concentration and growing foreign influ-
ence, which 'can emerge in two basic ways. Given an initially low concentration 
level, the entry of new foreign investors can shift the position of an industry in 
this direction. The newcomers can increase the number of enterprises and con-
currently reduce concentration in the industry, parallel with the growth in for-
eign ownership. Such a phenomenon occurred in the Hungarian fruit and veget-
able processing industry from 1997 to 1998 (Figures 18 and 29), where green-
field investments by foreign companies reduced the level of concentration. 
Nevertheless, shifts in the position of food processing companies in Central and 
Eastern Europe in the direction vtt+i can usually only prevail in the short run, 
and it is very unlikely that such industries will ever reach the area around point 
Vt, due to foreigners' market acquisition efforts and the discrepancies in per-
formance between foreign-owned and domestically owned processors. 
Highly concentrated industries with strong foreign influence can also move 
temporarily in the direction vt f _, / when the positions of large market leaders 
become equalised (the number' of such companies should exceed k in order to 
reduce CRk ), or newly established enterprises capture a certain market share 
from the leading companies. This latter tendency is called market polarisation 
(see point A on the opposite page). The distilling, confectionery and soft drink 
industries in Hungary followed this path temporarily in the mid-1990s. 
7.3.2. The Observed Time Interval for Industry. Life-Curves 
The regularities described above can be tested through concrete examples by 
means of a dynamic examination of the Hungarian food processing industries. 
The availability of data and the sequence of economic events determine what 
time interval is most appropriate for monitoring the routes taken by industries. 
Industry-specific statistical data, which comply with NACE standards, are 
available for about 17 separately distinguishable Hungarian food processing in-
dustries from 1991 onwards. The classification previously consisted of 14 indus- 
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tries. Although the scope of the data is different in the two periods, it is feasible 
in principle to trace the analysis between the two eras. 
Prior to 1988, FDI stocks in the Central and Eastern European region were 
negligible. Joint ventures existed, having begun in the 1980s in Hungary, but the 
foreign presence was limited to licensing agreements, know-how or production 
contracts and technology transfers. Foreign ownership was also unessential in 
the Hungarian food processing sector. Foreign direct investments began to make 
headway in 1990, with the first company acquisitions, and it is therefore logical 
to construct industry life-curves from that date onwards, or from 1989, in order 
to record the market structure of the command economy. Since trusts and state 
monopolies were terminated in several industries well before 1989, however, the 
descriptions of industry life-curves will refer to the previously state-owned 
monopolies or dominant companies wherever these used to exist, but the 1989 
data will not show this any longer. 
The above arguments explain why the construction of life-curves for the food 
industries in Hungary is not limited to the 1990s by the unavailability of statisti-
cal data, but rather by economic rationale, namely the zero level of one of the 
attributes, foreign direct investment. For that reason, the concrete industry life-
curves for the Hungarian food industries cover a relatively short time-span.45  
7.3.3. Typical Life-Curves in the Hungarian Food Processing Industries 
A comparison of the life-curves of Hungary' s seventeen food processing indus-
tries leads to the conclusion that they followed four main routes (Figure 21): 
A) Route A represents the typical path for industries characterised by a 
dominant company or tight oligopoly structure. A common feature 
of these industries is rapid penetration by foreign capital through 
acquisitions of the largest companies in the initial phase of privati-
sation. The vegetable oil, starch, confectionery, beer and tobacco 
industries followed this route. Another common characteristic of 
such industries is market polarisation, the emergence of a bipolar 
market structure.46 In most industries in zone A, small-scale pro- 
45  Due to the fundamental economic turning point, essential changes can be observed in the 
short-term life-curves of the food industries of the transition economies. On the other hand, 
the construction of long-term industry life-curves may be relevant for the food processing in-
dustries in the developed countries. Owing to the stable economic environment and long his-
tory of the presence of foreign capital, life-curves of several decades can be observed and may 
provide rational interpretations. Industry life-curves in the developed countries are determined 
primarily by globalisation and other national economic factors (for a detailed description, see 
section 8.2). 
46 Of the industries following route A, only sugar and tobacco manufacturing form exceptions to 
the general rule of market polarisation. 
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Figure 21. Typical life-curves in the Hungarian food processing industries. 
cessors appeared in the shadow of the large companies, the number 
of newcomers varying between 50 and 100 in each industry. These 
small enterprises together already represent a considerable share of 
the market, a fact that widens zone A while proceeding to the right 
on Figure 21. 
Route B, which comprises a U-shaped, arched path, applies to in-
dustries that first underwent decentralised privatisation and were 
then penetrated by foreign capital, which gradually raised their con-
centration level. It was mostly large industries such as milling, ani-
mal feeds, meat and dairy processing that moved along route B. 
Route C is a special course of competitive markets. The balcing in-
dustry represents a pure example, although wine making and fruit 
and vegetable processing can also be classified into this group on 
certain conditions. 
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D) The life-curves of poultry processing and distilling are quite pecu-
liar, since they took up a position in zone D in the early 1990s, 
which they never left afterwards. 
Some industries followed mixed routes. The soft drinks industry and sugar 
manufacturing started out on route B, for example, especially regarding their his-
tory in the 1980s, but arrived in zone A in the early 1990s (Annexes 8 and 10). 
The initial phases in the life-curves for wine malcing and the canning industry 
similarly followed route B, but by the mid-1990s they had departed from this 
course and arrived in zone C. 
7.3.4. Examples of Various Industries 
The next section will display detailed life-curves for selected food processing 
industries in Hungary, the objective being to reveal the relation of foreign influ-
ence and concentration and to demonstrate the driving forces effective in the 
system of coordinates. The life-curves will acquaint us with the internal changes 
that took place in these industries, the market structure and the state of competi-
tion, and help us document the most important market-specific events that have 
occurred in the recent decade. The section presents the concrete history of two 
industries in each of zones A and C, three in B and one example from zone D. 
7.3.4.1. The Vegetable Oil Industry 
The most disputed case in the entire history of privatisation of food industries in 
Hungary is that of the vegetable oil industry. The state-owned monopoly was 
sold in one piece to a foreign investor, the Feruzzi group, and the ensuing de-
bates were fuelled chiefly by the agricultural raw material producers, whose pri-
vatisation tender was rejected. The survival of the dominant company market-
type aroused anxiety on the part of both the raw material suppliers and the con-
sumers. The subsequent years have proved that the dominant company, Cereol, 
has been able to pay back ali the debts of its predecessor and fulfil the techno-
logy development and raw material procurement cornmitments that it entered 
into in the privatisation agreement. 
The life-curve of vegetable oil industry, depicted in Figure 22, is an illustra-
tive example of a sub-category of route A. The conversion of a state monopoly 
into a private monopoly occurred in two cases altogether: in the vegetable oil and 
starch industries. In both cases the market position of the former monopoly be-
came modified to that of a dominant company over the years as newly estab-
lished small-scale companies appeared. The vegetable oil and starch industries 
are extreme cases of polarisation of the market structure, since the new compa-
nies entering the markets succeeded in capturing only a one to four percent share 
between 1992 and 1998. 
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Figure 22. Life-curve for the Hungarian vegetable oil industry between 1990 
and 1998. 
7.3.4.2. The Beer Industry 
The beer industry is an excellent illustration of the life-curve of an oligopolistic 
market type moving along route A. Brewing had already been a fairly concen-
trated field prior to the corporate restructuring reforms, as there were seven large 
companies, five owned by the state and two functioning as cooperatives. The 
changes in market shares that took place in the 1990s are presented in Table 17. 
The table also demonstrates the emergence of a polarised market structure, i.e. 
the appearance of a large number of new companies on the market. 
Pdvatisation in the Hungarian beer industry took place between 1991 and 
1994, and attracted great interest from foreign investors. The penetration of for-
eign capital in terms of individual companies can be traced in the life-curve for 
the beer industry (Figure 23), where as much as 90 percent of the registered cap-
ital is shown to have been controlled by foreign companies by 1997. This illus-
trates the invasion of an entire industry by foreign capital through a series of 
acquisitions of large companies in a concentrated oligopolistic market. 
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Table 17. The largest enterprises in the Hungarian beer industry and their 
market shares, based on sales revenues between 1989 and 1998 (in percent). 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Borsod Brewery 25.4 29.6 23.6 28.0 25.3 28.8 23.3 24.1 25.3 26.8 
Köbånya Brewery 36.9 37.5 30.8 17.3 23.7 24.9 25.9 26.1 35.7 31.4 
Kanizsa Brewery 14.2 4.2 13.3 16.5 8.8 7.3 7.9 7.7 
Pannonia Brewery (136es) 10.1 11.4 11.9 7.7 11.1 7.8 5.8 4.8 5.1 4.3 
Sopron Brewery 6.4 7.7 8.2 10.7 9.4 8.8 14.0 13.3 17.6 23.2 
Martfti Brewery 3.8 4.6 5.2 6.2 7.3 11.8 11.6 8.4 
Koinåromi Brewery 3.2 4.0 3.3 5.5 6.2 7.6 5.5 6.1 6.2 5.0 
Albadomu - - - 	3.5 7.3 8.0 7.2 
Large breweries 99.9 99.2 96.3 91.9 91.9 96.9 97.4 97.7 97.9 97.9 
Other enterprises 0.1 0.8 3.7 8.1 8.1 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.1 
Total number of breweries 10 10 27 89 142 190 183 171 161 152 
Source: own calculations based on data from AKII, 1990-1999. 
Foreign capital had already been present in the beer industry before 1991, due 
to the ownership structure of the two cooperative breweries. Heineken wäs a 
minority shareholder in Komårom Brewery, while the First Hungarian Coopera-
tive Brewery Co. in Martfii operated as a joint venture from 1990. The privatisa-
tion of the state-owned breweries started with Nagykanizsa Brewery, which was 
sold in the framework of a management buy-out programme in 1990, but the new 
owners were unable to revive the company appropriately, as they lacked capital. 
A considerable move towards the right can be observed in the life-curve for the 
first time in 1991, when Brau-Beteiligungs AG purchased a majority share in the 
Martfil factory and the Belgian Interbrew acquired control of Borsodi Brewery. 
The ownership of several companies changed between 1991 and 1994 and for-
eign participation increased constantly until 1994, a pattern that is clearly re-
flected in the industry life-curve. Privatisation of the largest brewing company, 
Köbånyai Sörgyår, was completed in 1993, when South-African Breweries 
(SAB) became the majority owner, while the Dutch company Heineken bought 
the rest of the shares in the Komårom Brewery in 1994, increasing its ownership 
to 100 percent. At the same time the Austrian firm Wenckheim-Ottakringer 
attained a share in Pannonia Brewery. 
In the subsequent two years, 1995 and 1996, a strange detour can he per-
ceived in the life-curve, which is the result of slight changes in the ownership 
structure of some large companies such as Pannonia Brewery (P6cs) and Sopron 
Brewery. The latter company was floated on the stock exchange, as a result of 
which the proportion of its shares owned by Brau Union AG fell to 53 percent, 
while small shareholders, mostly Hungarian, acquired 47 percent (Raskö 2000). 
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Figure 23. Life-curve for the Hungarian beer industry between 1989 and 1998. 
In the most recent phase of the life-curve, the advance of foreign capital has 
been unbroken since 1996. The shares of Kanizsa Brewery were purchased by 
South-African Breweries in 1996, and the same investor also raised its equity in 
its other subsidiary, Köbånya Brewery. Interbrew and Brau Union AG also in-
creased their shares in their Hungarian subsidiaries. The malt producing com-
pany Albadomu, which is also an almost 100 percent foreign-owned enterprise, 
has entered the brewing industry in recent years. Its share in the output of the 
industry had risen above 7 percent by 1998 (Table 17), overtaking Komårom and 
Pannonia breweries in the rankings. 
The concentration ratio CR4 decreased by ten percentage points in the middle 
of the decade, when small breweries took advantage of the lengthy process of 
restructuring and privatisation of the larger companies and temporarily raised 
their combined share above 8 percent in 1992 and 1993. When the large compa-
nies completed the reorganisation of their ownership relations, however, they 
soon regained their earlier market positions due to their technological and logis-
tic developments and intensive marketing activities, so that the concentration 
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ratio returned to its initial level of 85-90 percent by 1996. The new increase in 
the ratio can he explained by the emergence of company groups — Brau Union 
AG and SAB unifying two large breweries each — and the concurrent market 
losses incurred by medium-scale breweries such as 136cs and Komårom. 
No spectacular changes are foreseeable in the position of beer industry on the 
FDI-concentration map in the immediate future. No decline in foreign ownership 
is probable, and a further slight increase rnight even he conceivable. A decrease 
in CR4  cannot he excluded if the medium-scale breweries gain new impetus and 
prove able to return to their earlier positions. However, since the sales revenue 
difference between the smallest large brewery and the largest small-scale one 
was sixteen-fold in 1998, the ability of the smaller operators to modify the mar-
ket structure will remain minimal in the future. The present market structure in 
the beer industry could only he altered by the appearance of an additional strong 
foreign investor. Since there are no quick returns to tempt such an investor into 
the already crowded Hungarian beer industry, there is in fact little possibility of 
any new company emerging. 
7.3.4.3. The Dairy Industry 
The dairy industry is a typical case of route B in Figure 21. It was dominated in 
the 1980s by one large processor, the Dairy Trust Company, which processed 85 
percent of the country' s raw milk and accounted for about 90 percent of the in-
dustry' s output, while the rest of the market was shared by approximately 20 
processors that were in cooperative or other (municipal and/or state) ownership. 
The dominant company, the Dairy Trust, was wound up in 1991, when the 
state monopoly was decentralised into 15 units. The decline in the concentration 
rate CR4 was slightly reinforced by decentralised privatisation from 1992 to 
1995, which split the 15 county-based companies into further constituents, creat-
ing a total of 64 dairy processing facilities.47 
When the SPA decided to involve domestic milk producers and other domes-
tic investors in the privatisation, it offered them compensation coupons and 
favourable credit to buy dairy processing companies. The foreigners were more 
successful in the bidding process, however, and managed to grasp the largest and 
most prosperous processing units. The dairy companies in Hungary have tradi-
tionally focused on the domestic market, and their processing facilities are geo-
graphically scattered over the entire area of the country. 
47  Decentralisation, which started in 1992, affected the production structure of the industry con-
siderably, but is not so prominent on the FDI-concentration map, due to the moderate changes 
in the market shares of the four largest companies. 
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Figure 24. Life-curve for the Hungarian dairy processing industry between 
1989 and 1998. 
Foreign firms have invested huge amounts in quality improvements, packag-
ing, marketing, distribution and logistics. At present, there are five major foreign 
firms in the Hungarian dairy industry: Parmalat, Danone, Bongrain, Nutricia and 
Gala Italia. The only large processor in domestic ownership, Baranyatej, has 
failed in its struggle against intense foreign competition in 1999. Besides these 
large firms, the dairy industry consists of over 60 companies of various sizes. 
Given the severe competition for market shares, the companies have no other 
choice than growth. Dozens of domestically owned, financially wealc companies 
are operating with outdated equipment, poorly organised raw material supplies 
and an old-fashioned product mix. These are easy prey for the strong, expanding 
foreign-owned processors, which usually buy them up in order to secure their 
shares of the market. The intensity of the competition is characterised by the fact 
that after a few years of operation, the foreign owners of Avonmore decided to 
give up their aggressive market expansion policy and withdraw from the indus-
try. 
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Figure 25. Company acquisitions in the Hungarian dairy industry between 1995 
and 1999. 
Concentration in the dairy industry started in 1995 and speeded up after 1998. 
The value of CR4 has primarily grown through acquisitions, but some of the large 
companies also expanded by extension of their corporate premises. The process 
of concentration is illustrated in Figure 25, in which the six largest companies 
are highlighted on the map. The sizes of the companies refer to total sales 
revenues in 1996 and 1997. Having been as low as 29 percent in 1995, CR4 
jumped to 43 percent by 1998 and is expected to reach 65 percent by 2002 
(Szabö 1998). The shaded area in Figure 24 marks expected position of the dairy 
industry in the next decade. 
7.3.4.4. The Milling and Animal Feed Industries 
The life-curves for both of these industries concerned with grain processing are 
covered by area B on Figure 21. Hungarian agricultural policy has always con-
sidered the milling industry strategically important for security reasons related to 
basic food supplies, and grain production and grain exports were always con-
ducted within a carefully supervised framework. State control and coordination 
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was in the hands of the Grain Trust until its abolition on December 31, 1989. 
This was partly attributable to the strategic importance of the industry, which 
meant that the restructuring and privatisation of milling enterprises could pro-
ceed only slowly in the crossfire of political debates. The other reason for the 
delay in privatisation was the weak financial status of the would-be agricultural 
producer-owners and of the milling companies themselves. 
Until 1992, the Hungarian statistical office recorded only one independent 
industry that encompassed both milling and feed mixing. Separate figures for the 
two fields have been available for analysis only since 1993. Monitoring the 
patterns of grain processing nevertheless provides a number of interesting 
lessons. The initial position of the two industries was naturally identical in 1993, 
but they followed very different routes in the subsequent years. 
The privatisation of the milling industry was a matter of timing, being sched-
uled to occur after the first wave of privatisation, i.e. after 1991-1993. By that 
time, entire food processing industries had been sold off to foreign investors and 
the predominant attitude in privatisation policy had changed in response to inter-
nal pressure in the agrifood chain. The new concept of privatisation diverged 
from the previous policy in three main aspects: 
(1)A policy of "positive discrimination" was pursued in order to pro- 
mote domestic ownership in the case of the remaining large 
processing industries. This had the best chance of success in the 
milling industry, since limited foreign interest had been expressed 
in the milling enterprises anyway. 
(2) Privatisation was to take into account the entire agrifood supply 
chain. The preferred group of domestic owners included agricul-
tural raw material producers, the employees and managers of 
objects of privatisation and bakery companies. 
(3)The third important aspect of the new privatisation policy after 
1993 was decentralisation. In the grain sector, this was manifested 
in a substantial disaggregation of the 19 large, county-based grain 
trading and milling companies. Out of the 480 facilities, 127 mills, 
87 feed plants, 225 storage houses and 7 feed compounding 
(premixing) facilities were designated to he privatised separately 
(Raskö 2000). 
For the above reasons, privatisation resulted in a predominance of domestic 
ownership. Foreign companies were squeezed out of the privatisation proce-
dures, which primarily involved compensation or special credit access for do-
mestic buyers. On the other hand, agricultural producers did not have the eco-
nomic power and real capital to manage their new property, many of the priva-
tised processing units had no real market prospects. Therefore, the ownership 
structure had changed substantially by 1997, through the sale of companies. 
Shares, which originated from compensation-based purchases and employee 
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Figure 26. Ownership structure of the milling industry after the completion of 
privatisation in 1997. 
buy-outs, gradually lost importance, and domestic corporations became the 
dominant owners (Figure 26). 
The milling industry struggled with crisis in the 1990s. Redundant capacity 
grew tremendously because of export market problems, and the companies were 
carrying serious debt burdens. With very rare exceptions, there were no invest-
ments aimed at improving efficiency. The situation was further exacerbated by 
the sudden development of market fragmentation, in that there were over 150 
firms operating in the industry in 1995, either as spin-offs from the 19 county-
based companies or as newly established enterprises. The tense economic envi-
ronment led to tough competition. Overproduction pushed the price of flour 
down, and although the smaller mills withstood the competition for a while ow-
ing to their flexible attitude, they have recently started to be eliminated from the 
market. A mass bankruptcy of small mills can be predicted in the coming years, 
and the only feasible solution for the remainder will be a concentration of capital 
and the involvement of external sources and improvement of efficiency. 
Concentration in the milling industry, primarily by the same owners acquir-
ing groups of large mills, began inunediately after decentralisation was com-
pleted. Thus the owners are typically grain trading companies or other enter-
prises that have interests in the sector. The three strongest groups are Agrograin 
(owned by the US Cargill company), the Agrimpex-Agrimill group (backed by a 
British financial investor) and Gabona Co., which is also involved in grain 
trading. The mills themselves have also promoted concentration by means of 
cross-acquisitions. The process accelerated in 1999 and 2000, and is expected to 
continue in the coming years. 
One interesting phenomenon is a wave of company acquisitions by various 
processing industries in the grain chain. Beside the grain trading companies, the 
largest mills, pasta manufacturers and bakeries are also involved in company 
acquisitions in order to strengthen their vertical positions. 
The presence of 10-15 large and medium-scale processors has maintained the 
concentration ratio in the animal feed industry at a vety low level for years. For-
eign capital has been constantly strengthening its position primarily by establish- 
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Figure 27. Organisational chart of business and ownership relations in the 
grain chain. 
ing new ventures. The bulk of the basic, inexpensive mass feeds are typically 
produced by domestically owned companies, while the foreign-owned pro-
cessors are more active in the manufacture of products with high value added 
such as premixes, additives and pet foods. The life-curve for the animal feed 
industry indicates a permanently atomised market structure in which concentra-
tion is expected to proceed slowly, primarily through corporate growth on the 
part of the largest processors as opposed to acquisitions. This industry is usually 
among the less concentrated ones elsewhere in Europe, as well. 
Analysing the FDI-concentration map, the disparate routes followed by the 
two industries may seem surprising at first sight, since they had a common 
predecessor in the former milling industry, and many of the companies 
concerned still have interests in both activities.48 The proportion of foreign 
capital has rarely stayed so low in the Hungarian food processing sector as it has 
in the case of milling industry. The life-curve for milling has not moved 
significantly to the right on the diagram even in recent times (Figure 28), 
whereas the animal feed industry has attracted considerable foreign capital. The 
motivations of foreign investors become obvious when we compare the profit 
rates of the two industries (Table 18) and see that the gap has widened notably 
since 1996 and had risen above 8 percentage points by 1998. The problems of 
marketing fiour and the enormous amounts of redundant capacity explain the 
negative profitability recorded in the milling industry. 
48 In accordance with the standards of industry classifications, companies are categorised into 
the milling or animal feed industries on the basis of their majority activities in terms of sales 
revenue. 
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Figure 28. Life-curves for the Hungarian milling and animal feed industries 
between 1989 and 1998. 
Thus the differing industry life-curves for the milling and animal feed indus-
tries can be attributed to their significantly different rates of profit. Beyond the 
specific domestic reasons, the differences in foreign influence between the two 
industries also refiect international patterns. 
Table 18. Profit rates in the milling and animal feed industries between 1991 
and 1998 (in percent of sales revenues). 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Milling -1.68 0.39 3.70 1.67 -1.58 -1.78 
-0.11 -0.72 
Animal feed. -0.32 2.02 2.69 3.38 4.68 6.24 
Source: own calculations based on data from AKU, 1990-1999. 
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7.3.4.5. The Fruit and Vegetable Processing Industry 
Fruit and vegetable processing followed route B in the early 1990s, but tempo-
rarily moved to zone C in the middle of the decade. The Canning Industry Trust 
had been discontinued in the 1980s, and 14 large companies were left operating 
as independent units but under state control. The market losses in the early 1990s 
hit the canning industry more seriously than any other part of the Hungarian food 
processing sector. The eastern markets used to absorb a half of canning output, 
but the system, built on the existence of a favourable sales mechanism, collapsed 
in 1991. 
The special nature of the privatisation that took place in this industry can he 
imputed to these market losses. Enormous stocks of goods accumulated, and 
companies were unable to pay back their revolving credits. Many companies ori-
ented towards the eastern markets became insolvent and went bankrupt, and the 
banks were forced to take over the liquidated canning companies in settlement of 
their loans after a wave of bankruptcies in 1991 and 1992. The National Com-
mercial and Credit Bank alone acquired nearly half of the Hungarian canning 
capacity by 1994 (Raskö 2000). The banks attempted to sell off the large canning 
facilities directly, as a matter of their own financial interests rather than in com-
pliance with the official intentions of decentralised privatisation. Nevertheless, 
the State Property Agency managed to sell only three companies, Nagykörös, 
Kecskem& and Nagyatåd, through the conventional bidding process. 
As a consequence of these bankruptcies, the large-scale companies incurred a 
loss in their market power, and a more scattered market structure emerged. Over 
200 new firms were founded in the industry between 1992 and 1998. The con-
centration ratio CR4 reached its lowest point in 1995, a situation which could he 
ascribed to the high number of large companies and their balanced positions with 
regard to market shares. The jump in the life-curve for the industry in 1996 is 
associated with the establishment of the Limpex group, consisting of several 
processing units. Quite interestingly, the proportion of foreign capital declined 
in the same year, largely on account of an alteration in the statistical classifica-
tion of two refrigerating companies and several processing and trading enter-
prises between 1995 and 1996.49 
After 1996, the level of the concentration ratio CR4 on the life-curve for the 
industry became established at between 30 and 33 percent. The decline in 1998 
is the result of a further equalisation of market power among the large compa-
nies. The life-curve obviously does not capture the inter-industrial concentration 
49 The changes involved such firms that had high foreign ownership. Goldsun Co and Baja 
Refrigerating Co were excluded from fruit and vegetable processing, the latter one was 
consolidated into Unilever. At the same time, some processing-trading companies were 
classified into trading activities. 
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Figure 29. Life-curve for the Hungarian fruit and vegetable processing industry 
between 1989 and 1998. 
of overall canning activities, such as the company acquisitions of Globus, which 
is classified as operating in the meat processing industry. 
A deeper look at the structure of fruit and vegetable processing industry re-
veals further peculiar features. The production structure was analysed by seg-
menting the companies into three groups based on their sales revenues. The 
number of companies with sales revenues above HUF 1 billion (approximately 
USD 5 million50) was 27 in 1997, which demonstrates the market fragmentation 
even among the large participants. This group accounted for over 80 percent of 
the foreign capital, and a similar proportion of the total sales revenues. This is a 
unique phenomenon, since in other industries ali the foreign capital is typically 
centralised in large companies, whereas here the small and medium-scale com-
panies have a share of the foreign capital that corresponds to their market power. 
The situation is also somewhat fluid, as out of the medium-scale companies, 
50 See notes of Table 19 for accurate equivalent figures in 1997 and 1998. 
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seven achieved revenues of over HUF 1 billion in 1998 and joined the group of 
large companies. The figures suggest green-field investments with full or partial 
participation of foreign capital, as these investments mature with time and the 
sales revenues of the companies increase. 
The amount of the registered company capital in the group of small-scale 
companies that was in foreign ownership grew from USD 0.78 million to USD 
Table 19. Structural data on the Hungarian fruit and vegetable processing 
industry in 1997 and 1998. 
over 	USD 5 	below Industry 
Company groups by sales revenuesa, b 
	
USD 5 	million USD 0.5 total 
million 	- 0.5 	million 
million 
1997' 
Number of companies 27 61 144 232 
Total sales revenues (million USD) 532.66 122.59 13.92 669.16 
Division of sales revenues among groups (%) 79.6 18.3 2.1 100.0 
Registered capital (million USD) 137.00 37.96 1.76 176.71 
Registered capital in foreign ownership 
(million USD) 75.35 17.91 0.78 94.04 
Proportion of foreign-owned capital (%) 55.0 47.2 44.2 53.2 
Division of foreign-owned capital among 
groups (%) 80.1 19.0 0.8 100.0 
1998b 
Number of companies 34 69 160 263 
Total sales revenues (million USD) 520.75 112.82 13.52 647.09 
Division of sales revenues among groups (%) 80.5 17.4 2.1 100.0 
Registered capital (million USD) 125.32 24.16 12.48 161.96 
Registered capital in foreign ownership 
(million USD) 78.01 8.37 6.44 92.83 
Proportion of foreign-owned capital (%) 62.2 34.7 51.6 57.3 
Division of foreign-owned capital among 
groups (%) 84.0 9.0 6.9 100.0 
Source: own calculations based on data from AKII, 1998-1999. 
Note: hICa1cuIations  were made with values in Hungarian Forint (HUF), the sales revenue bound-
aries for company groups being over HUF 1 billion, between HUF 1 billion and HUF 100 mil-
lion, and below HUF 100 million. Using the 1997 annual average exchange rate, the accurate 
boundaries in USD are 5.35 million and 0.535 million. 1)/ The accurate boundaries in USD are 
4.66 million and 0.466 million in 1998. 
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6.44 billion between 1997 and 1998, so that almost 30 companies out of the 160 
now have foreign owners, mostly with 100 percent stakes. The high registered 
capital and small sales revenues again suggest the existence of newly established 
companies or green-field investments. 
The results of the above analysis prove that foreign capital penetrated evenly 
into ali company size groups in the fruit and vegetable processing industry, and 
is therefore now present in the industry through both newly established firms and 
acquisitions of large companies. These facts explain the peculiar position of the 
industry on the FDI-concentration map and why the degree of concentration has 
remained relatively low despite the high foreign involvement. The ,data in Table 
19 reflect the tendency for growth on the part of small and medium-sized firms 
founded with foreign capital participation. Their market growth influences the 
level of CR4  only to the extent that the relative position of the market leaders is 
slightly weakened. This fact is responsible for the decline in the initially low 
concentration ratio despite the massive and rising inflow of foreign capital in 
1998. 
The future position of the industry can be predicted to lie somewhere in the 
light-shaded area in Figure 29. There is little probability of any immense growth 
in the concentration ratio CR4; although the strengthening of the large companies 
may increase the ratio slightly. In the event of consolidation by the medium-scale 
companies, a slight decrease in the concentration ratio cannot be excluded, 
either. If the companies' industry classification does not change, then some in-
crease is predictable in foreign participation in the fruit and vegetable industry. 
7.3.4.6. The Bakery Industry 
The bakery industry is the only typical processing segment examined here with a 
life-curve that belongs purely to zone C. In the 1980s the companies operated 
and supplied their goods on regional principles similar to those goveming the 
purchase and market activities of companies in .many other food processing 
industries in the command economy. 
Municipal ownership played an important role in the bakery industry prior to 
corporate restructuring, and the large towns, typically ali ran their own bakery 
facilities. In addition, private ownership- was well represented in the industry as 
compared with other food processing- fields. Out of the 38 companies registered 
in 1988, 23 were in state or municipal ownership and 15 were owned privately or 
by cooperatives (Raskö 2000, p. 18). 
Privatisation of the baking facilities run.by the state and- municipalities began 
in 1992, -when the industry became subject to a.similar decentralised privatisa-
tion concept to that affecting the milling, meat and dairy. industries. Out of the 37 
large companies, five had been restructured before 1992, so that decentralisation 
involved 32 cornpanies, maintairiing a total- of 368 facilities. Ali facilities below 
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Table 20. Number of bakery companies in Hungary between 1985 and 1998. 
Year 	1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of 38 38 57 127 253 393 494 555 591 630 668 701 722 bakeries 
Source: AKII (1991-1999). 
a certain capacity limit had to be detached, so that eventually there were 184 
units to he privatised as separate entities; 75 facilities involved in the programme 
had been sold by 1993, and the remainder were sold within the framework of a 
simplified privatisation model in 1995. 
Hundreds of new companies were established during the 1990s, and the re-
dundant bakery capacity became an acute problem after decentralised privatisa-
tion had been completed. Over-supply has generated an atmosphere of aggres-
sive price competition on saturated markets, and mass bankruptcies on the part 
of small bakeries are probable in the future. 
The life-curve for the bakery industry differs substantially from those for 
most of the other food processing segments, the most evident difference being 
the low proportion of foreign capital. This is not surprising in the light of the 
market structure, since after decentralised privatisation even the leaders did not 
command more than 4-5 percent of the market. This extremely scattered market 
structure did not attract foreign investors. 
The life-curve for the bakery industry has followed the route of a slow in-
crease in foreign participation. Of the bakeries whose products followed conven-
tional Iines, only the retail shop networks, microbakery chains and companies 
supplying the capital city attracted notable investments. The position of the 
bakery industry also changes substantially if the two cookie and biscuit manu-
facturing companies, Györi Keksz and Wolf Hungaria are excluded, for without 
these the level of foreign participation is only 8 percent as opposed to 30 percent 
and the concentration ratio CR4 is only 14.5 percent. The position of the industry 
without the two companies is marked by a separate point in Figure 30. 
The low level of concentration in the bakery industry can he explained by 
several factors: 
The large companies are not strong enough to achieve spectacular 
corporate growth. 
Company acquisition is not practised. 
Some acquisitions stretch over the borders between the bakery, 
pasta manufacturing and milling industries (Figure 27). 
The company acquisitions across the borders between industries in the grain 
chain are obviously not reflected in the 1-1)I-concentration maps, although cross-
ownership relations occur among milling and bakery companies, in order to 
ensure the flow of goods and supplies in the chain (Tarnöczi 1997). 
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Figure 30. Life-curve for the Hungarian bakery industry between 1990 and 
1998. 
If the bakery industry ever alters its position, it will probably proceed very 
slowly towards a higher degree of foreign influence and higher concentration. 
Changes of less than 10 percentage points are probable on both dimensions in 
the next decade. 
7.3.4.7. The Distilling Industry 
Distilling is among the rare industries, which can be found permanently in area 
D in Figure 21. One important feature is that its position has not changed much 
since privatisation, although its course has been restricted to a clearly deter-
mined domain (Figure 31). 
Investors expressed massive interest in these companies, which can be 
explained by the high profit anticipations and excise nature of the products. The 
largest companies were privatised as early as 1991 and 1992. Buszesz Co. was 
purchased by Mauthner and Markhof on the basis of a closed tender, while the 
Zwack family won the tender competition for Buliv Liquer Producing Ltd. This 
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Figure 31. Life-curve for the Hungarian distilling industry between 1989 and 
1998. 
raised the proportion of foreign ownership to 60 percent at once, and the sharp 
growth in sales revenues achieved by the market leader, Buszesz Co., lifted the 
concentration ratio above 75 percent by 1992. After privatisation, however, sev-
eral dozens of new companies entered the market, which together dragged the 
concentration ratio down to the 1991 level. 
Both domestic and foreign-owned companies occur among the newly estab-
lished small and medium-sized firrns, so that like the concentration ratio, the 
proportion of foreign ownership also returned to the 1991 level by 1998. No 
significant change is anticipated in the industry in the next few years, it is pre-
dicted to remain in the domain in which it has been permanently located for eight 
years. 
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7.3.4.8. Other Industries 
The classification of the Hungarian food processing industries is summarised in 
Figure 32, and the history and life-curves of eight sectors, the names of which 
are indicated in bold-italic letters, were discussed in section 7.3.4. As the rest of 
the industries also provide edifying lessons, some further life-curves are pre-
sented in the Annexes 5-10. 
By definition, the' industry life-curveS are closely related to the classification 
derived from the cluster analysis. Nearly ali the industries with a life-curve of 
type A belong to Cluster 1, except for "other foodstuffs" in 1998. The majority of 
the industries of life-curve type B had reached Cluster 2 by 1998, and sugar and 
soft drink manufacturing had moved up as far as Cluster 1. Life-curve type C 
typically contains the members of Cluster 3, while fruit and vegetable process-
ing, winemaking and the milling industry represent intermediate cases and over-
lapping routes between the life-curve types A, B and C, and similarly their cover-
age spanned Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 in 1998. The special life-curve type D 
includes only the poultry industry, as an outlier, in addition to distilling. 
distilling [2] 
Figure 32. Classification of the Hungarian food processing industries into the 
four types of life-curve. 
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7.4. Prospects for Applying FDI-Concentration Maps 
The selected examples of Hungarian food processing industries appropriately 
demonstrate the analytical potential of this dynamic extension of FDI-concentra- 
tion maps. The industry life-curves give authentic information on structural 
changes in the food processing markets on a year-to-year basis, and comparison 
of these allows general tendencies to be identified for the entire food processing 
sector or parts of it. 
Industry life-curves could be applied in three research directions in the 
future: 
(1)It is easy to recognise background relations by constructing these 
life-curves. An unexpected position or move recorded for an 
industry, or an unusual detour, should provoke a search for the 
underlying reasons. 
Secondly, they demonstrate graphically the impacts of known 
historical events such as restructuring, privatisation and other 
economic and political measures. 
Thirdly, although knowledge of the industries' background is 
necessary for making projections, the graphical approach may still 
assist one in predicting possible future routes and scenarios for 
particular industries and their impact on the overall industry 
structure in terms of the two attributes examined. 
The further directions for the application of FDI-concentration maps and new 
research areas may be the following: 
A third extension of FDI-concentration maps could be a concurrent 
extension into the dynamic and spatial directions, in other words, 
the application of industry life-curves to comparative analyses. 
Comparison of corresponding food processing industries among the 
various Central and Eastem European countries may lead to excit-
ing results and interesting conclusions. It may well be possible to 
monitor the impacts of discrepant economic and privatisation poli-
cies by means of such comparative life-curves. This type of analysis 
is not included in the objectives of the dissertation due to its exces-
sive data and time requirements. 
The theory of JO is directed towards the analysis of industries or 
markets, i.e. the meso-economic level, which also possesses other 
attributes besides concentration and FDI. The market for a product 
or group of products has interesting aspects from the Structure-
Conduct-Performance perspective. New types of maps and industry 
life-curves with different content can be constructed by incorporat-
ing new research dimensions. Interesting pairs may be "market 
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structure — industry profit rates" or "FDI — industry profit rates". 
The use of two dimensions at a time results in easily comprehens-
ible and demonstrative maps or life-curves, but in principle, 
the concurrent use of three dimensions cannot he entirely excluded 
either. 
Finally, the analyses can be carried out for other branches of the 
economy and other countries based on the current concept. The 
method may prove suitable for comparing industries in the manu-
facturing sector. 
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8. Central and Eastern European Comparison 
Thesis IV: 
The examples taken from selected Central and Eastern European food 
processing sectors verify the industry preferences of FDI. The choices of 
foreign investors in the food processing industries of the entire region are 
driven by a pursuit for market power. 
The Central and Eastern European aspect of the dissertation does not attempt 
a thorough investigation of the situation in ali the countries in the region, but 
rather the primary objective is a comparative analysis to test the generalisability 
of the tendencies revealed in the case of the Hungarian food industry and to iden-
tify the overall trends in food processing within Central and Eastern Europe. A 
secondary objective is to document the concrete procedures and events that have 
taken place in the national economies, which means that the detailed country-
specific and industry-level information includes concrete illustrations that are of 
fundamental importance. In order to ensure the depth of analysis and to maintain 
the required breadth in the country reports, the scope of the research has had to 
be delimited to a selected group of countries. 
The countries selected for comparison with Hungary are Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. An important selection criterion was the requirement that 
they should represent the diversity of CEE economies in aspects that are espe-
cially important from a food industry FDI perspective. 
Size of the market. Poland represents the large markets in the 
region, Hungary the medium-sized ones and the Baltic states the 
small ones. 
Privatisation of the food industry. Privatisation policy proved to he 
an important determinant of foreign direct investment. The main 
privatisation techniques employed in the context of food processing 
have been commercially based, compensation-based or domestic 
ownership-based, together with mixed privatisation. All of these 
main types can he found in the countries selected. 
The similarity with respect to some characteristics also prompted the compar-
ison. Food industry is a significant segment in the national economies of all five 
countries, and it is a considerable contributor to export eamings. Corporate re-
structuring was launched immediately at the beginning of the reforms in the 
early 1990s, and shortly afterwards food industry set out on the path of recovery. 
Furthermore, all the countries selected here belong to the group of EU aspirants, 
and they are all characterised by advancing stabilisation in their political and 
economic conditions. 
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8.1. Introduction — Food Industry and FDI in Hungary, Poland, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
8.1.1. Operational Environment of the Food Industry 
8.1.1.1. Hungary and Poland 
Hungary and Poland inherited largely differing farm structures in terms of agri-
cultural raw material production, but their food industries entered the period of 
transition on a relatively equal footing. The artificial giants, trusts and other co-
ordinating associations of processors had been removed by the beginning of 
1990 in both countries. Companies continued to operate under state control, but 
already become accustomed to making their decisions fairly independently. 
Relations with the state budget had changed substantially, so that price subsidies 
on foodstuffs had been eliminated and the only essential type of payment that 
remained was export subsidies. 
Special transactions were placed on a conventional business basis with the 
termination of the favourable clearing mechanism of the socialist commercial 
and trading system. Some food processing industries that were traditionally 
oriented towards eastern markets, such as distilling, fruit and vegetables, meat 
processing — and wine making in Hungary — faced serious market problems. 
Exports had to be redirected to markets that represented a reasonable purchase 
power. 
Domestic markets also shrank at the beginning of the new decade, and the 
financial status of the food processing companies worsened. High inflation 
reduced profits and increased the burden of interest payments on bank loans. 
Restructuring and privatisation caused insecurity for the food processing 
companies and thus exacerbated the period of recession. At the same time, 
hundreds of new food processing enterprises were established, taking advantage 
of the economic liberalisation. Competition intensified to an unusual extent on 
the domestic markets, and a wave of bankruptcies swept through some of the 
food processing industries in the mid-1990s. 
8.1.1.2. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
Since Hungary and Poland enjoyed independent status, their food economies 
started out from very similar foundations in terms of the international environ-
ment, but this was not so in the case of the Baltic states, which were detached 
from the Soviet Union and declared themselves independent only in 1990-91. 
Their former internal or domestic relations were fragmented by the new borders, 
and consequently the three countries faced an entirely new situation. Since their 
historical backgrounds differed substantially from those of Hungary and Poland, 
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it is expedient to review the peculiarities of their economic environments sepa-
rately. 
After the Second World War, the structure of the food sector in these coun-
tries had been determined by the command economy prevailing in the Soviet 
Union. Central planning diverted Baltic food manufacturing towards the eastern 
internal markets within a short period, so that it was the densely populated ob-
lasts of the nearby areas and the two large cities — primarily Leningrad and to a 
lesser extent Moscow — that constituted the main markets for Baltic foodstuffs. 
The structure of food industry was developed according to the requirements 
of the market. Dairy and meat rose to be the leading processing industries in ali 
three Baltic states. The vast Soviet market was supplied with inexpensive mass 
products on the strength of consumer price subsidies. The Baltic member repub-
lics were capable of producing three to five times the amounts of basic food 
items that their own consumption would have required. In the early phases of 
development the production facilities were combined to cope with the large size 
of the markets and to make it easier to supervise and control their activities. The 
leading industries, such as the dairy, meat and bakery industries, comprised 5 to 
12 companies in each Baltic republic. 
After regaining independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania found them-
selves in a totally new operational and market environment. The new circum-
stances and the changes in the network of relations between the food processing 
companies reduced the output of the food industry, but the greatest blow of ali 
concerned the changes in market conditions, as the formerly secure Soviet 
markets had been left on the other side of the border. Four factors have hindered 
sales to Russia and to other CIS countries from that time onwards: 
import duties at the new borders, 
tough competition on the markets of the former Soviet Union 
republics, as the Baltic food processors have had to compete with 
subsidised exports and food aid from the western countries, 
punitive measures imposed on Baltic exports because of political 
disputes, 
diminished purchasing power in the CIS countries in the 1990s. 
Domestic economic conditions in the Baltic states changed fundamentally, as 
in ali the other post-socialist economies, and this also implied significant 
changes for the food processing companies. The new types of business, legal 
environment and essentially reformed state budget relations shocked the food 
processors. The most important component of the economic changes was owner-
ship reform, while the market economy also acquainted the processors with a 
previously unknown phenomenon: competition. 
The internal conditions inside the agrifood chain, which are the direct deter-
minants of the economic relations of food processors, have also changed sub-
stantially. This implied a more serious crisis for the Baltic food processors than 
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in other Central and Eastern European countries, since the former vertical rela-
tions once established in the Soviet Union were severely disrupted by the new 
borders. The Baltic food processors lost their access both to cheap agricultural 
inputs such as machinery and feeds and to secure markets. 
8.1.2. The Significance of Food Industry 
Food industry in the selected countries shows divergent characteristics in some 
important aspects, primarily stemming from the different sizes of the markets 
(Table 21). The absolute sizes of the national food sectors can be compared on 
the basis of net sales revenues expressed in USD. 
The output of the Polish food processing sector is three times larger than that 
of Hungary, whereas the Baltic food processing sectors are only a fifth to an 
eighth of the latter in size. Export sales of processed food do •not show such a 
pronounced difference, however, for Hungarian export sales in USD exceeded 
Polish food exports in 1998, and the exports of the Baltic states were one-fifth to 
one-seventh of the corresponding Polish figure (Table 21). 
The proportional indicators demonstrate the significance of food processing 
sector better than do the absolute figures (Table 22). The food industry plays a 
considerable role in ali the five economies, with shares in the GDP ranging 
between 4 and 8 percent. 
Food industry is the leading manufacturing industry in ali five countries. In 
Hungary, its proportion of total manufacturing fell from around 25 percent to 
Table 21. Major indicators of the food processing sectors in Hungary, Poland, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1998. 
Number of Number of 	Sales 	Export 	Export as a 
food employees revenues (million proportion 
processors 	(thousand) 	(million 	USD) 	of total sales 
USD) in the food 
industry 
Hungary 	 2,971 	132.7 	8,108.7 	1,549.5 	19.1% 
Poland 12,107 	548.0 	25,801.4 	1,413.7 	5.5% 
Estonia 	 528 24.2 	964.0 	251.1 	26.0% 
Latvia 806 	36.9 	980.1 	192.1 	19.6% 
Lithuania 	 518 45.8 	1,448.6 	283.2 	19.6% 
Source: AKII (1998, 1999); GUS (1999d, pp. 436-438); SDL (1998c, p. 260), (2000b, p. 16); 
direct data: ESA, Industry and Energy Statistics Section; LCSP, Industry and Fishery Statistics 
Section. 
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Table 22. Significance of the food industry in Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania in 1998 (figures in percent). 
GDP 
Food industry' s proportion of 
manufacturing 	employment exportb 
Hungary 4.16 18.95 3.59 17.50' 
Poland 5.33 25.91 3.48 a 11.17d 
Estonia 4.14 30.24 3.94 9.84' 
Latvia 7.79 29.41 3.54 15.86" 
Lithuania 5.47 28.82 2.76 14.03 g 
Source: KSH (1999, pp. 83, 288, 404-406); GUS (1999c, pp. 391, 544); ESA (1999b, p. 39), 
(1999e, pp. 190-191, 203, 249), (2000a, pp. 90, 110); LCSP (2000a, pp. 20-21); SDL (1999i, 
pp. 94, 542), (2000b, p. 12) 
Notes: Figure from 1997. bi Total export of agricultural raw materials and processed food 
products. ci EU (1998, p. 16), figure from 1996. di GUS (1999a, p. 13). ei ESA (1998, p. 212). 
u LCSP (1999b, p. 265). SDL (1999e, p. 24). 
below 20 percent in 1998, for the first time in the 1990s, a decrease that can be 
attributed to the strengthening of light industry and car manufacturing. 
Food industry accounted for a significant proportion of manufacturing in 
Poland in 1998, one-fourth, and was by far the most important single branch, 
with an output more than twice as great as light industries or metallurgy. The 
domestic market is the primary target for food processing, with almost 90 
percent of the food items being sold on the Polish market. Food processing is 
still more prominent in the Baltic states than in Hungary and Poland, its 
proportion being approximately 30 percent, and although the figure has been 
decreasing for years, it remains overwhelmingly the most important branch of 
manufacturing in ali three countries. 
The proportions of the GDP and national employment in these countries 
accounted for by food industry are compared in Table 22. The figures and their 
interpretation raise the following issues: 
First, food processing contributes more to the economic output of 
each country than would be anticipated from its proportion of the 
labour force. 
Two circumstances place reservations on an analysis of the above 
GDP figures: 
Labour constitutes only one aspect of the production inputs, 
as capital and raw materials are also important constituents 
of the full picture. 
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The proportions of GDP and employment point to the advan- 
tages of the food industry over other branches of the eco-
nomy in the given country and consequently these figures 
primarily reflect the domestic power and position of the food 
industry and can not be used for direct comparison between 
countries. 
The agrifood export ratios are already directly comparable between the coun-
tries examined. Ali five countries export ten percent or more of their food pro-
duction. The export ratios for the Baltic states in 1998 did not fully reflect the 
impacts of the Russian crisis, as they had decreased by only a few percentage 
points compared with the previous years. The balance of trade in food was nega-
tive for both Poland and the Baltic states, so that it was only Hungary that man-
aged to export more food than it imported in 1998. 
Poland' s food exports also play a significant role in the country' s total ex-
ports. Food production did not become as vulnerable here as it did in the Baltic 
states upon the collapse of eastem trade relations, chiefly because of the large 
size of the domestic market, which can be considered extraordinary for this 
group• of countries. Thus the Polish demand was able to alleviate the market 
problems of the food industry at the time of serious recession. The other reason 
is the successful reorientation of export sales to Westem European and CEFTA 
markets, which proceeded as fast as in Hungary. 
8.1.2.1. Corporate Reforms 
The rapid changes of the operational environment for the food processing 
companies have been touched upon in section 8.1.1, but the companies 
themselves also changed fundamentally. The state-owned companies operating 
in a command economy environment had to be altered to private companies that 
comply with the conditions of a market economy. Two stages were required for 
accomplishing the task: 
Restructuring the state-owned companies. This involved adopting 
the conventional business types of a market economy, such as 
limited liability or shareholding companies. Restructuring also 
implied the rationalisation of plant size and profile improvement. 
Privatisation. This involved transforming state ownership into 
private ownership by means of various privatisation techniques. In 
practice, privatisation often implied the disaggregation of large 
companies into smaller segments. 
The two stages often proceeded simultaneously, although there were also 
cases in which they were separated in time. Food manufacturing was typically 
among the first economic branches in the CEE region to be privatised, and the 
whole food industry or some segments of it were subject to exceptional privati- 
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sation regulations in a number of countries, mostly because of the powerful de-
mands for compensation and the tight business connections with the politically 
delicate agricultural sector. 
Ali three major types of privatisation occurred in the food industries of the 
selected group of countries:51  
Commercial privatisation. With the exception of a few industries, 
Hungary applied this type as an overall approach to food process-
ing. Many examples can also be found in Poland and the Baltic 
states, but mostly in second stage processing. 
Compensation-based privatisation. Within the selected countries, 
mostly Lithuania, or the Baltic states in general, represented this 
type, although certain characteristics can be identified in Poland 
and Hungary, albeit to a less extent. Of the CEE countries, which 
are not in the current sample, the privatisation policy in the food 
industry of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Ukraine and Russia 
followed a largely compensation-based pattern. 
Mixed privatisation. A wide spectrum of privatisation techniques 
was applied in Poland, the methods varying not only by industries, 
but also from one company to another. 
8.1.2.2. Food Industry in the 1990s 
The jamming of the raw material supply, market difficulties, the rapidly chang-
ing and insecure economic and legal environment and the radical restructuring of 
the companies drove food production into a severe crisis in the early 1990s, 
when the output from both agriculture and food processing declined drastically 
in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe compared with the leyels in late 
1980s. Agricultural production reached a minimum in 1993-95, whereas food 
processing has recoyered since the mid-1990s thanks to the consolidating do-
mestic markets and to a less extent to the slow revival in exports to the CIS 
countries. 
The output of the food industry in Poland dropped below the average for the 
1980s in the early 1990s and reached a minimum in 1993, since when production 
has grown steadily. A remarkable recovery in fact took place between 1994 and 
1996, although — as in other. CEE countries — the rapid pace of growth slowed 
down by the end of the decade. 
The food output in the Baltic states ranged from USD 0.9 to 1.5 billion in 
1998, but this spectacular development was hit dramatically by the Russian fi- 
51  The model known as "employee privatisation", which was applied in its purest form in Slove-
nia, is not regarded a separate type here. It has been used in ali the selected countries to some 
extent, but has not dominated privatisation of the food industry in any of them. 
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nancial crisis in August 1998. Sales started to decrease at once, and the annual 
decline in the following year was as high as 17, 16 and 6 percent in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania, respectively (Table 23/a). The sales problems on the east-
ern markets had repercussions for domestic food prices, as products initially in-
tended for export ended up on the domestic market and generated a state of over-
supply, which - through intensive competition - dragged food prices down. 
Tables 23/a-c. Trends in food processing indicators from 1993 to 1999. 
Sales revenues (million USD) 
1993 	1994 	1995 	1996 	1997 	1998 	1999a 
Hungary 	6,800 	7,958 	8,672 	8,608 	8,247 	8,109 	8,336 
Poland 	14,540 15,015 18,594 24,187 24,413 25,801 26,137 
Estonia 	n.a. 	584 	760 	811 	933 	964 	801 
Latvia 	n.a. 	. 610 	706 	883 	994 	980 	840 
Lithuania 	981 	1,028 	1,052 	1,283 	1,446 	1,449 	1,362 
Gross industrial profit rateb (in percent) 
1993 	1994 	1995 	1996 	1997 	1998 	1999 
Hungary 	0.24 	0.73 	0.70 	1.55 	2.77 	2.72 	2.94c 
Poland 	1.73 	2.09 	2.52 	2.71 	2.37 	2.11 
Estonia 	n.a. 	n.a. 	0.18 	1.96 	2.46 	-0.65 	0.029d 
Latvia 	n.a. 	n.a. 	n.a. 	6.07 	6.13 	1.26 	0.002e 
Lithuania 	n.a. 	n.a. 	7.92 	5.26 	5.08 	3.05 
Labour productivity (thousand USD/capita) 
1993 	1994 	1995 	1996 	1997 	1998 	1999 
Hungary 	40.7 	49.2 	56.8 	59.8 	58.6 	55.9 
Poland 	28.8 	30.2 	35.2 	45.8 	45.4 	47.1 
Estonia 	n.a. 	20.9 	28.8 	31.9 	36.5 	39.8 
Latvia 	n.a. 	17.7 	21.1 	25.2 	26.2 	26.5 
Lithuania 	14.0 	17.3 	17.2 	25.0 	31.0 	31.6 
Source: AKII (1998); GUS (1999c, pp. 391, 459), (1999d, pp. 436-438); SDL (1998b, pp. 8), 
(1998c, p. 260), (1999h, p. 16), (2000b, p. 16); direct data: ESA, Industry and Energy Statistics 
Section; LCSP, Industry and Fishery Statistics Section. 
Notes: ai Source: UN (2000, p. 75). bi Profit before taxes/gross sales revenues. ei The figure was 
calculated based on the 606 largest food processors' profits. di19991 half, ESA (1999g, p. 33), 
(1999h, pp. 10, 47). ei 1999 I. half, LCSP, Industry and Fishery Statistics Section. 
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While prices in general continued to rise at a moderate pace of 1 to 3 percent, the 
prices of food decreased by 2-3 percent (UN 2000a, p. 79). 
The Russian crisis undermined the profitability of Baltic food manufacturing 
so much that it became negative in Estonia in 1998 and diminished seriously in 
Latvia and Lithuania (Table 23/b). Although the profit rate in the food industry 
has grown at a modest rate in Hungary, it had approached 3 percent by 1999. 
Profitability in Poland has remained stable between 2 and 3 percent since as 
early as 1994. 
The data in Table 23/c show the sales revenues per capita between 1993 and 
1998.52 The figures indicate an expeditious improvement in ali these countries. 
One important background factor is the steady lay-off of labour. Output levels 
rose every year between 1993 and 1998, in spite of the concurrent fall in employ-
ment. 
8.1.3. Foreign Direct Investment in the Food Industry 
Both the changes in the external economic environment and the internal restruc-
turing placed a severe financial burden on the food processing companies of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Maintaining the previous production levels proved 
to be a great challenge, and the revolving credits used for raw material procure-
ment imposed excessive interest burdens on them. More and more firms were 
forced to postpone investments, and even the replacement of fixed assets. Since 
Table 24. Proportions of foreign-owned registered company capital in the food 
processing industries of Central and Eastern Europe on December 31, 1998 (in 
million USD). 
Hungary 	Estonia 	Latvia 	Lithuaniaa 
Registered company capital 1,756.2 134.4 249.4 620.7" 
of which: foreign-owned 1,099.6 58.9 71.1 124.8 b 
Source: FOSZ (1999, pp. 2, 37); ESA (2000a, p. 94); LCSP (1999a, p. 11); SDL (1999b, pp. 
22-23). 
Notes: al Data from 1999 first half. Equity figures. 
52 Calculation of the classical labour productivity indicator would have required figures for value 
added in the food industry, which were unavailable. 
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the state had withdrawn from subsidising their investments and the banking 
sector was developing concurrently with the reforms in the agricultural and food 
sector, an acute shortage of capital emerged. This coincided with the change in 
ownership of the food processors. The new owners were required to finance the 
purchase prices for the companies and their modernisation investments at the 
same time. 
There were realistic chances of succeeding in these two things simul-
taneously only with the involvement of external resources, and in this respect 
foreign investors proved to be financially strong new owners who could afford to 
inject sufficient capital into the daily operations of the companies and into tech-
nical improvements and modernisation. They showed great interest in food 
processing in Central and Eastem Europe from the outset, and foreign capital 
started to flow in immediately after corporate restructuring had been completed. 
Although the changes in ali the countries of the region practically coincided 
in time, foreign investors showed varying interest in the food industries of the 
different countries. A marked disparity emerged among the five countries as far 
as foreign capital penetration was concemed (Figure 33), the reasons for which 
will be investigated below. 
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Figure 33. Proportions offoreign-owned registered company capital in the food 
industries of the five CEE countries examined as of December 31, 1998.53  
53 For Poland: 1997 data, sales by foreign-owned companies as a proportion of total sales in the 
food industries. 
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8.1.3.1. Distribution of FDI between Food Industries in Poland and 
in the Baltic States 
Foreign direct investment in the food industry followed an uneven distribution 
among countries, and also among the individual segments of the food industry in 
each country. The general tendencies for the distribution of FDI among the food 
processing industries of the CEE countries have already been presented in sec-
tion 5.1, and these overall trends also held good in Poland and in the Baltic 
states. 
The case of Poland is quite peculiar in terms of the arrival agenda for FDI and 
its distribution among the food processing industries. Foreign investments 
flowed in slowly in the early 1990s, even in the case of the internationally very 
popular segments, but later on, from the middle of the decade onwards, the influ-
ence of foreign capital increased sharply in the soft drinks, beer, tobacco and 
confectionery industries and a medium level of foreign participation was re-
corded in the potato, fish and fruit and vegetable processing. Foreign invest-
ments have entered the largest segments, such as meat and dairy products, very 
cautiously (Table 25), obviously on account of the large size of these industries. 
In the Baltic states it was the industries manufacturing high value added 
products such as tobacco, confectionery, soft drinks, beer and sugar that were 
sold first, whereas foreign capital was slow to enter the bakery, meat and dairy 
industries, and almost no interest has been shown towards the milling industry, 
except in Latvia (Table 25). 
Table 25. Proportions of foreign ownership in the food processing industries of 
Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (in percent).54 
Hungary Polanda Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Dairy 59.2 17.7 9.2 0.5 32.6 
Meat 41.7 13.3 69.8 18.1 4.1 
Fish 27.3 2.1 14.4 4.5 
Sugar 33.0 15.8 32.0 67.0 
Bakery 30.6 16.1 44.7 41.3 6.7 
Brewery 90.3 78.3 81.8 61.3 82.1 
Tobacco 93.3 87.6 81.0 98.8 
Source: EFOSZ (1999, p. 37); GUS (1999d, pp. 436-441); direct data: ESA, Industry and Energy 
Statistics Section; LCSP, Industry and Fishery Statistics Section; Latvian and Lithuanian industry 
sources. 
54 Baltic states and Hungary: proportion of foreign-owned registered company capital, 1998 
data. Poland: 1997 data, sales by foreign-owned companies as a proportion of total sales in the 
food industries. 
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Dairy industry has been the flagship of food processing in ali three Baltic 
states. So far, Lithuania has attracted an appreciable amount of foreign capital 
into its dairy industry almost entirely in the form of financial investments, while 
the dairy industry of Estonia has lured a few strategic investors. The other impor-
tant segment, meat processing, has aroused the interest of foreign investors 
mostly in Estonia, where they already own nearly 70 percent of the industry. The 
bakery industry has been a popular investment target in Estonia and Latvia, and 
its attractiveness is also expected to increase in Lithuania in the future. The sugar 
and confectionery industries in Lithuania are predominantly in the hands of 
foreign investors. 
Foreign investors purchased the tobacco monopolies in ali three countries in 
the early phase of privatisation,55 and the beer industry proved equally attractive 
in all three countries. Beer consumption in the Baltic region started from a rela-
tively low level but showed a brisk recovery, and this was definitely among the 
major motivating factors. 
8.1.3.2. National Characteristics of FDI in the Food Industry 
The characteristics of foreign direct investment in the food industries in Hungary 
were discussed in Chapters 5 to 7, and we will now focus below on the corres-
ponding major tendencies in the other four countries. 
Poland, having a market of nearly 40 million consumers, attracted a remark-
able amount of foreign capital. The largest investors were multinational enter-
prises that favoured the manufacturing of high value added products. These dis-
tinct preferences of investors have resulted in a sharp anomaly in the investment 
structure within food manufacturing. Modernisation of the companies is pro-
ceeding dynamically in the expanding industries that are subject to foreign influ-
ence, such as tobacco, soft drinks, beer and vegetable oil, which primarily supply 
domestic markets. On the other hand, the amount of investment in sugar, meat 
and dairy processing has remained below the desired level for international com-
petitiveness. 
Inward foreign direct investment possesses numerous interesting characteris-
tics in Poland. The primary reason for the slow inflow was the indecisive and 
unclear process of privatisation of the food industry. An illustrative example is 
the tobacco industry, which enjoyed the greatest popularity among foreign in-
vestors throughout the whole region. This was in the hands of foreign investors 
in Hungary, and even in the Baltic states, as early as 1993, but the same level of 
penetration was reached in Poland only in 1996. The impatient foreign investors 
55 The Estonian company has ceased production since the acquisitions. The story of the Estonian 
tobacco industry is discussed in section 8.5.6. 
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resolved the problem of slowness and lack of transparency in privatisation by 
means of green-field investments in some industries, where this strategy resulted 
in two features: (1) foreign influence increased slowly due to the size of the in-
vestments and the time interval they required to mature, and (2) a considerable 
technology gap arose among processing companies in the same industries. 
A common characteristic of the Baltic states is the small size of their markets, 
as even the combined number of consumers remains under 8 million. Market size 
affected the inflows of foreign direct investment in several ways: 
Firstly, the largest investors set foot in only one of the countries and 
supplied the entire Baltic market from there, taking advantage of 
the Baltic Free Trade Agreement (BAFTA). 
Secondly, the multinational enterprises, pursuing an even broader 
perspective, did not establish production facilities there at ali, but 
considered the Baltic market an extension of Poland. 
Thirdly, the magnitude and proximity of the Baltic markets have 
best suited food processing investors in the adjacent Nordic coun- 
tries (Table 26). 
Despite the fact that privatisation policy shared many similar characteristics 
in the three Baltic states, the pattern of FDI in the food industries showed some 
discrepancies between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since a detailed account of 
the disparities and common characteristics will be given in section 8.4, the 
following list will highlight only some particularly important and interesting 
factors: 
In Estonia, the receipt of foreign capital in the food industry has been deter-
mined by the country's renowned liberal economic policy. The removal of ali 
import duties, including those on foodstuffs, in the early 1990s was a truly 
unique political measure for the whole of Europe. Outside observers expected 
this to reduce the inflow of foreign capital, since the substitution threshold for 
food imports as opposed to domestic production was very low. This caused the 
country' s food trade balance to sink sharply to a deficit, but the foreign investors 
did not entirely stay away. Apart from a couple of multinational enterprises, the 
majority of the investments originated from Finland, which has close linguistic 
and cultural ties with Estonia. Foreign capital increased its ownership ratio to a 
very high figure, reaching 43 percent in 1998. This can be attributed to the small 
size of the country and its food industry, so that the acquisition of a few compa-
nies elevated the proportion immediately. 
Latvia presents two interesting characteristics. Privatisation resulted in not-
able overlaps between the new owner groups and political leaders at the state and 
local levels. Although this phenomenon is familiar in many other transition 
econornies, the interconnection between active politics and corporate ownership 
has been particularly strong in Latvia. The other peculiarity is the high share of 
"foreign investments" with a domestic background. The number of "off-shore" 
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enterprises is exceptionally high in the Latvian food industry by comparison 
with other post-socialist countries. In fact, domestic ownership is behind many 
of these investments. These are rarely strategic investors, the nature of the in-
vestments tending rather to be financial, a geographical detour aimed at taking 
full advantage of the special financial or taxation incentives offered to foreign 
investors. 
Lithuania has a fair-sized food industry, especially in relation to its size and 
geographical location. Some multinational enterprises entered the country and 
built bases there, and one special characteristic of foreign investments in the 
Lithuanian food industry is the relatively high proportion of financial invest-
ments. Almost ali dairy investments and some of those in the animal feed indus-
try originate from development and investment funds, or from other financial 
institutions. As opposed to the general tendency in Central and Eastern Europe, 
there are also numerous companies with less than a 50 percent share in foreign 
ownership in Lithuania. 
8.1.3.3. Geographical Origin of FDI in the Food Industry 
The giant multinational enterprises that have invested in food processing facili-
ties in Hungary and Poland have naturally influenced the distribution of FDI by 
geographical origin (Table 26). The most active countries in the Hungarian food 
industry have been the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the USA, repre-
sented primarily by multinational companies, and Austria and Germany, which 
took advantage of their geographical proximity. 
The investments made by a few large multinational companies also deter-
mined the rank order of investing countries in Poland, where the leading coun- 
Table 26. Top three investing countries in the food industries of Hungary, 
Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1998. 
Hungary Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
g 2 
 i 	> Netherlands USA Finland Finland USA 
 Austria Germany USA Great-Britain Denmark 
> o 
 c.) Germany Netherlands Sweden Sweden Finland 
Source: KSH (2000b, pp. 70-89); LCSP (2000a, p. 11); SDL (1999c, p. 14); direct data: 
PAIZ; ESA, Industry and Energy Statistics Section. 
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tries were the United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United King-
dom, while Germany also showed notable investment activity utilising its geo-
graphical proximity through the agency of its small and medium-scale investors. 
The minor differences between the Baltic privatisation policies largely influ-
enced the advance of foreign capital into the individual states. Estonia was the 
most successful in attracting foreign direct investment, largely on account of its 
manner of privatisation and its geographical proximity and close cultural rela-
tions with Finland and to some extent Sweden. These two adjacent Nordic coun-
tries have accounted for two-thirds of total inward food processing investments 
in Estonia. The food processors of Northern Europe generally attempted to take 
advantage of the investment prospects in the Baltic region. 
Foreign investments arrived in the Baltic states in two waves. Some multina-
tional companies appeared in the first wave in the early 1990s, while the North-
ml European investors arrived in the second wave and have gradually increased 
their influence ever since. 
The following two conclusions can be drawn from the distribution of FDI in 
the food industry by geographical origin in the five selected countries: 
Two large groups of investors can be identified: (1) multinational 
companies and (2) enterprises in adjacent or nearby developed 
countries which take advantage of their geographical proximity. 
The multinational companies have been more active in the larger 
host countries, whereas investors from the adjacent countries have 
had a greater weight in the FDI stock of smaller host countries, 
whose markets are considered marginal by the transnationals. 
Based on the review of the major characteristics and indicators of the state of 
FDI and food processing in Hungary, Poland and the Baltic states, we can 
conclude that the FDI penetration pattems into the food industries comply with 
the general trends for Central and Eastern Europe in ali five countries. 
8.2. Comparative Extension of FDI-Concentration Maps — Driving 
Forces Determining the Industries' Positions 
A dynamic extension for FDI-concentration maps was defined in section 7.1 
(page 112), when industry life-curves were used to trace the history of the 
Hungarian food processing industries over the past decade. The comparative 
approach offered by FDI-concentration maps involves a new extension aspect, 
namely geographical extension for a single period of time, according to which 
national FDI-concentration maps can be defined as scatter plots including the 
positions of ali observed food processing industries for a given country in a 
given year. Several factors affect the positions that these industries will take up 
on the map. From the viewpoint of the food processing industries, the driving 
forces can be categorised into two major groups: 
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external factors, which can further be decomposed into global, re-
gional and national forces, affecting ali food processing industries 
equally, and 
internal factors, which are associated with the industry' s inherent 
characteristics, special features, group of products, manufacturing 
technology etc. 
Although the discussion relates primarily to the food industry, most of the 
statements can easily be generalised to other manufacturing industries. 
8.2.1. External Factors 
8.2.1.1. Globalisation — the Ultimate External Factor 
Globalisation has taken up the attention of economists for over two decades.56 It 
is a trend that has substantially modified the worldwide economic environment. 
In his analysis of intemational competition and the historical evolution of global 
industries, Porter (1986) dates the start of globalisation to the end of the 19th 
century, a time of numerous inventions that promoted economies of scale and 
accelerated communication and transportation. 
Between the two world wars, foreign affiliates of global companies usually 
conducted independent strategies, and the world economy was made up of na-
tional economies as separate segments. An intense acceleration of globalisation 
then took place in 1950-70, when a series of new inventions and removal of cer-
tain trade impediments together speeded up the process. In Porter' s view (1986, 
pp. 43-44) the most important factors motivating globalisation are the following: 
Technical developments, which increased the optimal plant size 
many times over in a number of industries. 
The demand for products, which started to become more homo-
geneous with the increase in information flows and private travel 
and the equalisation of incomes. 
The sharp drop in the real costs of transportation after the war, with 
the emergence of new, effective transportation equipment such as 
containers, tanker ships and freight aircraft. This made the shipping 
of bulk commodities fairly inexpensive. 
56 The trend is often interpreted more broadly than as just an economic term. Many scholars 
regard globalisation as a phenomenon prevailing concurrently in the fields of economics, soci-
ety and culture which has both positive and negative attributes. Globalisation usually increases 
social welfare through rationalisation and improved efficiency, but paradoxically, some of its 
impacts also detract from welfare (Dunning 1997). 
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The concurrent relaxing of impediments to international trade such 
as tariffs, cartels and patent associations. 
The strengthening of global coordination at this period. 
Transnational companies emerged which had clear global strategies, and the 
homogenising marketing and business patterns, infrastructure and distribution 
channels allowed these to harmonise the activities of their international subsidi-
aries ali over the world. 
A new acceleration of globalisation was witnessed in the past decade, in 
which Dunning (1995) highlights the impact of two factors: 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s more than thirty countries gave up 
the command economy and over 80 countries liberalised their for-
eign direct investment policies. Market liberalisation reinforced the 
free flows of products and capital both within the transnational 
companies and among independent enterprises. 
The innovation pressure brought to bear on companies. "...the esca- 
lating costs of research and development (R&D) coupled with ever 
truncated product life-cycles are compelling firms both to down- 
size the scope of their production and to search for wider markets" 
(Dunning 1995, p. 127). The companies which spend a lot on inno-
vation feel that they have to combine their accumulated expertise 
with the competence of other firms in order to achieve a better cost-
benefit ratio. This is the clear reasoning behind strategic alliances 
and company mergers. 
The transnational companies, growing through mergers and acquisitions, 
have been the engines of the globalisation in a number of industries. They propel 
the integration of the entire world economy, and it is the very fact of these 
merger and acquisition activities and the reasons behind them that reveal the 
global background to the most significant statement in the dissertation, namely 
the fact that foreign investors in the food processing industries of the CEE region 
are motivated by a market-seeking attitude. The transnational food processing 
companies consider each position on the individual national or regional markets, 
but only a summed market share is regarded as a real indicator of progress. 
Nevertheless, all segments are important contributors to the final result. 
The most significant driving force behind globalisation is derived from a 
fundamental characteristic of "the firm" that is well-known in microeconomic 
theory. The ultimate objective of firms is the maximisation of profits. In order to 
survive in intensifying competition, it has to strengthen its market power and be 
more efficient than its rivals are. Hence globalisation is eventually driven by two 
factors, growth pressure and efficiency pressure: 
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Growth pressure bursts open the boundaries of saturating national 
markets,57 and companies respond to this challenge by stepping out 
into the international arena and targeting new, emerging markets. 
Efficiency pressure is partly connected with growth pressure, since 
efforts to achieve economies of scale simultaneously increase effi- 
ciency. One of the most obvious ways to improve efficiency is to 
reduce costs by employing a more favourable mix of globally avail-
able production factors. Cooperation, mergers and acquisitions 
among companies also serve this purpose, as do changes in produc- 
tion through a recombination of raw materials, labour, technology, 
know-how, or market information. Efficiency pressure, like growth 
pressure, is usually resolved by means of internationalisation, or 
participation in the globalisation process. 
It should he noted how similar the factors motivating globalisation are to 
those motivating foreign direct investment. The list presented on page 67 
includes four FDI motivating factors, of which market seeking is cognate with 
the growth pressure on companies, while the seeking of resources, efficiency and 
strategic assets can he associated with efficiency pressure. 
Companies contribute to globalisation by employing various levels of 
business interaction. The most basic level and at the same time an essential 
component of globalisation in the food industry is growth in world trade. In the 
category of tighter business relations, licensing agreements centred on certain 
products, additives or recipes are worth mentioning, as the executive managers 
of multinational enterprises view these as a transitory phase between 
conventional trade in goods and foreign direct investments. 
While mergers play the dominant role in the globalisation of many industries, 
such as automotive industry, the food industry is characterised by the growth of 
multinational companies through acquisitions. The joint ventures established by 
the multinational food processing enterprises are somewhat transient in nature, 
for sooner or later one or other of the owners will make attempts to buy up the 
whole venture. This could he seen even in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
prior to the economic reforms foreign companies founded joint ventures in order 
to ensure an early presence, many of these being discontinued or purchased 
entirely by the foreign partner during the privatisation and economic liberal-
isation of the 1990s. 
57 This particularly applies to food items, since in accordance with Engel' s law, expenditure on 
food falls coincidentally with growing incomes. Although the decline is somewhat compen-
sated for in the developed countries by the growing consumption of high quality, functional, or 
high value added food products, this is not sufficient to alleviate the severe growth pressure on 
companies. 
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Traill (1996, pp. 390-391) distinguishes three aspects of globalisation in the 
food processing industry, and three areas for economic research: 
International trade theory places the significance of world trade 
and world markets at the centre, and accentuates the power of 
trade for promoting economic growth. 
The representatives of international corporate economics em-
phasise the role of transnational corporations both in world 
trade and in relation to foreign direct investment. 
Marketing professionals represent a third standpoint. In their 
view, globalisation is embodied in converging consumer mar- 
kets. 
Globalisation is effective in the field of food processing in all three aspects. 
(1) Trade in processed food items has speeded up in an unprecedented way over 
the past decades. (3) International consumption patterns are converging in the 
case of numerous food products, and global brands in certain groups of products 
are spreading dynamically throughout the world. 
Given the topic of this dissertation, the explanation contained in the current 
chapter starts out from the company and industry level, hence the survey of the 
literature on the definition of globalisation and the forces that motivate it has 
relied primarily on the standpoints of 10 scholars, who consider that (2) world 
trade and converging consumer markets are facilitators of globalisation, but as-
sert that the real determinant force in the process is the operation of international 
business. 
To summarise the literature review, the definition of globalisation may be 
rephrased as follows: globalisation is an acceleration in trade in consumer 
goods, services, technology, capital and other production factors. It is a bundle 
of business transactions that cross national boundaries and represent the grow-
ing international activity of economic players. 
A knowledge of international procedures is imperative in order to compre-
hend the external forces that affect the market structure and foreign capital pene-
tration in the food processing industries of Hungary and Central and Eastem 
Europe. The major force in this is globalisation, together with its driving forces, 
conditions and implications (Figure 34). 
An important condition on globalisation and recent accelerator of the trend is 
the liberalising world trade in agricultural and food products. One of the major 
topics of discussion in the negotiation rounds of the World Trade Organisation is 
the removal of tariffs and duties impeding trade in agricultural and food products 
(Csåld 2000). The protectionist attitude, which used to justify its goals in terms 
of ensuring food supplies, has been loosening its hold. 
The technical background to this is formed by revolutionary developments in 
the field of transportation and logistics, which facilitate a growing world trade 
even in perishable food products. Besides, other aspects of technical progress 
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such as R&D, communications, business infrastructure and electronics have 
assumed increasing importance in the food industries. Technical progress is 
therefore an indispensable "infrastructure-type" precondition that supports the 
current intensity of globalisation in the food industry. 
The purpose of this discussion on globalisation was to prepare for introduc-
ing the external factors that affect the positions of the food processing industries 
internationally on the FDI-concentration maps. Most of the issues mentioned in 
Figure 34 can he attributed to globalisation. 
Point 0 signals the presumed basic position of an industry on the figure, 
while point P signifies a more concentrated market structure, which may he 
caused by initially high concentration in the industry or the world-wide tendency 
for growth in company sizes. The appearance of a multinational company on any 
national market will definitely promote the concentration process because of the 
very size of the company. 
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Figure 34. External factors at the international level that determine the array of 
industry positions on national FDI-concentration maps. 
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A paradox deserves to be mentioned at this point, namely that the purpose 
frequently attributed to market liberalisation is to promote competition or a 
"deconcentrating process". This may work at the level of a national economy, 
but the direction is reversed internationally through the effects of globalisation: 
the liberalising of world trade results in internationalisation and the consolida-
tion of large companies, which in return, raises the level of concentration on 
individual markets. 
The emergence of point Q instead of point 0 in Figure 34 is a result of the 
same factors that enhance international capital flows. They are the driving forces 
and conditions for globalisation, as described before. The resultant force can be 
derived from the directions of the vertical and horizontal forces, i.e. globalisa-
tion pulls industries towards the zone of point G as opposed to point 0. 
8.2.1.2. External Factors Effective at the Regional and National Levels 
The survey of external factors can be continued at lower geographical levels. 
The factors effective at the regional and national levels can be grouped into 
general and CEE-specific forces. 
The most important general factor on the national economic level that influ-
ences the array of food processing industries on the FDI-concentration maps is 
the economic policy of the respective country. Public policy can drive an indus-
try in virtually any direction on the map. 
The general aspects of economic policy, particularly the attitude towards for-
eign direct investments, affect movements on the horizontal axis. Beyond this, 
the emergence of extreme cases, i.e. points Q and S as opposed to point 0, will 
be detennined by (1) the size of the region or country examined, and (2) the costs 
of capital investments: 
The larger the size of the host market, the more foreign investments 
it will attract. This is outlined in the framework of the gravity 
model in the FDI literature (Brenton et al. 1998; Barrel and Hol-
land 1999). 
Transaction costs, which play an important role among the installa-
tion and operational costs of investments, are determined by the 
general legal, economic and infrastructural environment of the host 
country (Figure 35). 
Competition policy and SME policy will determine the vertical positions of 
industries. A crucial aspect of competition policy is supervision and the right to 
intervene in M&A cases in monopolistic, dominant company or oligopolistic 
markets, in other words to ensure adequate conditions for competition. SME pol-
icy includes the measures by which governments are able to influence entry bar-
riers by enhancing conditions for the establishment and development of small 
and medium-sized enterprises. 
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Figure 35. External factors at the level of the national economy that determine 
the positions of industries on national FDI-concentration maps. 
Besides political factors, which affect market structure, the vertical extremes 
— i.e. the emergence of point P or R instead of 0 — will he driven by relations of 
market size and economies of scale. The pursuing and achieving economies of 
scale would result in a much more concentrated market structure in a smaller 
market, than in a larger market. 
The level of technological development in the food industry in a particular 
country may influence concentration within industries,58 but this is not a neces- 
58 The idea is based on the following logic: the high cost requirements of developing/purchasing 
and ap' plying new techniques or technology imposes a kind of technical threshold, since com-
panies are able to utilise these opportunities only above a certain magnitude. The application 
of the new technology has "spiral repercussions", since it further consolidates the large com-
panies and reinforces concentration. 
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sary determinant. Entry barriers can also modify the position of food processing 
industries on the vertical axis, and there are administrative, economic-financial, 
legal and technical conditions for the entry of new ventures into a market, some 
of which can also he ascribed to forces that operate at the national leve1.59 
8.2.1.3. CEE-Specific External Factors 
The Central and Eastem European countries started their transition from a com-
mand economy to a market economy over a decade ago. The main direction of 
the fundamental economic and social reforms in ali the national economies has 
been the same throughout the region, but the initial stage of development, the 
pace of the reforms and the set of policy measures have varied considerably from 
country to country. Since this geographical extension uses FDI-concentration 
maps to compare the food processing industries of the five selected CEE coun-
tries, a separate review is required of CEE-specific extemal driving forces. 
Privatisation policy and its concrete implementation are the most essential 
external factors of the CEE-specific driving forces on the national FDI-concen-
tration maps, where the positions of food processing industries in the horizontal 
plane are determined by (1) the pace and (2) the type of privatisation:6° 
Protracted privatisation may hold back the arrival of foreign invest-
ments, whereas multinational companies will he keen to exploit 
privatisation that is launched early and implemented rapidly. 
The type of privatisation is another essential factor modifying the 
proportion of a food processing industry in foreign ownership. 
Voucher-based privatisation, or privatisation favouring the inter- 
ests of local actors in the agrifood chain will result in a very low 
presence of foreign investments. Consequently, the industries 
would be located around point S as opposed to point 0. Commer-
cial privatisation, on the other hand, would engender a location 
around point Q instead of point 0. 
Apart from privatisation, the stability of the host country will affect foreign 
investments. A predictable operational environment will stimulate foreign par-
ticipation, while a quickly changing economic environment or political instabil-
ity will restrain it. Consumer demand is another factor affecting the horizontal 
axis, in that greater purchasing power or a higher national income will attract 
foreign capital, while a permanently low level of disposable incomes will obvi-
ously impede foreign investments. 
59 The levels of entry barriers vary from one industry to another, so that this is also listed among 
the internal factors in Figure 37. 
60 Holland and Pain (1998) present a comparative country matrix which encompasses the entire 
Central and Eastern European region and use this to confirm the impact of the type of privati-
sation on FDI. 
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The most influential of the CEE-specific factors determining the position of 
industries on the vertical dimension is again privatisation. Some of the privatisa-
tion strategies in the region left the food processing industries in a concentrated 
position around point P, where they used to be located in the command economy 
era. Conversely, the decentralised privatisation employed by many countries in a 
number of industries induced location in the proximity of point R as opposed to 
point 0. The establishment of competition offices as part of the institutional re-
forms and the policy of enhancing conditions for small and medium-sized enter-
prises became important factors in determining market structure. Similarly, 
bankruptcy and liquidation laws were enacted in most of the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Legal and institutional reforms applied differently in the 
emerging market economies. 
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Figure 36. External factors at the regional and national levels — CEE-specific 
driving forces determining industfy positions. 
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Of the external factors, global factors exert their effects at the level of the 
world economy, while the regional or national factors encompass determinants 
that are effective in certain groups of countries or in individual countries. Never-
theless, since the external factors alone are unable to provide a sufficient expla-
nation for the arrangement of the food processing industries on the FDI-concen-
tration maps,61 a review of internal factors derived from the attributes of indi-
vidual industries is also necessary. 
8.2.2. Internal Factors Affecting the FDI-Concentration Maps 
The cluster analysis of the Hungarian food sector undoubtedly served as 
evidence that food processing is made up of industries that are divergent in many 
aspects, this observation will be confirmed for the entire region in the national 
FDI-concentration maps for the CEE countries to be introduced below (Figures 
38/a-e). The following description includes the internal factors stemming from 
characteristic features of the processing industries themselves that determine the 
positions of industries on the FDI-concentration maps. 
The reasons for the horizontal positions of the food processing industries 
were investigated in Chapters 4 and 5 for the case of Hungary. The list below is 
partly a generalisation of these results, as well as incorporating non-quantifiable 
factors. 
The interest of foreign investors was minimal in the case of incon-
siderable segments of the food industry, or of first-stage processing 
industries which are especially exposed to fluctuations in agricul-
tural raw material production.62 
If the acquisition of an existing company was not possible for some 
reason, foreign investors tended to stay away, or — in the case of 
extremely good profit or market perspectives — they opted for 
green-field investments. 
Foreign capital prefers the second-stage processing industries, for 
two main reasons: (1) there is no agricultural lobby to be feared, (2) 
these industries have excellent market and profitability prospects. 
The cost/benefit ratio of market entry was often very favourable for 
foreign companies in those industries where they were given 
chances to conquer existing market shares by means of company 
acquisitions. 
61  Privatisation or competition policy may treat certain industries or groups of industries differ-
ently from others, even within the same country. In this context, some external factors may 
also govern the distribution of the food processing industries on the FDI-concentration map 
for the same country. 
62 A special exception to this rule concerns the sugar and vegetable oil industries throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Entry barriers and the technically related question of capital intensity may 
modify the location of industries in a vertical direction. Entry barriers and high 
capital, advertising and R&D intensity in a given industry will imply market 
success on the part of large companies, and hence increasing concentration. 
Exclusive knowledge and market rights together with exclusive access to raw 
materials or certain markets, or even preferential access to these -production 
factors, can cause the level of concentration to escalate. 
One important factor may be a market structure with a history going back 
several decades versus one which has evolved very recently. These characteris-
ties not only influence the divergence of individual industries, but may also 
cause noticeable discrepancies in the horizontal investigation of selected food 
processing industries between countries (section 8.5). 
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Figure 37. Internal factors determining the positions of industries on the na-
tional FDI-concentration maps. 
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8.3. Comparative Analysis Based on FDI-Concentration Maps 
The spatial, or geographical, extension of the FDI-concentration maps implies 
their use to examine the food processing sectors of Hungary, Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. The comparative analysis starts with the construction of 
national FDI-concentration maps, for which industry-specific data are needed. 
The latest figures originate from 1998 in the case of Hungary and the Baltic 
states, while detailed data for Poland were available only from 1996 and 1997. 
Foreign influence was measured by the proportion of foreign-owned registered 
capital in the industries in the case of Hungary and the Baltic countries, but due 
to the unavailability of the corresponding figures for Poland, foreign influence 
was assessed from the sales figures of foreign-owned companies in the food 
processing industries. Most of the international data originate from the national 
statistical offices. 
The scope of the food processing industries in the various countries is not 
identical to that in the Hungarian food processing industry, which includes 17 
segments. The main reasons for this are (1) that it is difficult to gain access to 
data and (2) that the structure of food processing differs between the countries: 
In the case of the Baltic states and Poland, data on market concen-
tration and foreign influence were unavailable for some small food 
processing industries. 
Certain food manufacturing fields can he regarded as independent 
industries only in some of the countries observed, due to disparate 
geographical or climatic conditions. 
Winemaking, based on the growing of grapes, does not have 
a measurable equivalent in the Baltic countries for climatic 
reasons. 
Fish processing has an important role in the Baltic countries 
and in Poland, which ali have seashores, but is negligible in 
Hungary. 
Potato processing is considered a separate industry alongside 
fruit and vegetable processing only in Poland, which has 
traditionally been a large potato producer. 
Figures 38/a-e reflect the disparate privatisation policies of the five countries, 
and indicate the differences in the market and production structures of their food 
processing sectors. The international comparison of FDI-concentration maps 
facilitates an interesting and enlightening classification of food processing 
industries. The lessons learnt from the comparative charts in Figures 38/a-e and 
derived from the country-specific analyses in sections 8.4 and 8.5 can be 
summarised in the following points: 
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The principal characteristic of foreign investments in the food 
processing sectors of Central and Eastern Europe is market-seek-
ing. This statement is the most essential conclusion reached in this 
concrete international application of the FDI-concentration maps. 
The relevance of such a generalisation is supported by the fact that 
although the five countries represent categories of varying magni-
tude and applications of different privatisation techniques, the 
foreign investors' preference for concentrated food processing 
industries is a clear and definite trend in ali cases. 
The food processing industries of ali the countries surveyed can be 
grouped into four distinct clusters. A cluster analysis of the Hun-
garian food processing industries was performed in Chapter 6, and 
the section below provides evidence for the above opening state-
ment for the other four countries, too. The four clusters may be 
described as follows: 
Cluster 1: industries with high foreign capital - high industry 
concentration, 
Cluster 2: industries with medium foreign capital - medium 
industry concentration, 
Cluster 3: industries with low foreign capital - low industry 
concentration, 
Cluster 4: industries with low foreign capital - high industry 
concentration.63  
In order to simplify the explanation, abbreviated notations will 
be employed. The names used to identify the clusters are derived 
from the global FDI-concentration map outlined in the conclusions 
to this dissertation.64 
Cluster 1 may be referred to as the global cluster [1].  This 
name may sound bizarre at first, since we are engaged here in 
analysing national food processing sectors, but it is justified 
by the disposition of the global FDI-concentration map, in 
that this cluster encompasses the food processing industries 
which are globalising in the world. Cluster 1 appears in the 
CEE region as a result of the effects of general globalisation 
63 The levels of concentration in Clusters [3] and [4] should be interpreted as high or low accord-
ing to the trend for the country concerned. The CR4 concentration ratios in Cluster [4] are very 
high in the Baltic states, 90-100 percent, whereas those in Cluster [3] are considered "low" by 
comparison, 40-60 percent. Similarly, the CR4 figures for the Cluster [4] industries in Poland, 
although only 40-60 percent, are considered high in relation to the really low figures of 10-30 
percent in Cluster [3] (Figures 381a-e). 
64 A justification of the cluster names is presented in association with the global FDI-concentra-
tion map in Chapter 10, section 10.4.2 (on pages 272-275). 
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on the markets of food products. This means that an active 
and prominent presence of transnational corporations is an 
important feature of these industries, either in their foreign 
trade or in foreign direct investment. 
Cluster 3, having opposite characteristics to the previous 
cluster, consequently receives the name: local cluster [3]. 
This comprises atomised industries which have very modest 
foreign participation. Production in these industries, and 
most often also distribution and sales, will be conducted 
locally. 
Cluster 2 is positioned between the two extremes on the FDI-
concentration map, and can therefore be referred to as the 
middle cluster [2]. While the composition of the global and 
local clusters can be predicted with high probability from the 
given international procedures and characteristics of food 
manufacturing segments, the member industries of the 
middle cluster are not at ali so self-evident. In the food 
processing of a particular country, national economic policy 
directions and other factors determine whether industries 
will eventually take up positions in the middle cluster as 
opposed to the global or local clusters. 
The fourth group is called the transition cluster [4], since it 
comprises highly concentrated, domestically owned food 
processing industries that diverge from the general trend. 
This is a characteristic of the CEE countries, which is one 
reason for the label "transition". Furthermore, the emergence 
of this transition cluster is associated with industry-specific 
exceptions, special stru'ctural or ownership reforms, or an un-
finished privatisation process. This implies that the indus-
tries are expected to leave their current positions and move 
towards lower concentration and/or higher foreign influence 
in the future, in which case the cluster may eventually disap-
pear. 
The above classification is based on the possible domains of 
occurrence of industries on the global FDI-concentration map. The 
clusters on the national maps will be identified as global, local, 
middle or transitional on the grounds of their positions relative to 
each other and the corresponding positions on the global map. 
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3. Despite the similarity of the basic tendency, interesting divergences 
can also be observed in several aspects within the group of coun-
tries. 
a) Concentrated and still domestically owned food processing 
industries exist in ali the countries. The transition cluster [4] 
appears in the Baltic states more markedly than in Hungary or in 
Poland, which can be attributed to two factors: 
The Baltic states did not decentralise ali the food industries, 
and they occasionally set up administrative barriers to restrict 
purchases by foreign investors in certain concentrated indus-
tries. 
The concentrated industries in Poland and Hungary were 
either decentralised through privatisation or sold to foreign 
investors, thus conserving their concentrated structure. 
The trend line marking the relationship between concentration 
and foreign capital is situated higher in the case of ali the Baltic 
states than for Hungary and Poland, on account of the signifi-
cant differences in market size. The Baltic states have 1.5 to 3.5 
million consumers each, and although they have notable export 
sales, their food industry output is much smaller than that of 
Poland or Hungary. Consequently, the CR4 indicators (or CR5 in 
Poland) are to be interpreted quite differently in the Baltic 
states: i.e. the level of concentration is higher on average due to 
the smaller sizes of the industries and the relatively higher 
market shares of the leading companies. 
The Hungarian food processing industries congregate in the 
global cluster [1], while the Polish ones tend to converge to-
wards the local cluster [3]. The reasons are to be found both in 
the different concepts of privatisation and in the sizes of the food 
processing markets in the two countries: 
Privatisation of the food processing industries in Poland has 
been going on for several years and the privatisation policy 
was initially hesitant and featured a combination of different 
approaches, whereas the Hungarian food processing indus-
tries were privatised rapidly and mainly through direct bid-
ding transactions. 
The output of the food processing industry is 3.5 times larger 
in Poland than in Hungary, and the shift in ownership struc-
ture has therefore been quite slow and cumbersome, taking a 
much longer time than in many smaller countries. 
For the above reasons, foreign capital will need a relatively long 
period to gain significant positions in the Polish food industry. 
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Decentralisation predominantly served to fragment the produc-
tion structure of the first stage processing industries, but con-
centration rates in these industries in Poland are expected to fol-
low the Hungarian example with time and to enter a steadily 
rising phase, albeit a slower one than in Hungary. 
d) A peculiar and exceptional disparity can he observed in Lithua-
nia, in that the middle cluster [2] of food processing industries 
is entirely missing. This may he ascribed to the Baltic concept of 
privatisation, a policy, which favoured exclusively domestic 
owners in the case of certain selected industries, whereas com-
mercial privatisation techniques were applied to other indus-
tries. This Baltic privatisation was carried out in its clearest 
form in Lithuania, and the results can still he perceived on the 
FDI-concentration map. The corresponding maps for the Estoni-
an and Latvian food sectors used to show a similar picture until 
the mid-1990s, but have now broken away from this "bipolar 
status". 
8.4. Country-Specific Analyses 
The following country-specific analyses list the characteristics of food process-
ing in the five countries. Despite the separate discussions, the main objective 
remains the comparison of national food processing sectors. Therefore, ali the 
country-specific sections are of similar structure, being concerned with: 
Privatisation. It was privatisation of the food industry, albeit in dif-
ferent aspects, that determined both the market concentration and 
the inflows of foreign direct investment. A summary of privatisa-
tion gives .useful background information prior to the cluster ana-
lysis and the review of the characteristics of food industry FDI. 
Cluster analysis. The cluster analysis of the food processing indus-
tries is intended to demonstrate the presence of the four clusters de-
fined above in the five CEE countries (page 171, point 2). The ana-
lysis provides valuable additional information in many respects: it 
distinguishes the separate groups of industries and it helps uncover 
the characteristics common to industries within the same group and 
the divergent patterns existing between the groups. 
FDI in the food processing industries. Foreign capital has pene-
trated into the food processing industries in an unequal manner in 
each country, and separate examples are needed to illustrate the 
situation in each case. This third analytical point also contains a 
ball diagram, a special graphical transform of FDI-concentration 
maps which introduces a third dimension into the analyses, the sizes 
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of the industries. By contrasting the ball diagrams for the five coun-
tries, further aspects of foreign investments can be identified. 
The discussions on a particular country will entail numerous references to 
parallel or disparate processes in the other countries. It is important to note that 
ball diagrams based on the national FDI-concentration maps, as used in the cur-
rent section (Figures 40, 43, 47, 50, 54), depict the proportions of various indus-
tries within one national food industry at a given time, and thus the sizes of the 
balls are not directly comparable between the charts of the countries.65 
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Figure 39. Four-cluster classification of the Hungarian food processing indus-
tries, based on 1998 data. 
65 The country-specific analyses will be followed by FDI-concentration maps that provide hori-
zontal pictures of certain selected industries across the five countries. The sizes of the balls in 
Figures 56 to 62 are already directly comparable between countries. 
177 
Confectionery 
1 1 	 1 
Vegetable oil Sugar 
Starch 
ltry 
Fruit and 
Vegetable 
Dairy, 	 
Wine 
8.4.1. Hungary 
The cluster analyses for the Polish, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian food 
processing industries suggest that the most appropriate agglomeration level is 
that of four clusters. Although three groups of industries were distinguished in 
the cluster analysis of the Hungarian food processing industries in Chapter 6, the 
position of the poultry processing industry, which was believed to be an outlier 
from the main trend, now becomes clearer in the light of the FDI-concentration 
tendencies of the new countries, so that it can be considered the only representa-
tive of a transition cluster [4]. In order to ensure comparison with the other 
countries, the Hungarian food processing industries may also be subjected to a 
four-cluster grouping using the 1998 data (Figure 39). 
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Figure 40. FDI-concentration map of the Hungarian food industry on three 
dimensions of investigation, based on 1998 data. 
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The history of the Hungarian food processing industries over the past decade 
was monitored by means of a dynamic extension of the FDI-concentration maps, 
i.e. industry life-curves. This brief section on Hungary attempts to provide an 
additional analytical viewpoint in the form of a ball diagram. 
The fact that the largest industries converge in the middle cluster [2J can 
immediately be noticed in Figure 40. As will be noted later, this is a special 
feature of Hungarian food processing. The second observation to be made from 
the figure is the high number of medium-scale industries in the global cluster [1]. 
The intensity of foreign ownership is demonstrated by the combined low weight 
of industries in the local cluster [3]. 
8.4.2. Poland 
8.4.2.1. Privatisation 
Privatisation was regulated by the Act for the Privatisation of State Companies 
passed in July 1990. It was followed by a number of later amendments and new 
regulations, the most important of which were the Act on National Investment 
Funds and their Privatisation (April 1993) and the Act on the Restructuring and 
Privatisation of State Companies (August 1996). Under the first privatisation act 
in Poland, 4,086 state-owned companies and 1,666 state farms were involved in 
a change of ownership (Parkiet 1999). 
Due to the "one company at a time" concept, Polish privatisation began very 
slowly, so the simultaneous privatisation of companies was soon adopted to 
speed up the process. Three major types of privatisation technique were devel-
oped in Poland, the most appropriate of which was selected in each case. 
Indirect privatisation, or capital privatisation, was applied in cases 
of large and medium-sized state companies. The technique implied 
forming the company first into a State Treasury Company (in the 
form of corporation and limited liabilities), after which it could be 
sold to investors. However, only 18 percent of the 1,094 companies 
designated to be privatised by this method were successfully sold to 
private owners (Parkiet 1999). 
Privatisation through liquidation was followed in the case of small 
and medium-sized state-owned companies. Liquidation should not 
be interpreted here in its original meaning, but rather it refers to a 
special technique allowed for in the Act for the Privatisation of 
State Companies. The "liquidated" company was ready for sale or 
leasing immediately. Since the method presumed the interest of one 
or more buyers or potential investors, it was appropriate only in the 
case of financially healthy and attractive companies. Of the 1,408 
companies listed in this group, the privatisation of 1,346 had been 
completed by July 1997 (Parkiet 1999). 
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The third method was the conventional liquidation of bankrupt 
companies, and the sale of their assets to investors. 
These three privatisation methods were supplemented with the following 
ones after 1992: 
The programme of the National Investment Funds involved 512 
companies, which were privatised through 15 investment funds. 
The funds are actually property management agencies in which 
Polish citizens can gain ownership shares through compensation 
coupons. 
In the case of corporate restructuring privatisation, tenders are re-
quested for the restructuring and management of state companies. 
After successful restructuring, each property management body is 
granted preferential rights to buy its company. 
Companies, which were in financial difficulties and did not have a 
chance of rapid privatisation, were registered under a Stabilisation, 
Restructuring and Privatisation programme. The Ministry of Priva-
tisation endeavoured to improve these companies in cooperation 
with the financial institutions involved and to sell them afterwards. 
Polish privatisation has included a variety of colourful methods which have 
made the procedure rather less transparent. In the food industry, where privatisa-
tion began only in 1991, the slow pace of restructuring caused serious delays. 
Although the number of new food processing enterprises has been steadily grow-
ing, the privatisation of the huge state-owned companies proceeded slower. As 
many as 139 companies were still entirely owned by the state in 1998. 
Of the 371 companies involved in privatisation up to December 31, 1998, 188 
had been restructured and registered in the ownership of the State Treasury, and 
the majority of these remained in state ownership, albeit in the form of corpora-
tions or limited liability companies. Among the food processing companies, 125 
Table 27. Number of companies in the Polish food industry between 1992 and 
1998. 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
State-owned companies 448 429 365 260 214 176 139 
New companies, small 
enterprises 5,072 8,292 9,346 9,617 10,275 10,805 11,405 
Food processing 
cooperatives 562 579 583 567 566 570 563 
Total 6,082 9,300 10,294 10,444 11,055 11,551 12,107 
Source: MAFEP (1999, p. 43). 
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were privatised in the framework of the second method detailed above, and 56 in 
the framework of the third (MAFEP 1999). 
Foreign investors acquired negligible shares in the major Polish food 
processing industries in the first half of the decade, apart from a few investment 
projects in second-stage processing industries. This fact is only partly explained 
by the large size of the country, however, as the slow headway made by foreign 
investors was mostly attributable to the mixed privatisation of the food process-
ing companies. Investors were forced to opt for green-field investments rather 
than participation in privatisation and the acquisition of companies. 
Privatisation proceeded most slowly in the sugar, milling and distilling indus-
tries, and as late as 1995, one fourth of the production capacity in food manufac-
turing was still owned by the state (Kupiec et al. 1996). 
8.4.2.2. Cluster Analysis 
Poland is the largest of the countries considered here, and it also has the largest 
food industry. Cluster analysis involved data on 17 individual industries, for 
which the dendrogram in Figure 41 indicates the formation of four distinct clus-
ters. 
Number of clusters in the agglomeration process 
17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Figure 41. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis of the Polish food processing 
industries, based on 1996 and 1997 data. 
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Figure 42. Four-cluster classification of the Polish food processing industries, 
based on 1996 and 1997 data. 
The industries of the global cluster [1], such as vegetable oil, tobacco and 
beer, span a spacious area, and the rniddle cluster [2] also encompasses indus-
tries which are scattered over a wide area, while those in the transition cluster 
[4], and even more obviously in the local cluster [3], are grouped together very 
tightly. 
The local cluster includes milling, sugar and bakery in addition to two major 
fields, the meat and dairy industries. A remarkably low level of concentration, 
the lowest to be found anywhere in the countries observed here, is a special char-
acteristic of this group. The industries of the transition cluster [4] (low foreign 
capital and high concentration) have "high" concentration ratios primarily by 
comparison with the local cluster [3]. Distilling is the weightiest industry in the 
transition cluster [4], and is also among the most successful ones in terms of 
productivity and performance. It continued under state ownership until 1999, 
and its privatisation was scheduled to begin in 2000. 
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8.4.2.3. Foreign Capital in the Polish Food Processing Industries 
The industries with the largest output in Poland are spread over ali four clusters 
(Figure 43). Two of the main ones, the meat and dairy industries, which are situ-
ated in the local cluster, are considered in more detail in the current section be-
cause of their significance and the low amount of foreign direct investment in 
them. The tobacco industry is uncommonly large in Poland, but is located in its 
usual zone by CEE standards. The location of distilling on the FDI-concentration 
map matches the situation in the Baltic states. 
Although the soft drinks industry can usually be found in the global cluster 
[1], it is a member of the middle cluster [2] in Poland. Coca-Cola operates ten 
bottling plants there and PepsiCo five, and although their combined share of the 
soft drinks market is a dominant one, there are over fifty additional mineral 
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water and soft drinks manufacturers. Furthermore, the figure of soft drink indus-
try includes ali fruit juice production, this is why the overall contribution of for-
eign ownership is much lower than the international average. The large size of 
soft drinks industry and the small size of fruit and vegetable processing are also 
explained by the statistical classification of fruit juice production. On the other 
hand, potato processing is recorded separately in Poland and not as a part of fruit 
and vegetable processing as is done elsewhere. 
Among the medium-sized food processing industries, the positions of beer, 
milling, bakery and animal feeds do not cause any big surprises. Conversely, the 
positions of the confectionery and sugar industries are astonishing. The reasons 
for the sugar industry diverging so much from the usual positions in the CEE 
economies will he explained in the horizontal comparison of FDI-concentration 
maps for selected food processing industries among the five countries in section 
8.5.3. 
The Polish food industry had attracted USD 3.6 billion of foreign direct in-
vestment by the middle of 1998, and the amount of investment commitments 
exceeded USD 1 billion. The tobacco industry was the biggest recipient, having 
absorbed over one-fifth of the total (Figure 44), while investments in the soft 
drinks and confectionery industries were ranked second and third. These three 
industries together had attracted over half of the food industry FDI by that time. 
Penetration by foreign direct investment increased considerably over the next 
year, however, so that the FDI stock exceeded USD 4.5 billion in June 1999 and 
investment commitments were simultaneously over USD 1.1 billion (PAIZ 
1999b). The order of the top recipient industries also changed slightly. The to-
bacco industry retained its leading place, but the penetration of FDI into the soft 
drinks industry decreased relative to that in confectionery and in the foreign-
dominated beer industry. 
A list of the top 30 investors as of June 1999 is presented in Annex 11, from 
which it may he seen that the structure of their investments is fairly concen-
trated. Altogether, 113 companies have invested more than USD 1 million in the 
Polish food industry, the top five having each contributed 7-9 percent of the 
total. These investors together account for nearly 40 percent of the total FDI 
stock in the food industry. The group includes several large, diversified inves-
tors, whose activities spread over the boundaries of many food processing fields 
(Annex 11). 
The most significant food processing industry in Poland is meat processing, 
which accounted for one-fifth of the output of the food industry in 1997.66 This 
consisted exclusively of state-owned companies in the late 1980s. The liberal 
legislation for the founding of new enterprises that has existed since 1988, 
66 Combined figures for meat and poultry processing. 
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Figure 44. Distribution of FDI stock in Poland by food processing industries as 
of fune 1998 (Wiatrak and Sawicka 1999, p. 319; PAIZ 1999b). 
coupled with high meat prices and increasing demand, resulted in the establish-
ment of hundreds of new meat processing companies in the early 1990s. These 
were competent rivals for the large processors, owing to their mobility and cost-
effective production methods. Six thousand new processors took over 60 percent 
of the industrial slaughtering trade and 25 percent of meat processing from the 
large-scale processors (Kupiec and Leat 1999). Profitability declined dramati-
cally by the middle of the decade, however, and the industry was already accu-
mulating serious losses in 1995. 
The structure of Polish meat processing has been uncommonly scattered, 
with the six largest firms having a combined market share of only 20 percent, 
while the 25 largest ones only 30 percent (Urban 1997). Large privatised pro-
cessors and small and medium-sized enterprises manufactured the majority of 
the meat products, while the state-owned companies accounted for only 14 per- 
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cent of the meat processing output in 1996. The peak in newly established com-
panies had additional serious consequences besides the fragmentation of market 
structure, as these further inflated the redundant capacity existing in the meat 
industry and worsened the problems arising from obsolete production techno-
logy. Some two-thirds of the slaughtering capacity of the large processors had 
been built before 1935 (Kupiec et al. 1996), and the newly established compa-
nies were apt to achieve cost savings by ignoring the sanitary and hygiene regu-
lations. Approximately 40 percent of the new companies were vegetating or on 
the verge of bankruptcy by 1998, the combined production of these making up 
27 percent of the total meat processing output. 
The meat industry had absorbed only 3.5 percent of the total food industry 
FDI by the middle of 1998 (Figure 44), very little compared with other process-
ing fields. The two most essential projects were the 51 percent purchase of Con-
star by US Epstein and the share of the Spanish company Campofrio in Morliny 
S.A. 
The second most significant food processing segment in Poland is dairy in-
dustry, which accounted for 11.5 percent of the total output of the food industry 
in 1997. 
The production structure of the dairy industry had been greatly scattered be-
fore 1989, as the industry used to consist of over 350 dairy cooperatives. These 
were actually under state control, as milk producers owned less than one percent 
share in them, but each operated in its designated territory, without interfering 
with the others. A national association of dairy cooperatives existed for channel-
ling down central commands, being cognate in this respect with the Hungarian 
dairy trust. 
The 1990s brought dramatic changes in the life of the industry. The owner-
ship structure of the dairy cooperatives changed rapidly in the course of the eco-
nomic reforms, and milk producers had attained a 60 percent ownership stake by 
the middle of the decade. Also, where the cooperatives had previously manufac-
tured identical groups of products and enjoyed a quasi-monopoly on the regional 
markets, although with negligible national market shares, they suddenly became 
mutual competitors. Competition was also stepped up by the establishment of 
136 new, privately owned dairy processors by 1996 (Przepiora and McLeay 
1999, p. 55). The rapid headway made by the new companies became a severe 
burden for the large old ones, whose aggregate market share fell rapidly in the 
mid-1990s. 
Inflation and the removal of the 40 percent price subsidy on milk products 
doubled dairy prices and induced milk producers to prefer direct sales of milk on 
the open market rather than selling it to the processing companies. This resulted 
in a sudden raw material shortage, leading to a 50 percent under-utilisation of 
processing capacity in the industry. The increased fixed costs, the burden of fi-
nancing credits and the removal of ali state subsidies drove dozens of dairy coop- 
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eratives close to bankruptcy. By the middle of the decade, the average profitabil-
ity of the profitable companies was as low as 1.22 percent, while those making a 
loss were operating at —5.88 percent profitability on average. The overall profit 
balance for the industry was a negative one. 
From this time onwards the dairy processors, including the cooperatives, be-
gan polarising in terms of financial performance. The number of cooperatives 
diminished to 280 by 1997, and half of those remaining were still struggling for 
survival. The largest and most vital cooperatives and 60 of the newly established 
companies were supplying 80 percent of the Polish dairy market, but the market 
leader still commanded less than 3 percent of the aggregate sales revenues, 
which implies a very even distribution of market positions. The current number 
of over 500 dairy processors is predicted to decline to 100-150 in five to ten 
years, of which presumably only a half will be cooperatives (Janicki 1997, 
p. 45). 
Polarisation is also perceivable in the product structure. The strong dairy co-
operatives and large processors are diversifying their production towards highly 
processed and high-priced product groups, while the weak cooperatives are 
stuck with the traditional products, including milk, butter, curd cheese and con-
ventional cheeses (Seremak-Bulge 1999, p. 45). 
Foreign investors have shown a moderate interest in the Polish dairy industry, 
as only four percent of the total food industry FDI stock had ended up in the 
dairy industry by the middle of 1999 (Figure 44). The example of the Polish 
dairy industry summarises the major attributes of foreign investors' attitudes 
towards food processing in the CEE: 
The modest amount of investments and the low foreign share of to-
tai registered company capital can he ascribed to the large size of 
the industry and its scattered structure. The excessive amount of 
redundant capacity is also one factor that discourages investments. 
The processors with a traditional product mix suffer the most from 
serious structural and quality problems and a cumbersome raw ma-
terial supply network caused by the scattered distribution of milk 
producers. Foreign investors are reluctant to cover any financial 
losses stemming from these disadvantages. Another very pro-
nounced feature in the field of conventional dairy products is the 
equality of market and competitive positions between producers. 
Foreign investors have tended to target one clearly defined segment 
of the industry, aiming almost exclusively to manufacture highly 
processed, high-priced products such as flavoured milk drinks, spe-
ciality cheeses, desserts and ice cream, ali of which usually have a 
high profit margin. This selective investment strategy has served 
the two major objectives of foreign investors: the maximisation of 
profits and the pursuit of market power. 
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The largest foreign investors, Nestle (Slupska), Kraft (Chorzele), Hochland 
(Kazimierz Wielkopolski) and Nutricia (Gdansk Mackowy), did not necessarily 
purchase the largest dairy processing cooperatives, but they certainly acquired 
the most vital ones (Przepiora and McLeay 1997, p. 55). Meanwhile, the Hoog-
wegt group, Land 0' Lakes Inc. and Friesland Dairy Foods also established their 
positions by purchasing dairy processing cooperatives. Some of the foreign in-
vestors ensured their presence on the market by establishing their own produc-
tion subsidiaries or purchasing other private companies. An example of the latter 
type is Danone (Wola in Warsaw and Tychy). The share of the foreign owned 
companies in the market for conventional dairy products is negligible, but it can 
be as high as 10-60 percent in the case of UHT milk, cheese, yoghurt and ice 
cream (Görska-Warsewicz and Krajewski 1997). 
Unlike the situation in the Hungarian dairy industry, foreign investors are 
unwilling to participate in the manufacture of mass products — milk, butter, curd 
cheese and conventional cheeses — on the Polish market, probably due to the 
extremely scattered market structure and low profit margin. There are several 
cooperatives and private firms in the industry which have stable positions and 
are constantly modernising their processing technology, thus competing fairly 
well with the foreign-owned companies. In this respect it is worth mentioning a 
spillover effect attributable to foreign investors: that their presence and strate-
gies force most Polish processors to improve their marketing and logistic activi-
ties and to pay attention to packaging and their product mix. Not ali the domestic 
companies will be able to emulate the techniques of the foreign owned compa-
nies and catch up with them, however, and several hundred firms will probably 
fail in the slowly advancing process of market concentration. 
8.4.3. Estonia 
8.4.3.1. Privatisation 
The Privatisation Act, which regulated the privatisation of large and medium-
sized companies, was approved and came into force in Estonia in June 1993. The 
main method of privatisation was tender-based direct sale, but this approach was 
applied only in the second-stage food processing industries. The privatisation of 
the grain, dairy and meat processing companies was regulated by a special 
amendment, called Article 32, which reflected pressure from the agrarian lobby, 
in that it promoted ownership by the producers of the respective agricultural raw 
materials. This meant that the producer cooperatives were granted the following 
concessions for the purchase of food processing firms: 
the right to make the first bid, 
the stipulation that a maximum of 10 percent of the purchase 
price needed to be paid at once, and 
188 
the remainder to be pffid over ten years at a maximum interest of 
15 percent (Sepp and Loko 1999). 
Privätisation of the food industry proceeded rapidly. Three years after the 
Privatisation Act came into force, the majority of the companies, even of those to 
which Article 32 applied, had been privatised. Most of the milling companies 
had been sold by the beginning of 1995, the entire dairy industry was in private 
hands by October 1995, and the last large state-owned meat processing firm was 
privatised early in 1996. 
The agricultural producer cooperatives became the dominant owners in the 
industries regulated by Article 32, while foreign and Estonian private persons 
and corporate investors were more active in the rest of the food processing indus-
tries. 
A cardinal element in Estonian economic policy is the country' s liberal trade 
policy, which has been in force since the declaration of independence. Estonia 
has, quite exceptionally, applied zero import duty to ali products, including agri-
cultural and food products, since 1994. Global and European rivalry from over-
subsidised agricultural products was felt at once, of course, as these came to be 
dumped on the Estonian market at a time, when the country' s own agricultural 
producers were already struggling for survival in the severe recession caused by 
restructuring. The priorities of the Estonian government nevertheless dictated 
that the agricultural sector should be pushed into the background and over-
shadowed by the general liberal trade policy. 
Agricultural producers saw a life-line in the opportunities for gaining owner-
ship of the maun food processing industries, and they consequently fought for 
control of the dairy, meat and grain supply chains. The ownership rights over 
processing companies were intended to strengthen vertical relations, as the gov-
ernmene s objective was to ensure a regular demand for agricultural products. 
Thus it was that ownership by the raw material producers became a dominant 
feature precisely in those industries which were dependent on FSU markets. The 
jamming of exports in the middle of the decade, followed by a temporary recov-
ery in 1997 and 1998 and the Russian crisis later in 1998, nevertheless shook the 
most successful of the Estonian food manufacturing industries, including dairy 
and fish processing. These market difficulties had repercussions for the financial 
status of the agricultural producers — as the owners of processing facilities — with 
nine of the 13 largest meat processing companies alone going bankrupt between 
1996 and 1998. 
The main problem for the export-oriented industries was the amount of re-
dundant capacity. Overpr. oduction was notably worsened by the mass appear-
ance of small enterprises, primarily in meat and fish processing, while redundant 
capacity in the milling and animal feed industries exceeded 80 percent. 
Foreign investors have stayed away from the privatisation of the first-stage 
processing industries in Estonia for several reasons: 
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The preferential treatment of agricultural producers created 
unequal conditions and discouraged potentially interested foreign 
investors. 
The orientation of the oversized processing industries towards 
exports to the FSU block, the companies' obsolete technology, the 
market dependence and rapidly emerging under-utilisation of 
production capacity, together with the economic crisis, detracted 
considerably from the appeal of these industries. 
In accordance with the "import-FDI substitution effect", the pursu-
ance of a liberal trade policy by a host country will induce foreign 
companies to export goods to it rather than capital, in other words, 
such a country can expect increasing imports instead of increasing 
FDI inflows. 
The last of these reasons applies to the entire food processing industry, and 
could be presumed to lead to dynamically growing food imports and a persistent 
negligible level of FDI in the food industry. Reality does not bear this out, how-
ever, since the Estonian food processing industry is the second most foreign-
dominated after that of Hungary. The Estonian experience suggests, in fact, that 
foreign investors are driven by considerations other than the advantages attain-
able purely through trade in commodities. 
The flow of foreign capital into food processing in the CEE was primarily 
motivated by considerations of market power, as already confirmed. It has also 
been pointed out that the primary target for foreign investors in the food industry 
has been the domestic market of the host country. Export opportunities are 
regarded only as additional benefits arising from the transactions. The high 
proportion of foreign ownership in Estonian food processing is explained best by 
one of the main theses of this dissertation: 
Due to the small size of the Estonian food processing industry, mar-
ket concentration ratios are high. This means that one large invest-
ment project may facilitate control over an entire industry, a view-
point which sheds a great deal of light on the background to the 
company acquisitions made by foreign investors in the fruit and 
vegetable, poultry, meat, beer, soft drinks and tobacco industries. 
Foreign investors held back in the case of the largest industries. 
They did not participate in the process of eliminating the redundant 
processing capacity, but waited for natural selection to clean out the 
industries eventually by means of a wave of bankruptcies. They 
may also have been hesitant in order to make sure about the persist-
ence of the recovery on the FSU markets. The cautiously growing 
foreign investments in the meat and dairy industries have targeted 
the secure Estonian and adjacent Baltic markets, and only in prin-
ciple, or in the long run, do they consider the perspective of exports 
to the FSU area. 
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8.4.3.2. Cluster Analysis 
The cluster analysis resulted in clearly separated groups despite the small 
number of industries. As in the other countries, each of the four typical clusters 
can be found in Estonia (Figure 45), and the member industries are tightly 
grouped. Fruit and vegetable processing became connected with beer and soft 
drinks at an early stage to form the global cluster [1], while the tightly associated 
pairs formed by the fish processing and milling industries and the animal feed 
and dairy industries made up the local cluster [3]. 
The transition cluster [4] — as will be confirmed later in the case of Latvia and 
Lithuania — is a peculiar grouping that deviates notably from the main trend, but 
is a characteristic feature of the Baltic countries. The middle cluster [2] includes 
only two industries: the meat processing and bakery industries, which were 
joined relatively late in the agglomeration process (Figure 45). Both of them are 
significant on the domestic market, however. Interestingly, the meat and bakery 
industries are closer to the domain of the global cluster in Estonia than in the 
other countries. 
Estonia is the smallest of the five countries examined, a fact that is reflected 
both in the size of its food industry and the array on its FDI-concentration map. 
The number of industries is also the smallest among the five countries. Estonia 
had no sugar or tobacco industry at ali in 1998, and the data on poultry process-
ing are recorded under meat processing. Certain food processing industries — 
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Figure 45. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis of the Estonian food processing 
industries, based on 1998 data. 
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Figure 46. Four-cluster classification of the Estonian food industry, based on 
1998 data. 
such as starch and the production of fruit wines — are missing from the FDI-
concentration map due to their small size and/or the lack of data. Hence, Figure 
46 presents the positions of 12 food processing industries. 
8.4.3.3. Foreign Capital in the Estonian Food Processing Industries 
The dominance of the dairy industry is immediately evident in Figure 47, with 
fish processing as the second largest industry. It was not accidental that these 
two sub-sectors ended up in the same cluster, as they share several common 
features. Both industries are highly export-oriented, with fish processing being 
directly dependent on exports, since 88 percent of its output was exported in 
1997. The balls refer to the proportion of production output, measured in value 
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terms on the basis of the 1998 data, which already include the first signs of the 
recession caused by the Russian crisis of August 1998. 
In the industries of the global cluster, huge foreign investors attained on over-
whelming influence through acquisition of the dominant companies. In the beer 
industry, Baltic Beverages Holding, owned by the Scandinavian consortium 
Hartwall-Pripps-Ringnes, acquired the Saku Brewery, the largest investment in 
fruit and vegetable processing was concluded by the Swedish Procordia AB in 
acquiring Pöltsamaa Felix, while Coca Cola, the largest foreign investor in the 
Estonian food industry, dominates the soft drinks sector. A list of the major for-
eign investors who had arrived by the beginning of 1998 can be found in Annex 
12. 
0% 	  
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Figure 47. FDI-concentration map of Estonian food processing on three dimen-
sions of investigation, based on 1998 data. 
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Dairy processing is by far the most significant food industry in Estonia, ac-
counting for one third of the total food manufacturing output in 1998 (Figure 
47). In the early 1990s the dairy industry consisted of 11 large companies, which 
were decomposed to 36 processing facilities and sold separately to the milk pro-
ducers' cooperatives, and to a less extent to other domestic investors in the 
framework of decentralised privatisation (Sepp and Loko 1999). This decentral-
isation pushed the CR4 concentration ratio down somewhat, but it started to 
increase spectacularly from the middle of the decade.67 
Partly because of the privatisation policy that preferred domestic ownership 
and partly due to the distorted capacity structure and outdated production-sales 
structure, foreign investors entered the Estonian dairy industry at a slow pace. 
Their caution is demonstrated by their indifference towards the market leaders 
and their strategy of purchasing healthy, medium-sized processors, which are 
easier to manage and in which changes in management, technology, marketing 
and product mix can be accomplished more easily than in big companies. The 
proportion of the dairy industry' s total sales revenues attributable to foreign-
owned companies was over 25 percent in 1997. The Finnish dairy concem Valio 
Oy stands out among the investors in terms of growth perspectives, as it controls 
the high-priced segment of the Estonian dairy market through the corporate 
growth of one company. Finnish investors may well want to expand and rein-
force their position in the future by acquiring other processors. 
The biggest problem for fish processing in the Baltic region is the product 
mix, which relies entirely on the demands of the FSU market. The proportion of 
the product structure of the Estonian fish processing industry accounted for by 
canned fish exported to eastern markets decreased from 100 percent to 77 per-
cent in the product structure of the industry between 1990 and 1998, while that 
of frozen, filleted and other culinary fish products that are well marketable in 
Westem and Central Europe increased from zero to 23 percent. Despite the 
evident problems, fish processing is still more successful in Estonia than in the 
other Baltic states in terms of modemisation and product-mix reform. Even so, it 
has not yet attracted any appreciable foreign capital, for a variety of reasons: 
67 There were three processing alliances in the Estonian dairy industry as of 1998: Chinermd 
Meiereid (United Dairies), the ETFC Group and the Eesti Piim (Estonian Milk) Central Coop-
erative. Only the dairies belonging to ETFC had common owners that time. Chinenud 
Meiereid had long been an association of four independent processors with joint purchasing, 
marketing, and export functions, while Eesti Piim was similarly established as an umbrella 
organisation to coordinate the sales and product strategy of 12 independent dairies 
(Eke Ariko 1998, p. 26). Thus only the companies in the ownership of the ETFC Group were 
taken as one market player when calculating the concentration ratio for the Estonian dairy 
industry. 
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There are no multinational giants in the fish industry which domi-
nate international or European capital flows as some companies do 
in other industries. 
The Estonian fish processing industry is relatively well concen-
trated, and its dependence on the unstable eastern markets still 
serves as a warning to foreign investors. The 20 percent market 
shares of the two leading companies suggested good export posi-
tions for 1997, but did not necessarily mean equally great power on 
the much more reliable domestic market. 
Fish processing is an essential component of any rural development 
strategy, and it is therefore subordinated to several ministries and 
organisations at the same time. The insecurity of fishing is further 
increased by the annual changes in catch quotas in the Baltic Sea. 
In some isolated instances, the foreign investors have been turned 
away because they represent a threat or rival to the current owners 
or raw material producers rather than an investing patron 
(Jansik 2001b). 
Only a few small Scandinavian investments had reached the Estonian fish 
processing industry by the middle of the decade, and some of these have already 
been withdrawn. Apart from the Scandinavian owners, there is also some Rus-
sian capital invested in the industry. The fish industry is rarely a large recipient 
of FDI in the CEE region, and hence it is a regular member of local clusters in the 
national FDI-concentration maps. 
The position of the meat industry can be explained by two large foreign in-
vestments that have taken place alongside some very tiny projects. The Finnish 
HK Ruokatalo acquired a majority share in Estonia' s largest and most modern 
meat processor, Rakvere Lihakombinaat, and a group of Northern European stra-
tegic and financial investors have attained a notable level of ownership in the 
largest poultry processor, Tallegg. 
8.4.4. Latvia 
8.4.4.1. Privatisation 
The first version of the Act on the Privatisation of State and Municipality-owned 
Companies in Latvia was passed in 1992, with an amendment approved in 1994. 
The act covered many food processing firms, although privatisation in the most 
significant industries such as dairy and meat processing, milling, bakery and the 
sugar industry was regulated by. separate laws. 
The 1992 version of the Privatisation Act prescribed certain shares for the 
state (5 percent), employees (5-20 percent) and private investors (50-90 per-
cent), the maun objective being to equalise the ownership structure out among 
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these groups (Miglavs et al. 1999). This method was used to privatise the major 
companies in the confectionery and fruit wine making industries. The disadvan-
tages of the method soon became clear, however, namely that it resulted in com-
plicated corporate decision mechanisms brought about by the interlaced owner-
ship relations. The modified privatisation law already allowed the acquisition of 
a majority share by a strategic investor, and this provided serious incentives for 
foreign companies, which promptly made use of the opportunities, so that the 
main companies in the starch, tobacco and fruit and vegetable processing indus-
tries had been sold off by 1995. 
The special laws for privatising the first-stage processing industries, passed 
in 1993, simply allowed the rights of ownership over smaller dairy cooperatives 
to he distributed among the milk producers for free. Although the privatisation of 
the large dairy, meat and grain processing companies involved real money (in 
practice mostly credits or bank loans) and to a less extent compensation cou-
pons, priority in ownership terms was still given to the producers of the respec-
tive agricultural raw materials. Farmers did not fully utilise the ownership rights 
which would have been allotted to them by law in most of the industries, how-
ever, and the unsold shares in the dairy companies and considerable stakes in 
other indebted dairy firms were taken over by financial institutions. The privati-
sation of the dairy and meat industries had been completed by the beginning of 
1996, while that of milling industry started only in 1995 and proceeded more 
slowly. The special privatisation laws resulted in high ownership by agricultural 
producers in the first-stage processing industries concerned, in that they ac-
quired a 70 percent stake in the dairy industry, 50 percent in the milling industry 
and 30 percent in the meat processing industry. 
8.4.4.2. Cluster Analysis 
The FDI-concentration map for Latvia is an excellent demonstration of the trend 
in interaction between market concentration and FDI penetration. The dendro-
gram shows the path by which the cluster analysis proceeded (Figure 48), which 
resulted in four distinct groups, the tight clustering within each being illustrated 
on the map (Figure 49). 
The composition of the global [1], local [3] and middle clusters [2] evolved 
primarily in a comparable manner to that observed in the other CEE countries, 
with two surprising exceptions: 
(1) The beer industry, which belongs to the global cluster [1] every-
where else, is situated only in the middle cluster [2] in Latvia, 
largely on account of the considerable cOmbined market force of 
the small domestic breweries. Also, foreign investors have not at-
tained notable positions in the medium-sized companies, although 
they have done so in the overwhelming market leader, Aldaris. 
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Figure 48. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis of the Latvian food processing 
industries, based on 1998 data. 
(2) The other surprising exception is the milling industry, which is 
usually located in the local cluster in Central and Eastem Europe, 
where foreign investors do not show any serious interest in milling. 
The milling industry in Latvia has recently moved into the appeal 
zone of bakery industry, however, with a strengthening of vertical 
relations, and thus both the largest bakery company and the largest 
mill were purchased by Nordic, i.e. predominantly Swedish-Finn-
ish investors (Vaasan & Vaasan, Cerealia AB and Melia Oy). The 
close business relations between these companies in their resident 
countries also connect them as owners in Latvia, and hence the re-
inforcing of the vertical relations in Latvia is not surprising. The 
milling industry, as elsewhere in the region, is struggling with 
problems of the under-utilisation of its capacity, outdated techno-
logy, shrinking markets and dozens of newly established enter-
prises. In such a situation, the dominant bakery company, which 
itself emerged as the result of the merging of ttn-ee large bread fac-
tories in the mid-1990s, "dragged" the milling industry into the 
middle cluster [2] through its vertical relations and supply chains. 
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Figure 49. Four-cluster classification of the Latvian food processing industries, 
based on 1998 data. 
The results of the cluster analysis, shown in Figure 49, demonstrate the ac-
centuated presence of the transition cluster [4] in Latvia, and thereby reveals a 
previously undetected peculiarity of some interest: that out of ali the countries 
whose food processing industries are examined here, the interrelation between 
politics and economics is strongest in Latvia. 
This phenomenon was manifested in the active participation of politicians in 
the process of privatising the food industry. The holding companies established 
by the leading politicians had an insider view of the financial status and market 
prospects of the processors to be privatised, and this enabled the best-known 
corporate investor to acquire the dominant companies in a number of food 
processing industries such as confectionery and distilling.68 The elite among the 
68 The most powerful holding company of this kind was Ave Lat Group, which was founded by 
the Latvian prime minister and other politicians. 
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domestic owners also shared the ownership of a major company in the bakery 
industry with foreign investors, the first case of its kind in that country, since 
surprisingly, they let the foreigners take over the majority share. 
8.4.4.3. Foreign Direct Investment in the Latvian Food 
Processing Industries 
Two facts are worth mentioning in connection with the ball cliagram for the 
Latvian food processing industry (Figure 50): 
The weights of the industries are proportionally even between the 
major clusters, and the large and medium-sized industries are also 
evenly distributed among them. 
The three large first-stage processing industries — dairy, meat and 
fish — are still located in the local cluster and have not moved 
towards the middle cluster. 
At first sight, the even distribution would suggest that Latvian food process-
ing is diversified and the production factors and resources are divided evenly, 
but in fact the lack of specialisation points to problems in the two most signifi-
cant and most obviously export-oriented industries. Dairy and fish processing 
have been struggling with severe structural problems such as high redundant ca-
pacity, capital shortage and market difficulties. Consequently, the country' s 
neighbours — Estonia in the case of fish processing and Lithuania in dairy and the 
sugar industry — are emerging as its competitors in the foreign markets. 
A purely Baltic comparison suggests that a solid production basis has been 
built up in the fruit and vegetable processing industry in Latvia, which is fairly 
well concentrated by CEE standards and it is dominated by foreign — chiefly US 
— ownership. This explains its surprising position in the global cluster [1]. 
The top foreign investors in Latvian food industry are presented in Annex 12. 
An interesting and quite exceptional feature of Latvia in a Central and Eastern 
European context is the fact that the industries of the grain supply chain are 
among the recipients of the largest investments, mainly provided by Northem 
European companies. 
Domestic ownership, primarily by agricultural producers, has come to domi-
nate the main first-stage processing industries such as dairy, meat, fish and 
milling After the completion of pfivatisation, foreign investors have differed 
markedly in their levels of interest in these industries. 
Foreign capital is entirely absent from the dairy industry, where the milk pro-
ducers have kept hold on their ownership shares. On the other hand, foreign in-
vestors are not attracted by companies that represent an industry afflicted by 
redundant capacity, tough competition and obsolete technology. Although the 
Latvian dairy industry — like those of its two Baltic neighbours — has undergone 
some concentration recently, the concentration ratio CR4 was only 46 percent in 
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Figure 50. FDI-concentration map of the Latvian food industty on three dimen-
sions of investigation, based on 1998 data. 
1996, 10-15 percent lower than in Estonia and Lithuania. The main difference 
lies in the physical process of concentration itself, for while strong companies 
have pursued an active policy of conquering the market in Estonia and Lithuania, 
even the strong companies have been relatively passive in relation to this process 
in Latvia. They are content to "increase" their market shares passively by taking 
over the vacuum that emerges through the failure of competitors. The majority of 
the Latvian dairy companies' export trade is directed to Russia and the other 
FSU republics. It has become evident since the Russian crisis that the Latvian 
dairy companies that have good market prospects in the long run are those that 
concentrate primarily on the domestic market, but they need capital for the 
modemisation, a problem which can most obviously be solved by the involve-
ment of foreign investments. 
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In the meat industry, the Estonian company Rakvere Lihakombinaat pur-
chased the market leader, Rigas Miesnieks, soon after privatisation, and both 
were subsequently taken over by the same Finnish strategic investor. This single 
transaction raised the proportion of foreign ownership in the industry to nearly 
20 percent. 
Foreign investors attained various shares in the milling industry, but the most 
significant project is the investment made by the Swedish company Cerealia in 
the largest Latvian mill, Rigas Dzirnavnieks. The exceptionally high proportion 
of foreign ownership in the Latvian milling industry was motivated by vertical 
relations (section 8.5.2). 
8.4.5. Lithuania 
8.4.5.1. Privatisation 
In order to comprehend the characteristics of privatisation in Lithuania, it is 
expedient to review the major issues that faced this policy in the food industry. 
Under the first privatisation law, passed in 1991, employees of the processing 
companies enjoyed preferential rights to buy 30 percent of the shares, an oppor-
tunity which they rarely took advantage of. In the same year, a list was com-
pleted of the companies to be sold to foreigners. Although several food pro-
cessors were included in this list, only the tobacco factory in Klaipeda and the 
confectionery plant in •Kaunas were purchased by multinational investors 
(Phillip Morris and Kraft Jacobs Suchard). As a result, foreigners acquired dom-
inant shares in these two industries. 
The Lithuanian govemment changed its attitude to food processing privatisa-
tion drastically in 1992, and the law was modified to give definite priority to the 
agricultural producers, in that farmers were required to pay only 5 percent of the 
real purchase price of a processing company and could pay the rest off with com-
pensation coupons (Girg2diene et al. 1998). The regulation covered the privati-
sation of dairy, meat and grffin processing. Even these preferential rights did not 
result in a breakthrough for the producers as purchasers, however, probably on 
account of the weak financial situation of agricultural production and the limited 
resources available to the farmers. 
Privatisation of the food industry was speeded up by means of two further 
modifications of the law, one of which stipulated that agricultural producers 
were required to pay as little as 2.5 percent of the purchase price in cash. This 
and other incentives eventually accelerated the privatisation process, so that 
nearly 90 percent of the food industry was in private hands by the end of 1998. 
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8.4.5.2. Cluster Analysis 
In the light of the privatisation events, it is obvious that agricultural producers 
will have eventually succeeded in gaining a dominant ownership position in 
most of the food processing industries in Lithuania. Foreign investors were 
allowed to obtain shares in the processing companies only vety slowly and as a 
consequence they achieved considerable influence only in the beer and sugar 
industries, apart from the above two examples of the tobacco and confectionery 
industries. 
Thus a bipolar division of industries in the Lithuanian food sector has pre-
vailed until vety recently, as can clearly he seen in the FDI-concentration map. 
This interpretation is also supported by the cluster analysis, as the dendrogram in 
Figure 51 demonstrates that the industries make up two distinct but internally 
coherent groups, the distance between which remained considerable until the 
last step in the clustering process. The value assigned to the distance, 0.681, was 
the largest between any two clusters combined in the present calculations (see 
the agglomeration tables for the national cluster analyses in Annexes 13-16). A 
two or three-cluster classification of the Lithuanian food processing industries is 
therefore well justified and relevant. 
In common with the situation in the other Central and Eastern European 
countries, the excise or luxury product groups converge to form a global cluster 
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Figure 51. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis of the Lithuanian food process-
ing industries, based on 1998 data. 
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[1] in Figure 52, while the first-stage processing industries form the majority in 
the local cluster [3]. 
Lithuania is the only one of the countries considered here where the middle 
cluster [2] is missing. Regulations have hindered the agricultural producers' 
rights to sell their shares, and hence the movement of the meat, fish and milling 
industries towards increased foreign influence is expected to take place only 
very slowly and mostly in the long term. The transition cluster [4], which is com-
mon to ali the countries, is represented by the distilling industry in Lithuania. 
Since this consists only of four companies, it has a CR4 concentration ratio of 
100 percent. The state still owned 97.5 percent of the equity of these four com-
panies in 1998, and privatisation was scheduled to be launched in 2000. 
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Figure 52. Three-cluster classification of the Lithuanian food processing indus-
tries, based on 1998 data. 
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8.4.5.3. Foreign Capital in the Lithuanian Food Processing Industries 
Brewing attracted the most foreign capital into the Lithuanian food industry, fol-
lowed by tobacco, confectionery and sugar (Figure 53). The presence of foreign 
capital is negligible in several first-stage processing industries such as fish, 
milling and meat. These low levels of foreign ownership can he ascribed to the 
preferential rights given to agricultural producers in the privatisation process, 
the weak financial status of the industries and their low attractiveness. 
The data on the food industry FUI stock are in full agreement with the array 
of the FDI-concentration map, the only exception being the dairy industry, as the 
contributions of financial investors are not included in Figure 53. On the other 
hand, the acquisitions of the largest dairy processors owned by foreign investors 
are taken into account in the FDI-concentration map. These have elevated aggre-
gate foreign ownership, although the official statistics for Lithuania record them 
as cases of domestic corporate ownership. 
The statistics indicate considerable foreign ownership in the animal feed in-
dustry, which can he attributed to financial investors, together with the largest 
strategic investor, Master Foods Inc. 
The overwhelming size of the Lithuanian food industry' s flagship, the dairy 
industry, calls for a separate detailed discussion of its characteristics (Figure 54). 
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Figure 53. Distribution of food industry FDI stock in Lithuania by processing 
industries, as of June 1999 (data from SDL). 
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Despite the fact that it is the largest first-stage processing industry in Lithuania, 
foreign investors had attained a considerable share in it by 1998. 
The position of the Lithuanian dairy industry on the FDI-concentration map 
can be explained by the following factors: 
Dairy processing is better developed on average than the rest of the 
Lithuanian food industry. It is an export-oriented branch, which has 
also achieved success on the western markets beyond that recorded 
on the traditional eastern ones. 
The most successful companies were restructured through a sponta-
neous wave of privatisation by the management and employee buy-
out technique in the very first phase, before 1992. The relatively 
lower stakes of raw material producers in the best companies than 
in other processing fields also promoted the influx of foreign inves-
tors. 
Figure 54. FDI-concentration map for the Lithuanian food industry on three 
dimensions investigation, based on 1998 data. 
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3. Several dairy companies which were operating with outdated tech- 
nology or an old-fashioned product mix and producing low-quality 
products went banlcrupt, their domestic markets being talcen over by 
successful, rapidly growing competitors, a situation which has 
driven the concentration ratio upwards from year to year. 
The leading Lithuanian dairy processors achieved an extraordinary level of 5-
13 percent profitability in 1998, which is unusual in a Central and Eastern Euro-
pean context. Surprisingly, these good perspectives in the industry aroused the 
interest of financial investors rather than strategic investors, so that the leading 
dairy processors attracted notable foreign owners such as EBRD, Namura or the 
Bankers Trust Company. 
Concentration and foreign ownership have constantly grown in the industry, 
since the foreign-owned companies became committed to dynamic expansion, 
buying out their surrounding competitors systematically and talcing over the mar-
ket shares of those that have gone into fiquidation. Concurrently, they set about 
modernising their processing Iines and improve their competitiveness. The con-
centration process in the Lithuanian dairy industry is illustrated in Figure 55. 
Figure 55. The concentration process in the Lithuanian dairy industry between 
1995 and 1999 (Jansik 2001b, p. 128 based on Lietuvas Rytas, March 1999). 
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The changes in the structure of the dairy industry in Hungary and Lithuania 
have been fairly similar. Contrasting Figure 25 on page 129 with Figure 55 on 
the opposite page, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
Both the Hungarian and Lithuanian dairy industries have become 
concentrated through company acquisitions. 
The majority of the acquisitions have been made by foreign-owned 
processors. Five out of the six largest dairy companies in Hungary 
and three of the four largest in Lithuania are now fully or partly 
owned by foreigners. 
The type of foreign capital seems irrelevant as far as the market 
strategy is concerned. The Hungarian companies owned by strate- 
gic investors and the Lithuanian companies owned by financial 
investors pursue the same offensive market strategy. 
Market concentration is forecast to continue in the coming years. The major-
ity of raw milk procured in Lithuania is only of second quality, due to the scat-
tered farm structure, and in practice the expanding dairy processing companies 
reserve the first-quality milk, while the weaker processors, which are owned by 
the producers and suffer from domestic and export market difficulties, are forced 
to make do with the poorer quality. The gap in technology and quality between 
the two groups of companies is increasing, as the strong ones are gaining in 
strength and the weak ones are losing their positions. Paradoxically, ownership 
by agricultural producers, which was designed to break the concentration of the 
dairy industry, itself became the propellant of the process. 
8.5. Horizontal Comparison of FDI-Concentration Maps for 
Selected Food Industries 
The grouping of the food processing industries in the five CEE countries into 
four clusters indicated that the industries in the same clusters shared many more 
characteristics than the two investigated initially, concentration and the influ-
ence of foreign capital. One of the main regularities was the convergence of first-
stage processing industries in the local [3] and middle clusters [2] and that of 
second-stage processing industries in the global [1] and middle clusters [2]. Al-
though the distribution of the food processing industries follows the same trend 
on the FDI-concentration maps for ali countries examined, there are astonishing 
exceptions as far as the concrete industry positions are concerned. The following 
comparison confirms that the positions of the industries are a function of concen-
tration in the previous period, privatisation and general economic policy, the size 
of the country and its food markets, the internal characteristics of the particular 
industry and the level of processing (first-stage or second-stage processing). 
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Each of the following horizonta169 comparative case studies includes a group 
of five corresponding industries from the observed countries, plotted on a com-
mon FDI-concentration map. The industries selected for the analyses are those 
which are the most illustrative and offer interesting conclusions on differences 
and similarities in terms of foreign direct investments. In order to ensure compa-
rability, the balls in Figures 56-62 indicate the sizes of the industries expressed 
in USD. 
8.5.1. Meat and Dairy Industries 
The background to the two first-stage processing industries was discussed thor-
oughly in the case of each country in the previous sub-chapter. Meat processing 
is the leading industry in both Poland and Hungary, while the much smaller balls 
representing the Baltic meat processing industries are signs not only of an abso-
lute difference but also of the lower relative significance of meat processing than 
of their dairy industries." 
Poland attracted only limited foreign investments in its vast and scattered 
meat industry, whereas several of large meat processors in Hungary, such as 
Pick, Pini, Willis and Såga Foods, have foreign owners, which has moved the 
industry up to the domain of the middle cluster [2]. In the Estonian meat indus-
try, Rakvere Lihakombinaat, the most modern and vigorous processor, became 
the dominant company thanks to a series of bankruptcies among its competitors, 
which meant that the acquisition of Rakvere Lihakombinaat by a foreign investor 
carried the meat industry immediately into the neighbourhood of the global clus-
ter [1]. 
The foreign ownership of the market leader has largely determined the situa-
tion of the Latvian meat industry, while there has not been any notable foreign 
investment in meat processing in Lithuania. 
The dispersion of the dairy industries offers even more lessons. The first pat-
tern to be recognised is the relatively large size of the Baltic dairy industries by 
comparison with their Hungarian and Polish counterparts, a fact which is indeed 
interesting in the light of the considerable size difference observed in the case of 
meat processing. This can obviously be ascribed to the heightened significance 
of the dairy industry in the Baltic countries. The second observation regarding 
the map for the dairy industry highlights the fact that the field includes two 
clearly distinct groups of products: (1) conventional products and (2) highly 
processed dairy products. 
69 The adjective "horizontal" stems from the ordering logic by which the fields of national food 
industries are listed in columns placed side by side. A horizontal slice across this diagram 
results in a group of corresponding processing fields representing the various countries. 
70 Since meat and poultry processing are combined in Figure 56, the same was done for Hungary 
in order to ensure comparability. 
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Figure 56. Horizontal comparison of FDI-concentration maps for the meat 
industry on three dimensions investigation. 
As it was noted in the case of Poland, foreign investors almost exclusively 
tend to specialise in the production of highly processed dairy products and are 
usually not interested in the manufacturing of bulky, conventional or low-profit 
products. Hence, the Polish dairy industry eventually remained in the zone of the 
local cluster [3], despite the high absolute value of foreign investments. 
No foreign capital has been present in the Latvian dairy industry, while for-
eign investors avoided the purchase of large processors in Estonia and placed 
their emphasis on corporate growth in medium-sized subsidiaries instead, again 
focusing on highly processed products. In Lithuania, financial investors acquired 
20-25 percent stakes in the largest processors, which have a diversified range of 
products and enjoy good export positions. The strongest foreign influence was 
attained in the Hungarian dairy industry, where such investors are exceptionally 
closely engaged in the manufacture of conventional products as well. 
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Figure 57. Horizontal comparison of FDI-concentration maps for the dairy 
industry on three dimensions investigation. 
8.5.2. Milling and Bakery Industries 
Consideration of the milling and bakery industries facilitates interesting conclu-
sions, even though a fairly widely dispersed set of locations can be detected on 
the map. 
As a general rule, the grain processing industries tend to be situated 
in the low concentration-low FDI intensity quarter of the map. 
A pronounced concentration existed in ali the Baltic bakery indus-
tries. Although foreign investors are usually rather indifferent to-
wards bakeries in Central and Eastern Europe, the industry attracted 
considerable foreign direct investment in two Baltic countries, 
Estonia and Latvia, where Northern European strategic investors 
attained valuable market positions through the acquisition of the 
largest bakery companies. 
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A peculiar, parallel phenomenon can be identified in three coun-
tries, where the two industries of the grain processing chain are situ-
ated close to each other. In the case of Poland and Lithuania, this 
can be attributed to the minimal foreign investment in both indus-
tries, but the instance of Latvia is a notable precedent, since foreign 
investors there have pursued control over the entire chain through 
active acquisitions, even including a cross-acquisition over the bor-
ders of industries within the grain processing chain. Consequently, 
both industries can be found in the area of the middle cluster [2] in 
Latvia. 
The distance between the milling and bakery industries in Estonia 
and Hungary can be explained by certain special circumstances. 
The weak milling industry in Estonia was knocked out by the liberal 
trade policy, as a result of which the bakery companies cover their 
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Figure 58. Horizontal comparison of FDI-concentration maps for the milling 
and bakery industries on three dimensions of investigation. 
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raw material procurement with imports. In Hungary, the distance 
stems from the difference in market structure. Bakery is tradition-
ally the most fragmented industry in Hungarian food manufactur-
ing, whereas milling is in the hands of large companies, although its 
main product, flour, suffered from problems in the market in the 
1990s and remained an unattractive target. 
5. Another interesting phenomenon relates to the sizes of the indus-
tries: bakery is larger than milling in the Baltic countries, while 
milling has a larger output than bakery in Poland and Hungary. This 
can be explained by several factors: the favourable climatic condi-
tions for grain production in Poland and Hungary, the significant 
animal feed manufacturing activities of milling companies, and the 
fact that some activities such as biscuit production in Poland and 
pasta manufacture in Hungary are not recorded statistically under 
bakery. 
As for the future of the two industries of the grain processing chain, a group 
of highly attractive products is anticipated to draw notable foreign investments 
into the bakery industry in the larger countries. Similar selective FDI penetration 
has also occurred in the Polish dairy industry. In Hungary and Poland, foreigners 
are expected to become active only in the manufacturing of highly processed 
products such as flavoured or frozen bakery pastry and biscuits, so that their 
overall influence in the bakery market will grow very moderately. 
The full range of bakery products is covered by foreign-owned companies in 
the Baltic countries, as in the Hungarian dairy industry. It is worth remembering 
that the main reason for the two different strategies observable in the bakery 
industry across Europe is the initial level of industry concentration. 
8.5.3. Sugar Industry 
Sugar is a politically influenced food processing industry everywhere in the 
world. Therefore, the dispersal to he noted in the positions of the Central and 
Eastem European sugar industries on the FDI-concentration maps reflects the 
wide spectrum of national policies and verifies the statement that the political 
attitude of the host country is an important determinant of foreign direct invest-
ment in addition to global tendencies. 
Foreign investors are especially interested in the sugar industries of the CEE 
countries, since the sugar market is typically highly protected. In the CEE re-
gion, the motives of foreigners are reinforced by an attempt to gain as much as 
possible of the national sugar quota of the Eli aspirants. Since a high investment 
propensity is a given characteristic as far as the foreign investors are concerned, 
the intensity of foreign influence in the sugar industry is entirely a function of 
the host country' s policy. 
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As privatisation of the first-stage processing industries was regulated by spe-
cial laws or amendments in many CEE countries, foreign interest was also ini- 
tially lower in those industries, so that no doubt was raised about the low FDI 
level. The sugar industry, however, has been a unique first-stage processing in-
dustry as far as intensive foreign interest and special market mechanisms are 
concerned, and a reserved attitude towards foreign investors is engendered by a 
strong lobby of agricultural producers in many countries. 
An additional characteristic of the Central and Eastern European sugar indus-
try is irrational plant size, the processing capacities of the CEE sugar refineries 
being no more than one fifth to one fourth of that of their western equivalents on 
average (Walkenhorst 1999). In order to achieve economies of scale, sugar in-
dustry rationalisation has started or is well under way in the CEE countries.7I 
This involves increasing the average plant size, improving the modern factories 
and closing down the obsolete ones. Since the procedure exacerbates social ten-
sions, however, its pace is eventually determined by the direction and dedication 
of national economic and agricultural policies. 
The sugar industries in the four countries are situated in quite different posi-
tions, on the opposite edges of the FDI-concentration map (Figure 59). 
Hungary applied the commercial-based privatisation approach to the sugar 
industry as well. Of its 12 sugar refineries, seven were purchased by three main 
groups of foreign investors (Eridania Beghin Say, Agrana and Tate & Lyle), 
while the remaining five were combined into one company under the name of 
Magyar Cukor Rt (Hungarian Sugar Co.), which was primarily owned by domes- 
tic agricultural producers. The rationalisation of sugar processing started very 
quicldy, as a result of tough competition. Several plants were closed and the 
foreign companies eventually purchased the five domestically owned refineries 
as well. Since there are altogether three groups of companies in the Hungarian 
sugar industry, the CR4 concentration ratio has been 100 percent for years 
(Annex 8). Owing to this liberal approach, the Hungarian sugar industry has 
moved into the zone of the global cluster [1]. 
Lithuania promoted ownership by domestic sugar beet producers for a long 
time, but by 1998 foreign acquisitions could no longer be resisted, due to produc-
tion technology difficulties and market problems. The Danish Danisco company 
bought three of the four refineries, but in return for the investment opportunity, 
71  The story of the East German sugar industry is an illustrative precedent, as a rationalisation 
launched and completed within a few years immediately after unification led to ali 43 factories 
being bought by West German and Danish investors. Altogether 34 of these were closed, four 
were modernised, three were enlarged and two brand new factories were built. At the same 
time, the output of the East German sugar industry remained the same level, although the 
performance indicators for the factories improved many times over (Walkenhorst 1999, 
p. 154). 
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Figure 59. Horizontal comparison of FDI-concentration maps for the sugar 
industry on three dimensions investigation. 
the Lithuanian govemment asked the investor to conunit itself to the procure-
ment of a certain amount- of domestic raw material a year. The fourth refinery 
remained in the hands of domestic owners, but its future was rather insecure in 
2000, when state intervention was to save it from total failure. Danisco' s plans 
included the closure of two plants and modernisation of the third one, a rational-
isation that may easily result in a monopoly in the future. In terms of economies 
of scale, one sugar plant could supply the entire Lithuanian market. 
The opposite turn in policy took place in Latvia. In the early phases of priva-
tisation, one British and one Russian investor obtained shares in two of the three 
sugar refineries but remained in the minority as far as the ownership structure 
was concemed. Then the Latvian govemment froze the acquisition rights of for-
eigners in response to pressure from the sugar beet producers' lobby, so that only 
214 
agricultural producers and domestic private persons could participate in the 
second phase of privatisation. Three factories also proved to be too many for 
Latvia, and one of them has already gone bankrupt. As in Lithuania, one 
company could easily supply the Latvian market. 
Poland had 15 sugar refineries before 1990, and these were split into several 
dozens of separate facilities in the framework of decentralised privatisation. 
Competition decimated the companies, however, and their number decreased 
from 85 to 76 between 1991 and 1996 (Rijnsburger and Schroeten 1996). The 
structure of the Polish sugar industry nevertheless remained decentralised, so 
that even the market leader had only a 4.2 percent share in 1996. This market 
dispersion was manifested in the small size of the companies, the average output 
of a Polish sugar refinery being 20,000 tons/year, where the corresponding 
figure in the EU was 100,000 tons/year (Chechelski 1998). 
Privatisation proceeded languidly, the majority of the restructured companies 
remffining in the exclusive ownership of the Polish state. The government estab-
lished four artificial units, called sugar processing holdings, in response to pres-
sure from the sugar beet producers, and the refineries were allocated to these for 
administrative purposes. Despite their names, the sugar holdings do not have 
property management functions, but are administrative organisations established 
to improve the competitiveness of their members through a uniform market strat-
egy and common distribution networks. They are intended to increase the market 
security of the producers, and thus theii presence is a guarantee of the mainte-
nance of irrational plant sizes. The introduction of a sugar quota system rein-
forced the freezing of an outdated industry structure, in that three-fourths of the 
quotas were allocated to the four holdings. 
Among the real privatised sugar companies, 11 are in foreign ownership, four 
now belonging to Pfeiffer und Langen, four to British Sugar, two to Sudzucker 
and one to Tate & Lyle. Foreigners altogether hold 16.23 percent of the Polish 
sugar qUotas. The largest domestic investor is Rolimpex, which has purchased 
two refineries and rented three. 
As of early 2000, the rationalisation of sugar refining had hardly even started 
in Poland. The industry is concentrating at an extremely slow pace due to objec- 
tions from the agricultural lobby. Economic policy makers have been reluctant to 
let the acquisition plans of foreigners or the rationalisation of the industry pro-
ceed freely. These facts explain the position of the Polish sugar industry in the 
domain of the local cluster [3] in Figure 42 (page 182). Experts have calculated 
that 12 modern sugar refineries would he sufficient to supply the Polish market 
as opposed to the present total of 76 (Walkenhorst 1999). 
The sugar industry provides solid evidence for the fact that foreign investors 
are capable of improving the technical modernisation, profitability and effici- 
ency of an entire industry in a relatively short space of time. Foreigners operate 
on purely economic considerations when deteunining the optimal plant size, and 
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will stip away the political, rural development and employment components 
inherited from the command economy from the scope of the sugar companies 
and replace them with a business and profitability approach. 
8.5.4. Distilling Industry 
The strategic importance of distilling within the food industry is demonstrated 
by the fact that its privatisation was postponed to the very end of the process in 
many CEE countries. The reason for the special treatment is the high value 
added capability and high profitability of the industry. Distilling utilises low-
quality, low-value raw materials which cannot be used by other processing fields 
at ali, while the end product is a high-value excise commodity. It is not acciden- 
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Figure 60. Horizontal comparison of FDI-concentration maps for the distilling 
industry on three dimensions of investigation. 
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tai that beside the sugar industry it is distilling which has typically been subject 
to especially careful and sometimes procrastinated privatisation. 
Out of the five countries considered here, the distilling industry remained in 
state ownership until 1999 in Poland, Estonia and Lithuania. Privatisation had 
been concluded in Latvia before this, but foreign participation was not facilitated 
in the case of the dominant companies. Since the distilling industry tends to 
consist of only a few companies in almost ali these countries, the level of con-
centration is high and the industry remains in the transition cluster [4]. Only in 
Hungary did its privatisation proceed in parallel with the rest of the industries, 
accompanied by an active interest from foreign investors (section 7.3.4.7 on 
page 139). Provided no administrative barriers are raised against company acqui-
sitions in the distilling industries of Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, foreign 
investors may express serious interest in the privatisation process there, too. 
Figure 61. Horizontal comparison of FDI-concentration maps for the beer 
industry on three dimensions of investigation. 
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8.5.5. Beer Industry 
The positions of the beer industry on the horizontal FDI-concentration map for 
the five countries show a homogenous picture (Figure 61). Brewing was among 
the first industries to he privatised in most countries, and the promising market 
perspectives attracted forbign investors. An intensive growth in consumption 
was anticipated in ali the CEE countries. 
The market structure before restructuring had already been oligopolistic, and 
the appearance of foreign investors consolidated the power and influence of the 
largest breweries. There are currently three to eight subsidiaries of foreign 
companies competing with each other on the beer markets of all five countries, 
which makes competitiori fairly even. 
The Swedish-Finnish Baltic Beverages Holding (BBH) has become the 
market leader in ali three Baltic countries, and the Finnish beer and soft drinks 
manufacturer Olvi also has interests in ali three countries. In addition to these, 
the Danish company Habro is present in Estonia, while Danish Bryggerien and 
Carlsberg companies possess large breweries in Lithuania. The market leader in 
Poland is in the hands of Heineken, and the rest of the foreign investors are also 
well-known companies: Carlsberg, South African Breweries, Weissheimer Malz 
and AHK Gmbh (PAIZ 1999b). The large Hungarian breweries are ali in foreign 
ownership (section 7.3.4.2 on pages 124-127). 
8.5.6. Tobacco Industry 
The situation in the tobacco industry is similar to that in brewing (Figure 62), in 
that foreign investors tend to favour this globally concentrating industry. The 
tobacco monopolies in the Baltic countries were ali purchased by foreign compa-
nies at the very beginning of the privatisation process: Eesti Tubaka was bought 
by Svenska Tobak AB Rigas Tabakas Fabrika was acquired by the Danish 
House of Prince, and a multinational company, Phillip Morris, bought up the 
Lithuanian tobacco company (Annex 12). 
The story of the Estonian tobacco factory has become a textbook example of 
the failure of foreign investments. The Swedish owner arrived with huge invest-
ment plans and purchased a 67 percent stake in the company. Meanwhile the 
Estonian government was forced to levy equal excise taxes on domestically pro-
duced and imported cigarettes under pressure from the WTO in 1995. The profit-
ability of Estonian production then decreased so sharply that it was more advan-
tageous for Svenska Tobak to move production to Sweden and export the ciga-
rettes back to the Estonian market. The manufacturing of cigarettes thereby 
ceased entirely in Estonia and was replaced by imports. 
Mostly the same large investors are present in the Polish and Hungarian 
tobacco industries. The German company Reemtsma dominates the Polish mar- 
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Figure 62. Horizontal comparison of FDI-concentration maps for the tobacco 
industry on three dimensions of investigation. 
ket, representing at the same time the largest single company in the food, bever-
ages and tobacco sector in Poland. The other large tobacco companies are in the 
ownership of Phillip Morris, Seita, British American Tobacco and R.J. Reynold 
(Armex 11). The Polish market is an ideal terrain for foreign investors, as profit-
ability is close to six percent despite the 189 percent excise tax, and consump-
tion is stable (PAIZ 1999a). The 20 companies in the industry mostly use domes-
tic raw materials for cigarette production. 
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8.6. Summary 
8.6.1. Conclusions Based on the Comparative Analyses of 
FDI-Concentration Maps 
Geographical extension of FDI-concentration maps is an effective and useful 
tool for comprehending and comparing the food processing industries of the 
Central and Eastem European countries, enabling the following statements to he 
made: 
Foreign investors favour concentrated food processing industries 
and prospects of attaining market power. 
The food processing industries make up four distinct clusters on the 
dimensions of concentration and foreign capital penetration. 
The type of privatisation implemented and the attitude adopted to-
wards it is a determinant that directly shapes the disposition and 
locations of the industries on the national FDI-concentration maps. 
The decisions and choices of industry made by foreign investors are 
also influenced by other characteristics of the industries. 
The ball diagrams constructed on the basis of the national FDI-concentration 
maps verify that foreign investors attain power very slowly in the largest, first-
stage processing industries in most countries, whereas the small, medium-sized, 
typically second-stage processing industries are purchased quickly. 
The horizontal comparative maps also support the above statement, with the 
additional remark that the corresponding food processing industries in ali the 
CEE countries examined tend to converge to the same cluster. Exceptions to this 
rule can always he explained by clear-cut, administrative, political or other devi-
ating forces. 
The statements made about the Hungarian food industry in Chapters 4 to 7 
were proved and upgraded to the general regional level in the comparative ana-
lyses of Chapter 8. Foreign direct investments in the food industries of the transi-
tional countries have been motivated by the pursuit of market power. 
The attractiveness of concentrated food markets to foreign capital is an un-
questionable fact, but it still leaves an open question: what characteristic of the 
concentrated markets embodies the ultimate attractive force? Several attributes 
can he listed as possible answers to this question. 
Monopolistic rent or extra profit. Dominant company positions un-
doubtedly resulted in extra profit in a number of industries, the ulti-
mate objective of firms, as known from microeconomic theory, is 
after ali profit maximisation. 
Superiority over rivals. Superiority over the domestically owned 
competitors in technological, management and other operational 
aspects is an obvious characteristic of most foreign investors on the 
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CEE food markets. Foreign investors apparently employed a 
"double profit if you move fast" strategy against the other foreign 
rivals, while the rapid achievement of market power truly opened 
up opportunities for establishing sustainable superiority over ali 
competitors, both foreign and domestic. 
Negotiating power in relation to national governments. This repre-
sents an opportunity for the largest multinational companies, which 
have usually attained dominant or even monopoly positions in their 
target markets. Full or majority control over a particular processing 
industry may increase social tensions and raise issues of employ-
ment or the market security of raw material suppliers. Market 
power in these cases has typically implied special treatment, certain 
business and tax preferences or even specially made contracts with 
national govemments. 
Chances for misusing competitive power. This attribute of a con-
centrated market may have been an attractive factor in a few cases 
at least, although it could hardly have been the primary objective of 
any food industry FDI project. Nevertheless, the numerous cases 
cited by CEE competition offices confirm that some problems have 
indeed occurred. 
High capital concentration. This attribute stems from globalisation. 
Concentrated production and concentrated capital are regarded 
more and more as preconditions for intemationally efficient busi-
ness. The presence of multinational companies, which lay emphasis 
on capital concentration, inevitably leads to market power on the 
national markets, too. 
Opportunities offered by privatisation. The current analysis focuses 
on a time interval when the food industries of the CEE countries 
underwent unique and unprecedented structural and institutional 
changes. The practices of ownership change offered foreign inves-
tors many concentrated market positions on a tray. The purchase of 
the largest companies in the transitional countries was an opportu-
nity that best suited the financial power of companies in the devel-
oped countries. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the multina-
tional companies, it was not worth dissipating resources on the 
purchase and management of separate units when they could easily 
acquire the same market power in one piece. 
None of the above attributes can be judged to he exclusive or ultimate charac-
teristic of concentrated markets that could alone have been responsible for at- 
tracting food industry FDI to the CEE region. The concrete examples of indus-
tries or individual companies referred to in Chapters 7 and 8 indicate that a com-
bination of the attributes of concentrated markets must have been responsible for 
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FDI in pursuit of market power. Ali foreign acquisitions of concentrated markets 
or dominant companies postulate some form of joint influence of the attributes 
listed, the concrete case of a particular market or company always representing a 
unique mix of these. This review of the attributes of concentrated markets leads 
us already to a delineation of alternative research directions for the future. 
8.6.2. Further Research Directions 
A further expansion of the range of countries would be a worthwhile direction 
for later research. Such an expansion should cover those countries in which the 
food industry has already absorbed a notable amount of foreign direct invest-
ment. 
Although data collection and the obtaining of information on the food 
processing industries of various countries is a very time and energy-consuming 
process, FDI-concentration maps for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania would most probably provide illuminating results. Even more effort 
would be needed to construct corresponding maps for countries such as the 
Ukraine or Russia, although these would hold out promises of very interesting 
results. The author would expect the findings to confirm the general conclusions 
and statements about the food sectors of Central and Eastern European countries 
put forward in this dissertation. 
Testing the concept of FDI-concentration maps would be a useful experiment 
even in the case of developed countries, since mergers and acquisitions by trans-
national companies are exercising a growing influence in the food processing 
sectors of the industrialised countries as well. Intuition suggests that a similar 
arrangement of food processing industries on FDI-concentration maps would be 
detected as in the Central and Eastern European region. The grounds for these 
expectations will be established in the chapter of conclusions, where an FDI-
concentration map for the global food industry will be presented. 
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9. Impacts of Foreign Capital on the Hungarian 
Food Industry 
Thesis V:  
FDI has contributed to reinforcing the international competitiveness of the 
Hungarian food industry and has consolidated the position of the agrifood 
chain in the national economy. The performance of the predominantly for-
eign-owned food processors differed significantly from that of the predomi-
nantly domestically owned food processors in the second half of the 1990s, 
surpassing them in all the important efficiency and performance categories. 
The major tendency has been for the performance gap between the two 
groups to widen since the mid-1990s. 
9.1. Balance of Impacts of Food Industry FDI on 
the Agrifood Chain 
Privatisation of the Hungarian food industry proceeded very fast, so that the state 
owned only 1.1 percent of the aggregate registered capital in 1997, a proportion 
which had declined to under one percent by 1998 (Table 8, page 48). At the same 
time, foreign ownership became predominant, and domestic ownership was 
mostly centralised in the hands of corporations. A notable portion of the domes-
tic stake, however, was also indirectly in foreign ownership, for through their 
interests in banks and trading companies and on account of the inter-ownership 
relations in the agrifood chain, foreigners exercised a much greater influence on 
the Hungarian food industry than their statistically registered 62.6 percent share 
of corporate ownership would suggest. According to expert estimates, they con-
trolled as much as 65-70 percent of the industry in 1998 (FOSZ 1999, p. 2). 
The consolidating foreign power in the process of the corporate restructuring 
and privatisation of the food industry generated anxiety on the part of various 
players in the food economy. These early concems will be addressed below in 
the light of ten years of experience of foreign investors. 
9.1.1. Early Concerns about Foreign Ownership 
The early phases of privatisation of the food industry brought about active par-
ticipation by foreigners and direct acquisitions of companies. Approximately 50 
percent of Hungary's total privatisation revenues between 1990 and 1992 origi-
nated from the sales of food processing companies (Raskö 2000, p. 93). The con-
cems about the rapid penetration of foreign capital are illustrated in the follow-
ing potential risk factors documented in the mid-1990s (Alvincz 1994, p. 120): 
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direct and indirect capital withdrawal, 
potential misuse of a monopoly position, 
occupation of the market by running down purchased processing 
capacities and replacing production with imports, 
squeezing out the traditional domestic food brands, 
using up the resources of the purchased company to achieve rapid 
profits. 
Additional concerns about foreign ownership were related to (1) reduced 
revenues for the state budget, (2) elimination of certain auxiliary functions 
performed by the food industry, and (3) profit repatriation: 
This argument asserted that the state budget in any case suffered 
considerably from the tax concessions awarded to foreign-owned 
companies, and that the losses would only be worsened by the for-
eigners' cost accounting manoeuvres and profit abating policies. 
The foreign owners would ignore the social or rural functions of 
the food processing companies as they started internal rationalisa-
tion. This would mean labour reductions or the reorganisation of 
raw material procurement channels. 
One of the most frequently mentioned concerns over foreign own-
ership was profit repatriation. As Hungarian law places no limita-
tions on the repatriation of profits, many people were afraid of a 
mass pull-out of profits from the food industry. 
The privatisation of the food industry and the rapid increase in foreign owner-
ship was followed with genuine anxiety, especially by various groups in the agri-
food chain. The acquisitions made by foreign investors implied potential risks 
for three major groups in the chain (Jansik 2000, pp. 98-99): 
agricultural raw material producers, 
domestically owned food processors, 
consumers. 
1. The food processing companies constitute the largest market for 
agricultural raw material producers, for whom an ideal solution 
would have been the transfer of food processing capacity directly 
into their own hands. Since the restructuring and compensation sys-
tems that applied in agriculture did not precede the privatisation of 
the food industry in time, the raw material producers were left out 
of the first wave of privatisation. Privatisation methods were modi-
fied by the middle of the decade, however, in order to take the inter-
ests of the latter into account, but the amendments did not lead to a 
break-through in ownership relations. The agricultural raw material 
producers therefore watched the emergence of dominant foreign 
ownership with understandable anxiety, as 
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they were afraid of losing negotiation power in the agrifood 
chain upon the appearance of strong foreign investors, and 
they were worried about the future strategy of the foreign 
food processors and a potential cut-back in purchases of 
domestic raw materials. 
The Hungarian-owned food processors obviously regarded foreign 
investors as their most powerful rivals, and felt that their mere 
existence and survival were endangered by a form of competition in 
which the foreign investors would dictate the rules. 
The most essential concern of consumers was related to the prices 
of foodstuffs. They apprehended that certain goods that used to be 
affordable earlier would pass beyond the scope of their "personal 
consumption basket". Some consumers also feared for the continu-
ity of traditional food brands. 
9.1.2. Early Concerns in the Light of Experience 
A decade has gone by since the appearance of the first foreign investors in the 
Hungarian food industry, and five years since the completion of privatisation. 
This time seems sufficient to confront past experiences with the concerns listed 
above. 
9.1.2.1. State Budget Relations72 
The Hungarian government granted five years of tax relief for ali companies 
registered before 1995 with at least 33 percent foreign ownership, the tax obliga-
tions and benefits of which in 1997 are shown in Table 28. The data indicate 
conspicuously that foreign-owned processors achieved the majority of the profit 
made in the food industry in that year, more than 73 percent. The calculated cor-
porate taxes paid by the food industry were USD 61 million in 1997, of which 
exemptions amounted to USD 27.8 million. 
The taxation discrimination in favour of foreign-owned companies is demon-
strated by the fact that they would have paid nearly 70 percent of the taxes, but 
since they were granted 97 percent of the tax exemptions, their overall contribu-
tion to the corporate taxation of the industry finally remained well below 50 per-
cent. The foreign-owned food processors paid only one-third of their calculated 
corporate taxes in 1997. 
The balance of corporate taxes for domestically owned food processors 
shows a more solemn picture. They obtained less than 3 percent of the industry' s 
72 The annual 1997 exchange rate 1 USD = 186.8 HUF was used throughout this section to ex-
press the Hungarian state budget figures in dollar. 
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Table 28. Corporate tax obligations and payments of food processing compa-
nies in Hungary in 1997 (in million USD). 
Profit Calculated Tax 	Taxes 	Profit 
before 	taxes exemptions to be 	after 
taxes paid 	taxes 
Foreign-owned companies 177.7 41.8 27.8 14.0 163.7 
of which: 100-50 percent foreign 154.2 36.4 24.1 12.3 141.9 
49-10 percent foreign 23.5 5.4 3.7 1.7 21.8 
Domestically owned companies 32.7 18.7 0.5 18.2 14.5 
Total food industry 210.4 60.5 28.3 32.2 178.2 
Source: own calculations based on data of AKII. 
tax exemptions and they had to pay 95 percent of their calculated corporate taxes 
to the state budget.73 The financial and technological gap between the foreign 
and domestically owned food processors has evidently been widened by discrim-
inatory attitude adopted in the state budget in favour of foreign-owned compa-
nies. These had net profits of nearly USD 164 million for free utilisation in 1997, 
including internal development and dividend payments, while the corresponding 
taxed profit figure for domestically owned food processors was altogether USD 
14.5 million. 
The same pattern can also be demonstrated in proportional terms, in that 
domestically owned companies produced 15.4 percent of the food industry' s 
profits, but their proportion of the freely useable profit remained under 8 per-
cent. 
A comprehensive analysis of the state budget relations of the food processing 
companies results in a much finer picture (Table 29). The payments made by the 
companies include social insurance costs and taxes, duties and contributions 
other than calculated corporate taxes, while the benefits embrace tax exemptions 
and other subsidies that were granted them. Ali the groups of food processing 
companies have a positive balance, which means that none of them "sponges on" 
the state budget. The overall contribution of foreign-owned companies to the net 
state budget revenues was much weightier than in the category of corporate tax-
ation, although it was again exceeded by the net contribution of domestically 
owned food processing companies in absolute terms. 
73 The data in Table 28 may give the impression that domestically owned food processors are 
over-taxed, since their calculated corporate taxes amounted to USD 18.7 million after an 
aggregate profit of USD 32.7 million. Actually, it was the large number of companies making 
a loss that resulted in a high proportion of calculated corporate taxes relative to aggregate 
profits among the domestically owned processors. 
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Table 29. Total balance of money flow for food processing companies in rela-
tion to the Hungarian state budget in 1997 (in million USD). 
Payments 
of companies 
Benefits Balance 
Foreign-owned companies 190.0 119.4 70.6 
of which: 100-50 percent foreign 161.1 95.8 65.3 
49-10 percent foreign 28.9 23.6 5.3 
Domestically owned companies 148.3 64.2 84.1 
Total food industry 338.3 183.6 154.7 
Source: own calculations based on data of AKII. 
The foreign-owned companies recorded net profits of USD 163.7 million in 
1997, of which only USD 56.7 billion was used for internal development, so that 
USD 107 million was paid to the owners in dividends. The majority of these 
dividends — as laid down in the dividend conditions included in their articles of 
association, but in any case a proportion of foreign ownership at the most — pre-
sumably left the country; in other words this profit was repatriated. The fears 
concerning profit repatriation thus proved to be real ones, although the matter 
has to be interpreted in an international context. The food processing investors at 
the beginning of the decade had mobilised external resources, capital loans or 
their, own accumulated corporate profits in order to invest in Hungary. As soon 
as they attained the desired market position and the subsidiary had become a 
coherent part of the corporation, the Hungarian affiliate was subordinated to the 
global or regional strategy of the foreign parent company. As long as additional 
investments result in a growth in efficiency and better economies of scales, or 
the potential rate of return is high by international standards, the foreign inves-
tors will continue to reinvest the profit accumulated in the subsidiary. However, 
as soon as the parent company achieves its goals or perceives more favourable 
investment opportunities in other countries, it will withdraw the profit from the 
Hungarian food industry and utilise it for other investment projects, thus sustain-
ing a permanent flow of international investment capital. 
Profit repatriation is a natural and acceptable procedure as long as it is done 
under legal and controllable conditions. There is a reproachable form of profit 
withdrawal, however, which is frequently practised by foreign-owned compa-
nies in the food industry, and it is this hidden profit repatriation that presents the 
real threat. The amount of hidden profit repatriation is not known, since internal 
accounting manoeuvres between parent companies and subsidiaries make it 
impossible to measure. Three major methods can be identified: 
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cost-based profit repatriation — increasing the costs of the subsidi-
ary to the benefit of the parent company,74 
profit repatriation by raising the equity (Alvincz 1994, p. 71), 
trade-based profit repatriation by means of transfer prices, which is 
done through internal transactions between the parent company and 
its affiliates. 
9.1.2.2. Social and Rural Functions 
A certain group of social and rural functions used to he implicitly assigned to the 
agricultural sector and the food industry in the command economy, partly 
because the agrifood sector played a key role in rural employment. Soon after 
privatisation, the new owners usually east off these social or rural development 
functions (Bevan et al. 1999, p. 17). This was particularly true of the foreign 
owners, who — besides investments and substantial management reforms — hoped 
to achieve rapid profitability growth by laying off redundant labour and cleaning 
up the production profile of the companies that they had acquired. 
Food industry FDI has been allocated unequally between the regions of 
Hungary, with foreign capital achieving a smaller share in most of the counties 
than the role of agriculture or food processing activities in the economic output 
would have suggested. 
The rural functions of the food industry were hardly assisted or promoted at 
ali by foreign investments. Employment in the food industry decreased from 
203,000 to 132,000 between 1989 and 1998, the majority of the reductions 
taking place in foreign-owned companies. 
The weightiest statement in this dissertation is the declaration that the main 
motivational factor behind foreign investments was the attaining of market 
power, as is confirmed by the geographical distribution of food industry FDI in 
Hungary, where investors preferred the proximity of concentrated consumer 
markets to the proximity of a concentrated raw material supply. Over 62 percent 
74 Leibenstein' s concept of X-efficiency is defined by pushing costs down to the lowest possible 
level. "Altering a part of the profit into costs" is known as a technique frequently employed by 
monopolies and it is named X-inefficiency in the intemational literature (Shepherd 1990, 
pp. 126-128). Costs may exceed the efficient cost level by as much as 10 percent, which 
erodes the profitability of companies considerably and imposes a tremendous social burden on 
the economy. The possibility of X-inefficiency increases in close correlation with growth in 
market influence, so that monopolies or companies in an oligopolistic or dominant firm market 
structure have an ever-growing probability of accumulating it to a notable extent. There is still 
no approved, well-functioning method for quantifying X-inefficiency, but its prevalence is 
considered an unquestionable fact also in the Hungarian food industry. Foreign-owned com-
panies increase it with their market positions and hidden profit repatriation, although it should 
not be forgotten that domestically owned companies are partly responsible its accumulation as 
well. 
228 
of the investment was focused on Budapest and the surrounding county of Pest, 
whereas that region' s contribution to food industry output does not reach 30 per-
cent (Table 30). The counties, which have traditionally had strong food process-
ing activities, absorbed surprisingly little foreign capital. 
The proportion of foreign owners in the registered company capital of the 
food industry in Budapest and in the county of Pest greatly surpasses the national 
average of 62.6 percent, being as high as 84-85 percent. 
Table 30. County-based division of agricultural and food industry output, 
employment and food industry FDI in 1998 (in percent). 
County 
County proportions of 
agricultural 
a revenues 
agricul- 
tural em- 
pioymentb 
sales revenues food industry 	food in the food 	industry employment industry 	 FDI 
Baranya 6.87 5.66 4.82 4.57 3.30 
Båcs-Kiskun 7.37 7.47 5.41 6.83 3.06 
Bökös 8.96 7.35 4.19 4.88 1.74 
Borsod-Abailj-Zemplön 3.98 5.18 3.08 4.75 1.95 
Csongråd 5.79 6.09 5.63 5.59 2.02 
Fejör 5.64 5.87 4.30 3.25 3.89 
Györ-Moson-Sopron 4.57 5.51 5.83 6.46 3.47 
Hajdå-Bihar 10.37 8.91 9.83 7.48 4.96 
Heves 2.24 2.92 3.38 3.04 1.89 
Komårom-Esztergom 3.18 2.66 5.17 5.49 2.21 
Nögråd 0.87 1.43 0.90 0.95 0.70 
Pest ös Budapest 11.40 8.15 28.51 24.12 62.39 
Somogy 4.45 5.30 2.79 2.85 2.63 
Szabolcs-Szatmår-Bereg 3.56 3.92 4.06 5.36 0.31 
Jåsz-Nagykun-Szolnok 6.37 7.29 3.31 3.34 1.36 
Tolna 5.83 5.76 1.35 1.49 0.04 
Vas 2.70 3.99 2.62 2.79 2.00 
Veszpröm 3.08 3.73 2.18 2.99 0.83 
Zala 2.74 2.82 2.62 3.76 1.25 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: AKII (1998, pp. 10, 24) and own calculations based on data of AKII. 
Note: a, bl  1997 data. 
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Figure 63. Geographical distribution offood industry FDI in Hungary in 1998. 
The proportion of foreign capital also exceeded the national average in the 
counties of Vas (66.9 percent), Somogy (63.2 percent) and Nögråd (66.9 
percent), whereas it was minimal in Tolna (4.3 percent) and Komårom-
Esztergom (24.1 percent) and in the counties of Borsod-Abatij-Zemp16n (37.6 
percent), Szabolcs-Szatmår-Bereg (10.9 percent) and Jåsz-Nagykun-Szolnok 
(28.1 percent) in Eastem Hungary. 
This behaviour of foreign capital bore out the concerns expressed regarding a 
potential growth in regional inequalities. FDI did not change the unequal devel-
opment patterns, nor did it improve the rural or employment functions of the 
food industry.75 On the other hand, this direction should not be in any way sur- 
75 The closure of entire factories and liquidation of certain processing facilities in the sugar and 
dairy industries were concrete manifestations of this phenomenon. 
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prising, since private capital committed to processing industries does not assume 
these functions anywhere else in the world. Rural development objectives are 
usually pursued through the politically deeply woven agricultural sector in 
Europe, as also in some other parts of the world. 
9.1.2.3. Players Affected in the Agrifood Chain 
The balance of the foreign investors' presence in the food industry will be ana-
lysed with respect to three directly influenced groups, following the categorisa-
tion on page 224. A cost-benefit type of comparison will be employed to verify 
the real or exaggerated anxiety of agricultural producers, domestically owned 
food processors and consumers. 
Agricultural Raw Material Suppliers 
Agricultural raw material producers apparently do have weak negotiating power 
in the face of foreign-owned food processors, partly on account of the over-
whelming difference in financial and capital potential between them. A deeper 
investigation, however, unveils a refined set of relations. 
First, good quality raw materials are of crucial importance for food 
processing companies, being essential for their operation. In this 
respect, processors — regardless of their capital power — are "quasi-
exposed" to the supply maintainable by the raw material producers. 
The two groups are therefore more equal in negotiating power than 
it may seem at the first sight. 
Secondly, the group of agricultural producers is very heterogen- 
eous, and their relations to foreign-owned food processors are indi-
vidually influenced by their economic performance and the quality 
of the raw material. Producers who offer good quality have firm 
negotiating positions. There is a constant, vigorous demand for 
their produce, and the foreign-owned processors frequently en-
hance their production with various incentives or bonuses. On the 
other hand, those producers who supply poor quality will obvi- 
ously have much weaker negotiating power. 
The differences in performance between agricultural producers are con-
stantly increasing as a result of circular impacts, since consistently good quality 
is often a consequence of initial economic power. Some producers have stable 
financial status and solid agronomic expertise, and they can therefore afford 
more expensive agronomic techniques than other producers can. More sophisti-
cated production technology requires a certain minimum farm size, but it will 
then grant higher yields and better quality. Negotiating power in dealing with 
food processors is a function of both quality and the quantity supplied. The 
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incentives and the mere marketability of the commodities will further strengthen 
the status of farms that produce good quality in an efficient way. At the same 
time, the financially unstable producers who supply poor quality continue to be-
come weaker. In view of the heterogeneity of the suppliers, the balance of the 
relations between agricultural producers and foreign-owned food processors is a 
fairly complex matter, but it does mean that the emergence of foreign companies 
resulted in decaying negotiating power and weakening status for one part of the 
producers, while ensuring a consolidation of performance and secure markets for 
others. 
The above explanation leads us to the conclusion that the procurement 
strategy of foreign-owned food processors is based on rational economic logic, 
which evidently promotes the overall efficiency of agricultural raw material 
production. 
Another concern of the producers that was related to procurement channels 
was that the foreign-owned food processors would procure their raw materials 
through imports, for instance, rather than from farmers in the host country. Expe-
rience indicates that food processors in the international arena do not build their 
strategy on national emotions. Their activities, including the procurement of raw 
materials, are driven by strict economic and business considerations. 
Political decisions are powerful• factors, however, and they can change the 
operational environment. Food processors may reconsider their strategy and 
choose the best business option in the light of the new conditions. The power of 
political decisions is best illustrated by the example of industrial tomato produc-
tion in Hungary. As a result of the removal of import duty, processors started to 
procure tomatoes from the EU, and now over 70 percent of the tomatoes used in 
the Hungarian food industry originate from abroad. Western European tomato 
producers are no more competitive than Hungarian ones, but they enjoy unequal 
benefits in the form of EU subsidies and are able to offer the processors in Hun-
gary low-priced tomatoes. It is political decisions in agriculture or trade that tend 
to be influenced by national or emotional considerations, whereas the food pro-
cessors themselves regard the new environment as an exogenous factor to which 
they must adapt by following a rational path of business logic. 
The present import duties still protect the majority of the Hungarian agricul-
tural commodities from competition from the European Union' s subsidised 
products, but how will the status of Hungary's agricultural producers change as a 
consequence of accession to the EU? If the competition positions of Hungarian 
and Western European farmers were exclusively a function of their efficiency, 
the question could be easily answered by means of an economic analysis. How-
ever, agricultural production is deeply interwoven with national interests and 
compromises between various political tendencies, so that decisions are reached 
only after long, devious negotiating processes. Therefore only scenario analyses 
based on various sets of underlying conditions can be employed. Any modifica- 
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tion of the set of economic conditions by political decisions will drastically dis-
tort competitiveness and efficiency relations between agricultural producers, 
which should initially be based on natural endowments, access to production 
factors and the' technology applied. It would be fair to compare Hungarian agri-
cultural production with that of the European Union if it were not for the compli-
cated EU and state budget relations and other political impacts.-As it is, the task 
is virtually impossible, and in any case, such an analysis would only serve as one 
scenario for comparison purposes — a scenario representing a "pure economic 
environment". Researchers are usually forced to assume sirnilar political envi-
ronments in order to simulate the probable status of Hungarian and other Central 
and Eastern European agricultural producers within the European Union, or else 
to consider a number of different environments.76 
Many impact analyses performed so far suggest that a large proportion of 
Hungarian farmers — given that their production is influenced by financial sys-
tems, subsidies and incentives that are equal to those found elsewhere in the 
European Union — would remain competitive on the domestic market and con-
tinue to supply raw material to both foreign and domestically owned processors 
within Hungary. In order to protect their domestic farmers and to set a limit on 
the growth in agricultural production in the acceding countries, western member 
countries can be expected eventually to find the fine amendments to the present 
mechanisms that are necessary for preventing Hungarian agricultural exports 
from growing disproportionately within the EU. The supplying of the Hungarian 
market, including domestically operating food processors, can nevertheless be 
set as a realistic future objective for the country' s own agricultural producers. 
In summary, it may be said that foreign-owned food processors have a series 
of positive spillover effects that benefit raw material producers: they provide 
vital producers with secure markets and a stable economic background, and are 
thereby able to improve the overall efficiency of agricultural production. Even 
the negative impacts are not necessarily negative or entirely so from the perspec-
tive of total agricultural production, as they include the elimination of inefficient 
producers and result in a reduction in the rural functions assigned to agriculture. 
The positive impacts of foreign-owned food processors on Hungarian agricul-
tural production overwhelmingly surpass the negative effects. 
76  Political impact analyses are conducted in almost every country' s agricultural economics 
research institutes. These rely on econometric methods of various depths. ,Besides national 
research institutes, the OECD and the EU also have their own programmes for simulating the 
agricultural impacts of the Eastern expansion. 
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Domestically Owned Food Processors 
Foreign investors represent an obvious source of danger for domestically owned 
food processors, as their capital power, magnitude and intemational experience 
mean that their subsidiaries in Hungary have become fierce competitors. 
Two major groups can be distinguished among the Hungarian-owned food 
processors: restructured and privatised formerly state-owned companies that 
were purchased by domestic investors, and newly established enterprises. 
There is a risk factor which directly endangers the very survival of domesti-
cally owned processors. Foreign-owned companies tend to pursue the acquisi-
tion of domestically owned competitors, who become either an attractive target 
or a dangerous rival because of their spectacular economic performance, com-
petitiveness or market power. In most cases production is preserved, however, 
and the company is rapidly consolidated and subordinated to the headquarters. In 
some processing industries, which are characterised by excessive redundant 
capacity, some acquired companies may be liquidated entirely. 
In many industries dozens of new, domestically owned enterprises sprang up 
like mushrooms in the shade of the giant foreign-owned processors. Despite the 
impending sources of danger, these domestic firms have enjoyed the spillover 
effects and have thus usually become the "beneficiaries" of the dominant foreign 
ownership. Foreign companies introduced completely new managerial, market-
ing, information, logistic, distribution and financial methods into the food indus-
try. The domestically owned companies obviously took advantage of these and 
various other educational channels to leam modern concepts. Their leaming 
process was greatly accelerated, however, by close monitoring of their foreign 
competitors and following their example. 
Another aspect of the spillover effects caused by foreign-owned food pro-
cessors is their selective effect, in that the weak companies are rapidly eliminated 
by the tough competition that they generate, while the surviving domestically 
owned competitors are strengthened and prepared for competition on the large, 
homogeneous EU market. The benefit of this preparation period and intensive 
competition can be assessed in the light of a CEE comparison. Domestically 
owned food processors are temporarily saved from the fierce competition in 
those Central and Eastem European countries where the small number of foreign 
rivals, high import duties or other administrative measures have ensured a pro-
tective environment, but the dramatic liberalisation of trading and possible EU 
membership may be a sudden shock for them. 
Although the dangers and risks for domestically owned companies caused by 
foreign-owned processors are ostensibly greater then the benefits, the secondary 
benefits from the spillover effects effectively counterbalance the disadvantages 
on the level of the entire food industry. The differences in corporate performance 
between the two major ownership categories will be considered in detail in sec-
tion 9.3. 
234 
Consumers 
Although consumers are not part of the conventionally defined agrifood chain, it 
is reasonable to consider the benefits and disadvantages experienced by them 
here, as demand is the ultimate driving force for the chain. 
The concerns of consumers about foreign capital partly proved to be relevant. 
Foreign investors built the costs of modernisation into their prices, and the price 
level of foodstuffs, especially that of excise products, rapidly increased. It 
should be noted that the predominantly foreign-owned wholesale and retail food 
sector has been responsible for a considerable proportion of the price growth, 
although no accurate calculations or data are available on the distribution of 
incomes and margins among the various components of the agrifood chain. 
There is a much more concrete impact on the consumers than that of price 
level changes, namely the fact that foreign-owned companies have been striving 
for uniformity in Hungarian consumption patterns and integration of Hungary 
into the global food markets. Multinational enterprises seek homogenisation of 
consumption patterns, since this extracts the maximal benefit from the unit 
expenses of marketing, advertising and product development. Hungarian con-
sumers fall victims to a strategy which causes old, traditional food brands to 
disappear and to be replaced with uniform global brands. This is best illustrated 
in Hungary by the rapid disappearance of the wide assortment of carbonated soft 
drinks established in the 1980s. The foreign companies reshaped consumption 
patterns to their advantage within just a few years. 
Foreign food brands were foisted upon consumers in a similar, albeit not so 
totalitarian a way in the case of several other product groups. It is worth noting, 
however, that many foreign-owned companies in Central and Eastern Europe 
have recognised the popularity of traditional local brands in the confectionery, 
tobacco and beer industries, among others, and have taken advantage of the 
brand loyalty of consumers. 
Consumers also enjoy some benefits from the presence of foreign food pro-
cessors. The quality and range of food products and standards of packaging have 
perceptibly improved as a result of intensive investments. 
9.1.3. Summarised Balance of Impacts 
Research into privatisation and corporate performance in the transition countries 
has in general come to the conclusion that foreign capital improves the competi-
tiveness of the acquired companies and consequently that of entire industries 
(Bevan et al. 1999, p. 15). The higher the weight of foreign capital, the greater 
the probability of intensive growth in competitiveness. 
The negative and positive impacts reviewed in this chapter are summarised in 
Table 31. The Hungarian food processing industry underwent substantial 
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Table 31. Summary of the balance of impacts of foreign capital in the 
Hungarian economy and agrifood chain. 
Sector 
	 Negative impacts, 	 Positive impacts, 
potential risks results 
Macro-level, industry-specific impacts 
National economy, 
state budget, 
food industry 
Reduced state budget 	• Improvements in international 
revenues 	 competitiveness. 
Hidden profit repatriation. 	• Increased efficiency. 
Reduction in rural functions — • Maintaining of food exports. 
laying off of labour force. 
Agrifood chain 
Vulnerability, weak 	• Secure markets for 
Agricultural raw 	negotiating power. agricultural raw materials. 
material producers 	• Raw material procurement 	• Spillover effects within the 
from imports. 	 agri-food chain. 
Domestically owned 
food processors 
Rivalry. 
Company acquisitions. 
Spillover effects (leadership 
in marketing, logistic, 
management and technology). 
Selective effects, preparations 
for the EU food markets. 
Increased prices. 	 • Higher quality. 
Consumers 	• Global brands force local 	• Wider assortment of products. 
ones off the market. 
changes in the 1990s. After the recession, food output started to grow in the 
second half of the decade, with foreign investors contributing considerably to the 
consolidation of the entire agrifood chain. They now control a significant 
portion of this chain through their positions in the food industry and in wholesale 
and retail trading. 
The Hungarian food processing industry is an unquestionable beneficiary of 
foreign capital. There have been spectacular improvements in the financial posi-
tions and average technological levels of the food processing companies, and 
domestic food supplies and export markets have been consolidated. Although 
some of the figures stagnated or even slightly declined in 1998, the overall per-
formance of the industry in the second half of the 1990s was characterised by a 
definite recovery. Values in dollars obtained using average annual exchange 
rates are presented in Table 32. 
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Table 32. Indicators of the Hungarian food industry between 1992 and 1998. 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sales revenues (billion USD) 6.58 6.14 7.27 7.85 7.85 7.59 7.42 
Exports (billion USD) 1.01 0.83 1.05 1.40 1.52 1.65 1.55 
Profit margin (percent of sales) -2.31 0.24 0.73 0.70 1.55 2.77 2.72 
Labour productivity 
(thousand USD/capita) 36.61 40.68 49.25 56.76 59.83 58.65 55.91 
Source: own calculations based on data of AKII. 
Modernisation has resulted in improved competitiveness in terms of interna-
tional markets. This tendency has been aptly confirmed by the series of measures 
taken in the CEFTA countries to protect their processors against Hungarian food 
imports. Due to the smaller capital injections; their food industries have 
remained less competitive than the Hungarian counterparts (Raskö 2000, p. 96). 
The secondary benefits, which are of no less significance, have included mar-
ket security for agricultural producers and spillover effects within the industry, 
as already mentioned. It is true that continuous labour force reductions have cut 
down the workforce by one-third, or 71,000 employees, since 1989, but the 
wages of those remaining have increased rapidly. Average wages in the food 
processing industries, which are dominated by foreign capital, were two to four 
times higher than the national average in 1997. 
The balance- of impacts for FDI in the Hungarian food industry consists of 
both advantageous and disadvantageous factors, but the aggregate result has 
been reinforced competitiveness in international terms and consolidation of the 
position of the agrifood chain in the national economy. 
9.2. Influence of Foreign Capital on Corporate Performance 
After reviewing the impacts of food industry FDI on the national economy, rural 
areas and the agri-food chain, we turn our attention again to the narrower opera-
tional environment of the food processing industry itself. 
We will now consider in section 9.2 the theoretical discussions and literature 
concerning the influence of ownership on corporate performance. The introduc-
tion and review of the literature will be followed by a concrete analysis of the 
role of foreign direct investment in the Hungarian food industry in section 9.3. 
The topic of corporate performance has inspired an extensive literature, as 
the measurement and comparison of operational indicators formed on the basis 
of various corporate characteristics has been a favourite topic of research. The 
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summary of the literature provided here includes only those works that set the 
stage for the subsequent analysis or apply parallel analytical techniques to the 
main line of research considered in this dissertation. 
Company performance in a given industry can range between wide limits, and 
a great deal of research has been devoted to the causes of this dispersion in both 
developed and transitional economies. Empirical studies using micro-level data-
bases are grouped around three determinant factors: the competition environ-
ment, ownership structure and financial background (Bevan et al. 1999). 
The following literature overview primarily focuses on attempts to investi-
gate and test the impact of ownership structure on corporate performance. 
9.2.1. Impact of Ownership Structure on Corporate Performance 
9.2.1.1. Experiences in the Developed Countries 
The economic theories of property rights and public choices provide an analyt-
ical framework for the topic of corporate performance. 
In Lindblom' s definition, as cited by Martin and Parker (1997, p. 10), "prop-
erty is a set of rights to control assets: to refuse use of them to others, to hold 
them intact, or to use them up. Property rights are consequently grants of author-
ity made to persons and organisations both public and private and acknowledged 
by other persons and organisations." The general approach of the concept asserts 
that both state and private ownership may imply operational disorders. Private 
ownership results in a better usage of production means, however, since owner-
ship can be transferred through competitive capital markets. The main motiva-
tional indicator mentioned in the literature on property rights is profit. The right 
to gain profits is distinctly demarcated in the private sector, but is very unclear in 
the public sector, as it is scattered in a manner that makes it difficult to trace. 
The theory of public choices approaches the issue through the behaviour of 
the public sector. Politicians and civil servants follow their personal interests as 
opposed to those of the public. With the objective of gaining political popularity 
or promoting their personal careers, they manipulate political trends, and this has 
certain impacts on corporate performance. The theory maintains that civil ser-
vants and politicians will deliberately lessen the transparency of public expenses 
and retain information. This allows them to lobby for projects that serve their 
interests. Politicians may burden state-owned companies with various additional 
goals which are eventually rooted in political objectives, such as that of employ-
ing additional labour. 
The logic of both theories leads to the conclusion that state-owned companies 
differ greatly from private ones in their behaviour and performance, and sug-
gests that private ownership is more efficient than state ownership and results in 
better performance. 
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Empirical studies in the developed countries follow the above approach and 
set out to contrast the results achieved by the two main ownership groups: pri-
vate and state ownership. Early studies performed between the 1960s and the 
1980s focused on branches such as public utilities in which the market environ-
ment has certain special characteristics, e.g. electric power supplies (Jun-
ker 1975), transportation (Davies 1971, Caves and Christensen 1980), health 
care services (Bishop 1980) and financial services (Lewin 1982). 
The companies involved in the analyses included many natural or geographi-
cal monopolies and companies with regulated activities, and the efficiency cal-
culations therefore resulted in mixed conclusions. The majority confirmed the 
positive impact of private ownership on corporate performance, but there were 
some that confirmed the efficiency of state or public ownership, or were unable 
to prove the superiority of either ownership group. 
The analysis in the case of the processing industries verified the massive per-
formance improvement effects of private ownership (Boardman and Vin-
ing 1989). From the 1980s onwards, more and more research has been concen-
trated on comparison of the performance of companies operating in a competi-
tive environment. This was facilitated by the fact that a powerful wave of priva-
tisation spread over the economies of the developed countries, enlarging the 
range of companies available for concrete analysis. One of the following two 
major approaches was usually employed (Frydman et al. 1999, p. 1153): 
comparison of the performance of the same companies before and 
after privatisation, and 
comparison of state-owned and private or privatised companies 
operating in the same environment during the same period. 
The economic analyses of the developed countries regarded privatisation as a 
mechanism bringing about effective company restructuring and improved effi-
ciency. Privatisation improves efficiency in two ways: (1) through the owner-
ship interests of the private investors and (2) through the reduction of non-profit-
able activities. 
Private ownership cannot be considered a uniform category, however, but 
rather it is a composite of several ownership categories, and its precise composi-
tion can also be a determinant of corporate performance. 
Some recent research findings focus on the role of owner concen-
tration, maintaining that corporate control is more efficient in com- 
panies where shares are concentrated in a few hands (Caves 1990). 
Forms of private ownership emerging through privatisation can be 
divided into inside and outside categories.77 Experience shows that 
77 The categories of outside and inside ownership have proved to be of considerable significance 
for measuring corporate performance differences due to the wide variety of privatisation tech-
niques employed in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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the seizing of ownership control by outside investors results in 
greater efficiency than management buy-outs or other forms of 
inside privatisation (Boycko et al. 1996). 
9.2.1.2. Experiences in European Transitional Economies 
In order to take advantage of the rules described for the developed countries, 
efforts have been made to improve corporate efficiency through privatisation in 
the post-socialist transition economies as well. This process provides a unique 
opportunity to analyse the impact of various ownership forms on corporate per-
formance, since data are available on the same companies before and after priva-
tisation, and private and state-owned companies are operating concurrently in 
the same economic environment (Frydman et al. 1999). There has therefore been 
a whole collection of studies addressing the issue of corporate performance in 
the CEE region. 
Cox et al. (1998) analysed corporate attributes in a sample of 1,619 compa-
nies in three countries, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, with the intention of ex-
amining exclusively the impacts of privatisation. They identified three groups of 
owners: mixed state-private, totally privatised, and newly established enter-
prises. Although no exact measurements of performance differences were made, 
the research led to interesting findings. Privatisation resulted in more efficient 
utilisation of human and other resources, and the operation of totally private 
enterprises was more profitable than that of the mixed (state-private) companies. 
Holland and Pain (1998) came to the conclusion that the type of privatisation 
significantly affects both the influx of foreign direct investment and corporate 
performance. The colourful range of privatisation policies in the countries of 
Central and Eastem Europe arose from the application of various sets of political 
and economic priorities. One characteristic feature of the transition economies 
has been compensation coupon or voucher-based privatisation, in which ali citi-
zens, or some of them, were issued with coupons that entitled them to purchase 
shares in processing companies as part of the privatisation process. This voucher 
privatisation, albeit at varying intensities, occurred in nearly ali the countries in 
the region, while the components of the mass privatisation shaped the pro-
grammes primarily in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, 
Moldavia, Kazakhstan, Kirgisia and Mongolia (Claessens and Djankov 1999, 
p. 21). 
Insider privatisation was fairly common practice in Central and Eastern 
Europe. This involved the sale, lease or transfer of the shares of a given company 
to its employees and/or management, as opposed to commercial privatisation, 
which implied an open or closed bidding process in which companies were sold 
to the investors who made the best offer for them and resulted in total or partial 
ownership by strategic or financial investors. Investors were customarily divided 
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according to geographical origin into foreign and domestic ones, and it was re-
cognised that the range of new owners included investment funds and local au-
thorities, and occasionally the state even retained shares in certain companies. 
The above list is not by any means an exhaustive one, but it does demonstrate 
that privatisation in the Central and Eastem European countries has created a 
wide spectrum of new owners over the past ten years. Many studies of corporate 
performance in the region stepped over the two categories of state and private 
ownership and extended the investigations to a comparison of the various seg- 
ments of private ownership. It is not surprising that the rich literature has been 
dominated by analyses performed by western researchers, who took advantage 
of the unique opportunity to segment private ownership and conduct refined 
impact analyses with real databases. 
Bevan, Estrin and Schafer draw attention to the danger of an endogenity 
problem arising from the implementation of privatisation in the CEE region 
(Bevan et al. 1999, p. 24), in that employees or managers of certain companies 
succeeded in acquiring their companies by smart lobbying or by using the legiti-
mate rights of preemption that existed in many countries. Since acquisitions by 
employees and management usually targeted the companies with the best market 
perspectives, other investors were able to purchase only the residual companies 
that supposedly had worse starting points. This implies the opposite causal rela- 
tion from that originally suggested in most assumptions, as ownership structure 
had been assumed to serve as an exogenous factor affecting corporate perform-
ance, while in reality it could be treated as an endogenous factor that is itself 
influenced by corporate performance. 
The endogenity problem may provide an explanation for why early research 
found so little empirical evidence for better corporate performance on the part of 
privatised companies in Central and Eastern Europe (Pinto et al. 1993). Al-
though state ownership gave way to private ownership, no dramatic changes in 
the operation of the companies were implemented by the employees or managers 
who had now become their owners. 
As privatisation accelerated, research interests tumed to the impacts of vari-
ous groups of private owners on corporate performance. Earle and Estrin carried 
out several projects in the second half of the 1990s using a database of privatised 
Russian companies. They came to the conclusion that out of the three private 
ownership categories, scarcely any impact of employee ownership could be ob- 
served, the impact of management was more prominent, and outside ownership 
had brought about the most significant improvement in corporate performance 
(Bevan et al. 1999, p. 23). 
The retarding impact of employee ownership on corporate performance can 
be attributed to two factors: (1) Employee owners are extremely cautious risk 
takers, they are reluctant to make substantial changes in the company, and they 
have poor access to extemal financial sources such as bank loans. (2) Employees 
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are obviously reluctant to streamline the workforce at the company, which would 
propel the desired productivity growth. 
Blasi and Shleifer (1996) found management ownership in Russian compa-
nies to be intent on averting risks, leading to a cautious corporate strategy that 
resulted in slow modernisation and development. These conclusions were also 
verified by other authors (Barberis et al. 1996). 
Experience indicates that insider privatisation did not necessarily result in 
improved efficiency, whereas the positive impacts of outsider privatisation are 
confirmed in most instances. Walsh and Whelan (1999), analysing a database of 
220 processing companies in four CEE countries over a number of years, found 
that outside investors significantly improved the companies' export potential. 
Frydman et al. (1999, p. 1154) concluded that insider privatisation did not result 
in a growth in efficiency in 200 privatised companies in the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary, whereas outsider privatisation brought significant 
improvements in ali four of the performance indicators that they analysed. 
Frydman and his research group stressed the relevance of further segmenta-
tion of the group of outside investors, identifying the following categories: for-
eign, domestic financial, domestic strategic and private persons. Their findings 
regarding the influence of foreign investors were somewhat surprising, as they 
appeared to have a significant impact on revenues and employment, but insigni-
ficant influence on productivity and cost management (Frydman et al. 1999, pp. 
1164-1165).78  
These statements contradict the general and empirical results achieved in 
other research projects. Aghion and Blanchard (1998) found a superior influence 
of foreign investors in a comparative analysis of insider and outsider privatisa-
tion, and Claessens and Djankoy (1999) concluded from their regression analy-
sis of data on 706 Czech companies for a six-year period that foreign owners 
significantly improved profitability and labour productivity. The positive impact 
of foreign investors on corporate performance is also confirmed in numerous 
Hungarian studies. 
One ownership category that is frequently used in research based on Central 
and Eastern Europe is ab initio, or newly established enterprises. Performance is 
often spectacular in this category and features constant growth, which is attrib-
uted by Bevan et al. (1999) to the rapidly changing composition of these new 
ventures. There is a constant, intense exchange of members going on in this 
group, as many companies are liquidated or go bankrupt and new ones emerge 
every year. Samples of ab initio companies tend to distort the performance 
results of the group, however, as only the vital or successful companies can be 
accepted for the sample in a given year, so that the averages for the indicators are 
not affected by the companies that fail. 
78 It should be noted that, with only one exception, the impact of the other three owner groups 
was also insignificant in the latter two performance categories. 
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Besides ownership structure, ownership concentration is also considered an 
influential factor affecting corporate performance. Although the impact of own-
ership concentration is not consistent over ali the developed countries, it is con-
firmed in almost every case in Central and Eastern Europe (Bevan et al. 1999, 
p. 25). Ownership concentration is usually a performance-improving factor, al-
though it is crucially important which owner group exercises majority power. 
The results of Claessens and Djankov (1999, p. 19) indicate that foreign majority 
ownership unequivocally brings performance growth, while domestic majority 
ownership shows a mixed picture, growth being recorded in most instances but 
not in the case of ali indicators or owner groups. 
9.2.1.3. Hungarian Comparative Studies of Corporate Performance 
Privatisation opened up opportunities for examining corporate performance 
among the various owner groups in Hungary, as elsewhere. Many early attempts 
at analysing the impact of foreign capital on the basis of empirical evidence 
failed to find any significant performance differences between the owner groups. 
Hamar (1995) attributed this to the serious recession in the early 1990s, from 
which foreign and domestically owned companies suffered equally. 
The most extensive Hungarian comparative study of corporate performance 
in relation to owner groups is that of Major (1999), who analysed the total range 
of companies, categorising them into ten groups and examining the impact of 
ownership on corporate performance between 1988 and 1997. The results indi-
cate that state, domestic private and foreign ownership did not have any consist-
ent influence on corporate performance before 1994, and that although indica-
tors for entirely private firms were better than those for state companies between 
1988 and 1990, their position worsened in the early 1990s. The crisis hit ali com-
panies regardless of their ownership background, and the difference between 
state and private ownership became prominent again only between 1995 and 
1997. 
The tendencies in the above periods verify the fact that although the endogen-
ity problem highlighted by Bevan et al. (1999) was an observable feature of the 
Hungarian privatisation, it did not have such a marked effect as in other coun-
tries, where compensation and insider privatisation were more powerful. Instead, 
Töth (1999) discovered a time relation between initial performance and the pri-
vatisation of companies, in that those companies that performed better had 
greater chances of early privatisation, while weaker companies were privatised 
later. Csånyi (1997) remarked that state ownership "stuck in the inefficient 
sphere" of the economy. 
Töth pointed out that foreign and domestic private ownership had become 
dominant in the Hungarian economy by 1996, so that the theory of recombinant 
ownership suggested by Stark (1994) was not relevant, at least not in the second 
half of the decade. 
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Researchers were able to measure a definite difference between state and pri-
vate ownership by the end of the decade, and attributed this to the presence of 
foreign capital rather than to the general superiority of private ownership over 
state ownership. 
Major' s empirical results showed that corporate performance is significantly 
differentiated in terms of ownership forms only in 1994 and 1995, whereas Töth 
(1999, p. 38) found that foreign ownership had a positive impact on value added, 
profitability and corporate growth potential throughout the period 1993-1996. 
The superiority of foreign-owned companies in terms of measures of efficiency 
is confirmed over the entire transition period in the computations of Halpern and 
Körösi (2000). 
Apart from profit and efficiency indicators, foreign companies surpassed the 
domestically owned ones in export measures, too. The investigations of 
ltetö and Sass (1997) support the notion of a dominant contribution of foreign-
owned companies to export sales and a centralisation of this contribution in a 
few companies. 
9.2.2. Indicators of Corporate Performance 
Various indicator categories have emerged in the international literature to 
measure corporate petformance. Martin and Parker (1997, p. 53) distinguished 
the following major categories: 
Profitability. Profit is internationally the most accessible and com-
parable measure in business. The interpretation of profit may be-
come irrelevant in the public sector, however, due to its non-profit 
operations, social functions or other activities. Wide application of 
this eategory requires the utmost care in the private sector as well, 
since pricing policies or short and long-term objectives may differ 
greatly between individual companies. The market power of com-
panies may also influence profits, so that real performance differ-
ences cannot be identified by a mere comparison of the profitability 
of monopolies with that of companies operating in a competitive 
environment. 
Productivity. Productivity growth usually means that a particular 
company becomes more efficient.79 Productivity is concerned with 
79 It is extremely important to distinguish between efficiency and productivity, since the two 
terms are not identical. A given company or industry is not sufficiently efficient if it is capable 
of producing more output with the existing amount of input, in other words, it is situated 
below the curve of production opportunities. On the other hand, productivity is derived from 
the volume of end products manufactured, and measures how many units of output were pro-
duced using a given amount of input, regardless of whether maximum efficiency — the curve of 
production opportunities — has or has not been reached (Sharpe 1995). In this respect one 
company can be more efficient than another even though neither is efficient in the strict sense. 
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the input or inputs required for the manufacturing of the end 
product. The most frequently used indicator is labour productivity, 
which compares value added or total output with the labour force 
required to achieve this. Since this index involves one input, labour 
productivity is a partialfactor productivity measure. It is total fac-
tor productivity, which includes ali inputs utilised, that is usually 
quoted as a benchmark for corporate growth.8° 
3. Production costs. The category of production costs is cognate with 
profitability, but costs may give more accurate and detailed infor- 
mation on corporate performance both in the public and in the pri- 
vate sector than profits. There are several problems associated with 
measuring costs, however, including the construction of cost func- 
tions and the identification of appropriate ratio bases. 
In their comparison of the attributes of 63 analyses of the corporate perform-
ance of state-owned and private companies in the United Kingdom, USA and 
other developed countries over the period from 1970 to 1995, Martin and Parker 
(1997, pp. 68-75) found that 20 percent of those employed profitability in their 
calculations, 30 percent productivity and 25 percent production costs. In many 
cases indicators in more than one category were calculated, and other indices 
such as market shares and financial indicators also occurred in the overview. 
In order to measure corporate performance, researchers rely on data from bal-
ance sheets and profit and loss statements of individual companies, a circum-
stance which limits the scope of applicable indicators. Return indices are the 
most palpable indicators, leading Boardman and Vining (1989, p. 11) to use four 
profit categories in their much-cited comparison of the Fortune magazine's top 
500 companies: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales 
(ROS) and net revenues. Frydman et al. (1999, p. 1158) considered profitability 
an unreliable indicator in Central and Eastern Europe, and preferred to use 
labour productivity and its components, i.e. net sales revenues, employment, the 
ratio of these two and cost levels per unit of sales revenue.81  
Most researchers attempt to take advantage of both profit and productivity 
indicators, often together with other types. Claessens and Djankov (1999) em-
ployed only two indicators, profit margin and labour productivity, in their study 
of ownership structure and ownership concentration. Megginson et al. (1994) 
used various financial measures beside profit and productivity indicators, while 
Walsh and Whelan (1999) measured corporate performance in four CEE coun- 
80 The literature on total factor productivity is very extensive, the development of the indicator 
being associated with such famous economists as Solow, Hicks and Tornquist. 
81  Costs per unit of net sales revenue is in fact still an indicator that can he postulated from profit 
C (1—P)  
through the equation 	 , where C denotes the costs, P the profits and R the revenues 
of the particular company. 
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tries in terms of the export activities of the companies. A similar approach was 
taken by Halpern and Körösi (1998), who measured the corporate performance 
of the expanding multitude of Hungarian companies between 1985 and 1994. On 
the other hand, Major (1999, pp. 66-68) employed a wide range of indicators to 
measure the performance of Hungarian companies, including three profitability 
indices, three productivity indices and six financial and liquidity indices. 
9.3. Impact of Foreign Capital on the Performance of 
the Hungarian Food Industry 
The aggregate performance indicators for the Hungarian food industry have 
improved since 1993. Foreign investors played an active role in reshaping the 
ownership structure of the food industry. By 1998 they had acquired over 60 
percent of the aggregate company capital in the industry (see Table 8). We set 
out here to determine the influence of foreign capital on the Hungarian food 
industry by examining the impact that corporate ownership has had on company 
performance. This is a test of the causal relation D in Figure 7 on page 57, in 
other words a quantification of the impact of FDI on the performance of the food 
industry. 
The opening question of the analysis arises out of the above research objec-
tive: Are either foreign-owned or domestically owned food processors superior 
to the other group in terms of performance? The hypothesis is that ownership 
does have an impact on company performance in the food industry and that for-
eign affiliates have better performance indicators than their domestically owned 
rivals. 
This hypothesis is based on the finding that the comparative advantages of 
foreign investors are internalised in their production subsidiaries soon after the 
investments are made (Dunning 1997). This results in an overall improvement in 
performance and efficiency in foreign-owned companies, which — in the case of 
considerable foreign participation — would have a measurable impact on the per-
formance of the entire food industry. The effect is expected to be extremely 
strong in Central and Eastern Europe, where the performance level of the domes-
tically owned companies is initially low. 
Rare examples can be found in the literature that feature empirical evidence 
or accounting-based analyses of the impact of multinational or other foreign sub-
sidiaries on the Hungarian food processing industry. Most studies consider food 
processing as one of the industries in manufacturing comparisons. 
Hamar (1995) also viewed food processing as one of the set of processing 
industries and attributed the rapid growth in the food industry to the participation 
of foreign investments. Furthermore, she documented a uniform cost structure in 
the industry. 
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In one of the most recent studies, Szabö (2000) introduced an interesting and 
novel approach. He traced the history of 38 large food processors, ali of which 
had been transferred from state control to foreign ownership, between 1990 and 
1998. The fact that the sample included only companies that had distinct equiva-
lents in both years of observation eliminated several multinational enterprises 
from the investigations. This restricted size of the sample may he the explanation 
for the surprising fact that their aggregate growth in sales revenues and profit 
earnings remained below the average for the industry as a whole. On the other 
hand, the growth in equity and total assets in the sample surpassed the average 
for the industry, indicating rapid development and high-intensity investment. 
Also, the companies in the sample were among the best in terms of productivity 
growth, which is a result of their internal rationalisation and intensive labour lay-
off (Szabö 2000, p. 47). 
The direction adopted in the current analysis differs from that of the two 
studies mentioned above in terms of (1) the database employed, and (2) analyt-
ical approach: 
The database includes accounting information — excerpts from bal-
ance sheets and income statements — on the complete anonymous 
set of Hungarian food processing companies amounting to over 
2,500 enterprises examined between 1995 and 1998. 
The analytical approach entails dynamic measurement of differ-
ences in performance between foreign and domestically owned 
companies. It is this that gives novelty to the current analysis. 
9.3.1. Impact of Ownership on Corporate Performance Figures 
9.3.1.1. Indicators of Corporate Performance and Data Set Employed 
In the first part of the calculations, the performance of the companies is meas-
ured by sales revenues, profit earnings, export sales and investment activities. 
Sales revenues are an essential indicator of corporate performance, since they 
embody market power. Market power has proved to he significant in motivating 
the inflows of foreign capital by a number of studies (Caves 1996, pp. 84-87). 
In the post-socialist economic environment, profit earnings have provided 
somewhat distorted information on the performance of food processing compa-
nies, but the profit performance of the companies improved in the second half of 
the 1990s, partly owing to a halving of corporate tax rates.82 
82  Nevertheless, many domestically owned companies are presumed to "hide" their profits, while 
foreign-owned companies may tend to exercise hidden profit repatriation. The only available 
profit figures are the officially reported ones, and it is these that were used in the calculations. 
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Although experience indicates that foreign investors settle primarily for 
supplying the domestic market, traditional export performance also strengthened 
in the Hungarian food processing sector. The volume of investments is an 
indicator of the companies' future objectives and anticipations. 
The impact of ownership on corporate performance is first identified by seg-
menting the companies. The total number of observations in 1998 amounted to 
2,977, which narrowed to 2,961 after eliminating the companies with zero regis-
tered capital. Two major groups were identified according to the ownership 
structure: 
predominantly foreign-owned and 
predominantly domestically owned companies. 
The segmentation was performed on the basis of the proportion of foreign 
versus domestic ownership in the registered capital of each company. 
9.3.1.2. Results of the Company Segmentation 
The corporate figures for the companies in the two groups, comprising both 
aggregate figures, and group averages, are shown in Table 33. The data in the 
table confirm the superiority of the foreign-owned companies in terms of size, 
the difference in sales revenues referring to the fact that foreign-owned 
companies are typically among the largest ones in the food industry. 
The superiority originating from foreign ownership seems to be even more 
impressive in terms of average profits and export sales than in the case of sales 
revenues, while the average investments made by the foreign-owned companies 
were nine times greater than those of the domestic companies. 
The data in Table 33 taken alone may well raise a doubt: since ali the large 
companies are in foreign ownership, the real reason for the difference in per-
formance may not he the type of ownership, but rather the size of companies. A 
two-step segmentation was performed to resolve this question, in which the ini-
tial grouping attribute was company size in terms of sales revenues, where the 
Table 33. Aggregate figures for Hungarian food processing companies by pre-
dominant ownership in 1998. 
Sales 	Profits Export 	Value of 
revenues sales investments 
(million USD) 
Total, predominantly foreign (N=398) 3,566.2 210.4 879.3 66.9 
Total, predominantly domestic (N=2 563) 3,851.2 26.9 667.5 47.4 
Average, predominantly foreign 8.960 0.529 2.209 0.168 
Average, predominantly domestic 1.503 0.011 0.261 0.019 
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first group included ali the companies whose revenues exceeded USD 0.47 mil-
lion (HUF 100 million) and the second ali the companies below that limit. There-
after the segmentation followed the method employed previously. The objective 
of the double segmentation was to compare the foreign and domestically owned 
companies within their own size groups. The results of the analysis are shown in 
Tables 34/a and 34/b. 
Slightly more than 40 percent of the foreign-owned companies fall into the 
group of large companies, and their power continues to he evident (Table 34/a), 
for although they make up less than one-fourth of the total number of large-sized 
companies, their combined sales revenues amount to nearly half of the group 
total. Consequently, there is more than four-fold difference in average sales 
revenues between the two ownership types in the group of large companies. The 
difference in average profits is even wider indicating that foreign-owned 
companies are much more profitable than domestically owned ones. The 
differences between the group averages for profits, exports and investments are 
ali in excess of that in sales revenues. 
Table 34. Corporate figures for Hungarian food processors by size and owner-
ship type in 1998. 
Table 34/a. 	 Sales revenues above USD 0.47 milliona 
Sales 
revenues Profits 
Export Value of 
sales investments 
(in million USD) 
Total, predominantly foreign (N=167) 	3,547.6 	204.6 	874.4 	64.0 
Total, predominantly domestic (N=718) 	3,677.8 	35.2 	661.0 	39.3 
Average, predominantly foreign 	21.243 	1.225 	5.236 	0.383 
Average, predominantly domestic 	5.122 	0.049 	0.921 	0.055 
Table 34/b. 	 Sales revenues below USD 0.47 millionb 
Sales 
revenues Profits 
Export Value of 
sales investments 
(in thousand USD) 
Total, predominantly foreign (N=231) 	18,674.1 5,827.5 4,955.2 	2,950.1 
Total, predominantly domestic (N=1,845) 173,343.1 -8,254.1 6,494.6 	8,088.1 
Average, predominantly foreign 	80.653 	25.175 	21.445 	12.587 
Average, predominantly domestic 	94.172 	-4.662 	3.730 	4.196 
Note: a'bi The boundary of the size categories was set at HUF 100 million in the original calcula-
tions. 
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The group of small companies provides some unexpected findings. In that the 
average sales revenues of both ownership groups are of roughly the same magni-
tude, the figure for the domestically owned companies in fact even being slightly 
higher than that for the foreign-owned group (Table 34/b). Due to the similar 
sizes of these companies, any difference in corporate performance can be attrib-
uted entirely to the differences in ownership structure. Further data again point 
to the superiority of foreign ownership, in that foreign subsidiaries earned con-
siderable profits, compared with the losses made by the domestically owned 
companies, their exports were almost six-fold and the value of their investments 
three-fold by comparison with the average figures for the domestically owned 
processors. 
Investment is an extremely important performance category in terms of future 
corporate growth, and the investments made by the foreign-owned companies 
surpass those made by the domestically owned ones in both company size 
groups. The difference is not surprising in the case of the large companies, where 
the strength of the large multinational enterprises in terms of capital is over-
whelming, but the small and medium-sized enterprises could be the ones that are 
mobile, flexible and perceptive to emulate the modern techniques of their for-
eign-owned counterparts. These are believed to be the germ of a strong Hun-
garian-owned food processing segment in the future, and are expected to com-
pete successfully against foreign subsidiaries. Since these small Hungarian 
enterprises cannot easily compete with the large foreign ones in terms of innova-
tions, product differentiation or know-how, the only relevant path for corporate 
growth appears to be through physical investments. In this respect, it is sad to 
note that Hungarian-owned small-scale processors take such a low-key approach 
to investment opportunities. 
9.3.2. Definition of the Corporate Performance Gap 
A difference in corporate performance has been demonstrated to prevail between 
the foreign and domestically owned food processors in Hungary and confirmed 
by the corporate data used in the above analysis The analysis can therefore be 
continued one step further to incorporate the dynamic aspect. The initial ques-
tion now takes the modified form: Is the peiformance gap between foreign and 
domestically owned food processors widening or narrowing with time? 
The dynamic concept of the performance gap is illustrated on Figure 64, 
where the shaded area signifies the gap. Widening or narrowing can be revealed 
only through a careful study of dynamic indicators. Such calculations require 
comparable data covering many years. In the present case, data availability 
limited the period to four years, 1995 to 1998. Again, companies with zero 
registered capital were omitted from the data set. 
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performance curve of 
majority foreign owned 
food processors 
performance curve of 
majority domestically 
owned food processors 
Figure 64. The concept of performance gap determined by the curves of majority-
foreign owned and majority-domestically owned food processors.83 
9.3.3. Comparison of Foreign and Domestically Owned Companies 
9.3.3.1. Performance Indicators Used in the Comparison 
In order to quantify changes in the performance gap, a wider group of indicators 
of corporate performance must be calculated containing four indicators of profit-
ability, one of productivity and three other accounting indicators: 84 
Profit rate (profitability margin)85  
P(bt ).  
ROS = 
Return on Equity86 
 ROE. 
P(bt)
i = 
Ei 
83 The figure displays schematically the trend in the performance gap 
84 The group of indicators was assembled based on the traditions of 
tional literature; for a review, see Martin and Parker (1997). 
85 The indicator is identical to the category of Return on Sales, ROS. 
86 The measure is not entirely identical to Return on Equity, ROE, 
capital" is used in the denominator instead of equity. 
the corresponding interna- 
since the figure for "own 
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Profit on Assets  
 
Profit per Capita 
 
Labour Productivity87 
 
Own Capital Intensity 
 
Share of Export Sales 
 
Asset Efficiency  
 
where 
P(bt)i 
= Pi  TA;  
epip
= 
 P(bt)i  
ENflpi 
prodinP = 	 
EMP, 
Ei 
	
e.= 	 
TA, 
EXP 
exp; =
i
= 	 
TA;  
P(bt)i is the ith company's profit before taxation, 
R, is the ith company's sales revenues, 
EXPi is the ith company's export sales, 
is the ith company's own capital, 
TA, is the ith company's total assets, 
EMPi is the ith company's labour force. 
87  Labour productivity is usually calculated by means of the value added produced by the 
company, but when value added figures are unavailable, net sales/capita is an internationally 
accepted proxy. The indicator does not directly denote labour productivity, but it does express 
corresponding trends in this particular aspect of corporate performance (Frydman et al. 1999). 
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9.3.3.2. Results of the Dynamic Performance Gap Analysis 
In accordance with the definition explained in Figure 64, the data in Table 35 
provide a snapshot of the dynamic performance gap for t=1998. A significant 
disparity in performance is apparent between the foreign and domestically 
owned food processors, the labour productivity of the former being twice as 
great and their profit rate seven times as high. 
The advantage of domestic ownership was evident in the case of one indica-
tor, asset efficiency, but this points to illusive rather than real competitive advan-
tages. The logical explanation is that many domestically owned enterprises °per-
ate with almost fully or fully depreciated assets. Hence, the lower value for the 
denominator results in higher measures of asset efficiency than in the case of 
foreign-owned companies with their typically more valuable or recently 
installed assets. The indicator of capital intensity gives a better understanding of 
the real power relations. 
The dynamic approach to the performance gap is obviously more realistic 
than a static type of comparison, and the full implications of the figures in 
Table 35 would be revealed if they could be placed in the dynamic context of a 
longer period. 
In order to illustrate the development of the gap in practice, Figure 65 shows 
curves for the average sales revenues of foreign and domestically owned food 
processors in Hungary. The figure confirms that the difference in average sales 
revenues between the two ownership groups has been growing. 
Table 35. Relative corporate indicators for predominantly foreign-owned and 
predominantly domestically owned food processors in 1998. 
Number Indicator Predominantly Predominantly 
foreign 	domestic 
Total food 
industry 
Number of companies (N) 398 2,563 2,961 
 Profit rate, ROS (%) 4.94 0.70 2.74 
 Return on equity, ROE (%) 12.56 2.8 8.59 
 Return on assets (%) 6.08 1.12 3.83 
 Profit per capita (USD/capita) 4,048.5 302.1 1,531.5 
 Labour productivity (thousand 
USD/capita) 81.91 43.19 55.89 
 Own capital intensity (%) 48.4 40.1 44.6 
 Share of export sales (%) 24.65 17.33 20.85 
 Sales relative to assets (%) 122.95 160.27 139.86 
Source: own calculations based on data of AKII. 
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Figure 65. Average sales revenues of foreign-owned and domestically owned 
food processors in Hungaty between 1995 and 1999. 
Although such a chart of performance curves is illustrative, it has to be admit-
ted that the mere comparison of annual values may imply a danger of inaccurate 
calculation of the gap. Since the indicators for both groups of companies change 
with time, a comparison of absolute values would really not capture the opening 
or closing of the gap.88 
In order to resolve the issue, a similar methodology is applied to that pub-
lished by Pilat (1996) at the OECD to measure international productivity gaps, in 
which the performance of the most productive country was fixed at unity (or 100 
percent) and the productivity values of other countries were expressed as propor-
tions of this. The productivity gap was then defined as the difference between 
the most productive country and the other ones. This approach allows reliable 
and accurate dynamic interpretations to be made, even if the denominator 
changes in the meantime or a new country becomes the most productive. 
The data in Table 36 were calculated by applying a similar concept to the 
productivity gaps suggested by Pilat. In order to quantify the performance gap 
among the Hungarian food processors, the figure for the better group was fixed 
at unity. The denominator was provided by the performance of the foreign- 
88  A simple arithmetic example will illustrate the problem. Let us imagine two economic players 
— enterprises or nations — whose performance figures are to be compared for three consecutive 
years. Let the values for the better performer be 10, 12 and 15, while those for the weaker 
performer are 2, 3, and 5, respectively. The absolute difference between them will be 8, 9 and 
10, which would suggest a widening gap, but the performance gap given by the PGAP formula 
will be 0.8, 0.75 and 0.66, or 80 percent, 75 percent and 66 percent pointing to exactly the 
opposite trend, namely a narrowing performance gap. 
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owned companies in the majority of cases. The following formula expresses the 
performance gap (PGAP) for a particular indicator: 
PGAP =1 
where 
Pib is the indicator for the ith company in the ownership group 
with better performance, 
PW is the indicator for the jth company in the ownership group 
with weaker performance. 
The above formula for PGAP means that figures for the performance gap can 
take values between zero and unity or can he expressed in percentage form by 
multiplying them with 100. Thus, an arbitrary value of PGAP=0.72, for instance, 
can he interpreted in two ways: that the performance gap is 72 percent of the 
performance of the better group, or the performance figure of the weaker group 
is 28 percent of that of the better group. The latter represents an intermediate 
step in the calculation process, but due to its demonstrative power, it is also 
included among the results in Table 36. Pw is obtained by the following two 
formulae: 
PGAP =1— Pw , 
and 
The values for PGAP and Pw should he interpreted in the light of how they 
change with time, in that descending values of Pw or ascending values of PGAP 
would indicate a widening of the perforrnance gap and vice versa. 
Although the time span of the analysis was limited to four years by access to 
data, the number of indicators calculated is sufficient to allow pertinent conclu-
sions to be drawn. The changes in the performance gap demonstrated by the 
eight corporate indicators reveal a dramatic shift in the nature of the Hungarian 
food processing industry. Ali the profitability, productivity and export indicators 
point to a distinct widening of the pelfonnance gap, with the domestically owned 
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companies constantly falling behind the foreign-owned processors. In terms of 
capital intensity, the situation has stagnated since 1996, the only advantage of 
the domestically owned companies being the stable superiority in asset effici-
ency. 
It would be too early to become alarmed on the basis of a four-year trend in 
the performance gap, although future prospects do not promise any spectacular 
improvement for the domestically owned processors. The figures in Table 36 
reveal a notable disparity in investment activities between the two ownership 
groups, which may continue to accentuate the petformance gap in the coming 
years. This danger hangs over the future of both small and large domestically 
owned firms in the Hungarian food industry to an equal extent. 
The results shown in Table 36 should also be interpreted with caution for 
another reason. Since the performance gap is calculated from group averages, 
the figures conceal heterogeneity in the performance of group members. Thus 
the multitude of food processors may well include laggards amongst the foreign-
owned companies and rapidly developing domestically owned ones. 
The domestically owned food processors face three main options as far as 
their future is concerned: 
1. Catching up, the survival alternative. This is a function of the initial 
level of development but it also depends on the particular process-
ing activity to a certain extent. Those domestic companies may en-
ter the group which are narrowing the performance gap by applying 
state-of-the-art technology and modern business techniques. Devel-
opment capital can hardly be expected to be available from their 
own resources, and it will thus need to be mobilised on the domestic 
or international capital market. Domestically owned companies 
may develop competitive advantages in two ways: 
product differentiation, attempting to meet uncommon or 
specific consumer needs, 
special market strategies in a geographical sense, exploring 
the white spots on the Hungarian market, or specialising in 
export markets. 
Falling behind. Companies employing outdated equipment and 
management methods and restrained marketing strategies will inev-
itably be forced to drop behind. These companies will typically 
have a similar product mix to their large foreign competitors, but 
will lack resources for development and access to financing chan-
nels. 
The middle alternative. This would involve cooperation or collabo-
ration with large competitors, which is possible only for some com-
panies with special status in given industries. Large competitors 
may need cooperating companies because of the market distribution 
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or for other regional reasons. The middle alternative is of very lim-
ited applicability, and its outcome is risky, since company acquisi-
tions may soon put an end to the independence of the smaller part-
ner in any strategic alliance. 
9.4. Impacts of Ownership Structure in Individual Industries 
The analysis of the impacts of foreign ownership ends by considering industry-
specific tendencies. The proportion of the registered company capital in foreign 
ownership represents the ownership structure (OSTR). Thus, OSTR represents 
the division between foreign and domestic ownership and its value will be in the 
range from 0 to 1. The impact of this ownership structure can then be estimated 
in terms of six corporate performance indicators, sales revenues, profits, export 
sales, investments, labour productivity and asset efficiency, by means of a 
descriptive regression analysis: 
PER/ = ao +alOSTRi +8 
where 
PER,' is the jth  corporate performance indicator in the ith industry, 
OSTR' is the corporate ownership structure of the ith industry. 
The analysis was run for ali 12 industries for which the number of observa-
tions allowed such calculations. Owing to the nature of the OSTR variable, a 
positive sign for a parameter indicates a larger impact — i.e. an advantage —for 
predominantly foreign-owned companies and a negative sign a greater impact — 
or advantage —for predominantly domestically owned companies. 
Based on the calculations presented so far in this chapter, the foreign-owned 
companies can be anticipated to be superior in the first five performance catego-
ries and the domestically owned companies 'more probably in the case of asset 
efficiency. The signs attached to the parameters of the OSTR variable in the 
cases of various indicators and industries, as shown in Table 37, bear out these 
anticipations, pointing to the overwhelming superiority of foreign-owned com-
panies in ali respects with the exception of asset efficiency. 
Detailed explanations of the industry-specific disparities in the corporate 
indicators can be provided on the basis of the results of the regression analysis in 
Annex 17.89 The influence of foreign ownership on sales revenues is significant 
89 The results also reveal that the superiority in the case of several industries and indicators is not 
statistically significant. In certain instances a low R2 is attributable to the fact that the relations 
measure the impact of one single variable, the ownership structure. The current research did 
not strive to expand the model, the purpose being simply to map the influence of the two major 
ownership categories. 
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Table 37. Impact of ownership structure on selected corporate indicators in 
some of the food processing industries. 
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Sales revenues 
Profits 
Exports 
Value of investments 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 	+ 
+ 	- 
+ 	+ 
+ 	+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ + + + + + 
Labour productivity 	 + 	+ + + - 	- + + + + 
Asset efficiency - 	- 	- 	- 	- 	- 	- 
Source: calculations presented in Annex 17 on page 312. 
in ali the industries with the exception of milling and baking, where foreign own-
ership was initially low. 
The profits category shows a less pronounced impact of foreign ownership, 
with a really significant influence detectable only in the vegetable oil and animal 
feed industries and in the manufacturing of beverages. The results again confirm 
the fact that the foreign companies soon adapted to Hungarian conditions and did 
not necessarily reveal the full extent of their profits. Foreign ownership never-
theless implies an improvement in profits, the only exception being in the dairy 
industry. Concentration and the fierce competition for market shares most prob-
ably detracted from the profits of the foreign-owned companies, causing domes-
tic ownership to result in higher profits than foreign ownership in some in-
stances. 
Export sales demonstrate the unequivocal superiority of the foreign-owned 
companies, which show more intense exporting activities in every industry, most 
significantly in the poultry, vegetable oil, dairy, grain processing, confectionery 
and brewing industries. 
The result in the case of the value of investments also points to vigorous activ-
ity on the part of the foreign-owned companies. Among the individual industries, 
this impact is highlighted above ali in the case of vegetable oils, animal feeds 
and beverages. 
The explanatory power of ownership structure in the field of labour produc-
tivity and asset efficiency is scarcely significant. Foreign-owned companies 
tended to be more productive than their Hungarian rivals in the entire food sec-
tor, but principally in the dairy and beer industries. Exceptions were the poultry, 
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animal feed, and bakery industries, where domestic ownership was a factor that 
increased labour productivity. 
The influence on asset efficiency is mostly insignificant, although the sign 
attached to this parameter indicates a positive impact of Hungarian ownership in 
every.  industry. The result is not at ali surprising, and is in compliance with ear-
lier calculations based on the entire set of Hungarian enterprises. Major (1999) 
reported the advantage of domestic ownership for the return on fixed assets, and 
Szanyi (1998) attributed it to the age and composition of the assets, factors 
which differ considerably between foreign and domestically owned companies. 
The results of the current calculations lead to the conclusion that the same pat-
tern also prevafis in the food industry (Table 36). 
A regression analysis for the individual food processing industriesverified 
that foreign ownership has an influence on corporate performance. This impact 
is insignificant in the majority of cases, but owing to the nature of the OSTR 
variable, the positive or negative sign associated with it inevitably signifies 
better performance by one or other of the ownership types. The calculations 
revealed the advantages of foreign ownership in the case of most branches of 
food processing, especially the vegetable oil, dairy and beverage industries. 
Hungarian-owned companies appear to be competitive, at least to some extent, in 
the grain and poultry processing industries. 
9.5. Summary 
The objective of Chapter 9 was to analyse the impacts of foreign direct invest-
ments in the Hungarian agrifood sector, and in particular in the food industry. 
The decade-long presence of foreign capital has facilitated the drawing up of a 
balance of impacts, including both positive and negative ones. Foreign-owned 
companies enjoyed considerable tax exemptions in the second half of the 1990s, 
but this burden on the state budget will be of a transitory nature. 
Foreign owners typically accomplished corporate rationalisation and per-
formance growth by phasing out the functions of the companies within rural so-
ciety and laying off part of the workforce. Profit repatriation is practised in both 
legal and clandestine forms. Foreign-owned companies have greatly improved 
the international competitiveness of the Hungarian food processing industry, 
and they have generated a stable and lasting demand for agricultural produce and 
been able to supply consumers with domestically manufactured, good quality 
foodstuffs. The balance of impacts is complex, but the final assessment over the 
span of the entire agrifood sector cannot ignore the advantageous secondary or 
spillover effects experienced by agricultural producers and domestically-owned 
food processors. 
The present analysis of the food industry investigated the performance of for-
eign-owned and domestically owned processors. Following corporate restructur- 
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ing and privatisation, a pronounced disparity was detected between these two 
groups in the second half of the 1990s, the predominantly foreign-owned enter-
prises enjoying unequivocal superiority over the predominantly domestically 
owned ones in terms of most indicators of corporate operation and performance. 
Dynamic analysis of the corporate perfonnance gap revealed a tendency for 
this to widen with time, the Hungarian owned food processors being unable to 
reduce their disadvantage between 1995 and 1998. A dominance by foreign-
owned companies also prevails at the level of individual industries, with the 
exception of the poultry industry and the entire grain processing chain. 
The superior corporate figures of foreign-owned companies translate into a 
constantly improving performance on the part of the Hungarian food industry as 
a whole. Thus the calculations suggest a definite overall positive impact of 
foreign capital. 
Hungarian ownership appears to have an overwhelming effect on asset effi-
ciency, although this is in fact a sign of worn out fixed assets. Although this 
feature coupled with low investment activities casts an ominous shadow over the 
future of Hungarian-owned food processing, catching up is in principle still a 
relevant option under the present conditions and given the existing framework. 
The current opportunities will most probably diminish if and when Hungary 
gains membership of the EU. 
It is the responsibility of domestically owned food processors to determine 
how much they wish to utilise and take advantage of the spillover effects of FDI. 
Economic policy may alleviate their size-based disadvantages by means of a 
policy aimed at supporting small and medium-sized enterprises and permanent 
requirements and incentives for efficiency. The banking sector and capital 
markets can provide a solid ground for more investments. 
These could contribute to the successful development of domestically owned 
processors, but in order to catch up with the high performers, they will have to be 
committed to state-of-the-art technology, perceptive of modem management 
techniques and prepared to take risks in order to implement new investments. 
Development should take place on the markets for particular groups of products 
which are driven by stable or growing consumer demand, and where there is 
reasonable room for expanding processing capacities. 
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10. Conclusions 
This summary of the theoretical and empirical findings of the dissertation opens 
with a brief introduction to the unique global context that prevailed in the 1990s. 
A concise discussion of the core idea behind FDI-concentration maps, including 
the findings of dynamic and comparative approaches, lays the foundation for 
introducing the concept of a global FDI-concentration map. The chapter ends 
with political and economic conclusions regarding the Hungarian and other 
Central and Eastem European food industries and the possible agrifood implica-
tions of these countries' future accession to the EU. 
10.1. Global Context 
The world economy is heading towards integration at an ever-intensifying pace. _ 
Globalisation has become a substantial force shaping it, and trade in capital out-
paced trade in goods and services in the 1990s, introducing an entirely new era. 
The growth in international production has entailed a global concentration of 
capital, generated by .an increasing pattern of two-way capital exchange in the 
form of M&As activities among the developed countries. 
The food industry has also become a global industry, as this concentration of 
capital and two-way capital exchange have also been effective factors in the 
world' s food markets. Global products have been sold on global markets, in a 
process propelled by the emergence and consolidation of transnational compa-
nies. 
In order to establish a wider economic context, the recent role of Central and 
Eastem Europe in the international trade in capital was examined at the begin- 
ning of this dissertation. Unlike capital exchange among the developed coun-
tries, this trade is characterised by a one-way capital flow, with the food process-
ing sectors in the region included among the net capital recipients. The reasons 
for this are illustrated in Figure 66. 
The fundamental socio-economic reforms that took place in Central and East-
ern Europe happened to coincide with the period of accelerating globalisation in 
the world economy. Food production experienced years of recession in the entire 
region during the post-socialist transition. The daily operations of companies 
were hit by severe problems such as market difficulties, removal of state subsi- 
dies and the shifting of banking relations onto a commercial basis. The crisis in 
food manufacturing was exacerbated by a general economic recession, inflation, 
the restructuring of the agricultural sector and a'reform in the ownership of food 
processing companies. The recession resulted in an acute capital shortage in the 
entire agrifood sector. Processing technology became outdated and the market-
ing problems were manifested in the form of redundant capacity. 
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Figure 66. Reasons for one-way capital flows between the CEE region and the 
developed countries. 
Simultaneously, companies in the developed countries were finding them-
selves in a situation of growth pressure, as their national food markets were be-
coming saturated. Food processors in the western countries have constantly had 
to improve their efficiency in addition to reinforcing their market positions. 
Given the huge gaps in productivity and the level of technology and manage-
ment techniques between the developed European countries and the post-social-
ist economies, any of these aspects of the prevailing economic conditions could 
have led to a one-way movement of capital between the two regions. It was the 
liberalisation in trade in goods, services and capital and the governmental incen-
tives provided for FDI in the CEE region that finally opened the valve for a mas-
sive FDI influx (Figure 66). 
10.2. Theoretieal Results: The Position and Role of FDI in 
the SCP Paradigm 
The one-way flow of capital was studied in this dissertation primarily from the 
viewpoint of the host economies, with the SCP paradigm for industrial organisa-
tion providing a framework for analysing the food processing industries. As far 
as the theoretical contribution is concemed, the role and position of FDI within 
the causal relations of the SCP paradigm were identified here. The mechanism 
in the mainstream or structuralist view is characterised by the basic [A] and [13] 
causal relations, which was supplemented here by the entry of an extemal ele-
ment, FDI. The basic findings are associated with the inflow and impacts of FDI. 
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The_ absorption offoreign directinvestments'was-Showntnbe..deter-
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tion of impact. is rfully supportedb,;. the- einpirical results•-presented 
in the disSertation;.,The econorniöinterpretationis self-evident: the 
gaining of large, intact . market-poSitions ..is. ,attractive»:for ali new 
entrants into the. .market, i.e 	 all.,new.Tpriyate..owners;. including 
foreign . investors. 
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and processing-industries received corifirmation;.-as -Signalledbythe 
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Figure 67. Position and .rae Of.FDIwithin-the'impact .meehanism,.of the .SCP 
paradigm. 
90  Testing of the Impact relation [F1 was not set as an objective for the dissertation, owing to the 
unavailability of data and the non-quantifiable aspects of corporate conduct. The prevalence of 
this causal direction was therefore taken asproved ab ovo on the strength of earlier findings in 
the FDI literature (Caves 1996, pp. 90-97). 
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Using the labels of Figure 67, this impact relation gains the 
following specification: 
P.= g ([F];[13]) 
Although most of the causal relations were supported by empirical evidence 
obtained from the example of the Hungarian food industry, the similar economic 
environment implies extended applicability to other manufacturing industries. 
Nevertheless, it is relevant to narrow down the validity of the causal mechanism 
in the following way in the light of the results of this dissertation: the position 
and role of FDI in the causal system lying behind the SCP paradigm apply (1) to 
a one-way capital flow among countries at different levels of development, and 
(2) to the industries of the host countries. 
10.3. Empirical Findings 
Since the empirical investigation in the dissertation was targeted at the quantift-
cation of FDI determinants and impacts, it relied for its objectives on the tradi-
tions of the international literature concerned with foreign direct investments. 
While many previous empirical studies have searched for FDI deteiminants 
in terms of countries, provinces, or manufacturing sectors, the dissertation iden- 
tifies the motives behind FDI at a new depth, investigating FDI determinants 
among the constituent industries in one particular industry by means of a cross-
sectional analysis. 
Since the data show that industries differ in the ways in which they attract 
foreign investors, one objective of the regression model was to explain the un-
even level of penetration of foreign direct investments into the various branches 
of the food industry by detecting the FDI determinants. 
Market concentration (CONC) and profit rates (P) proved to he significant 
explanatory variables for FDI penetration. Profit rates lost their explanatory 
power by the middle of the 1990s, as profitability became negative in 1992 and 
remained so for a few years. The transitional recession, restructuring and privati-
sation that took place in the food industry, coupled with a decline in demand, had 
detrimental effects on company profitability. In the meantime, the motivating 
force of market concentration continued to be stable, so that this variable 
(CONC) retained a significant explanatory power over the entire decade. 
The other variables remained insignificant in each model specification, i.e. 
the size of the market (MS) and export opportunities (EXP) apparently did not 
attract foreign investments. The insignificant explanatory power of the export 
variable proves that foreign capital in the food industry tends to make efforts to 
capture primarily domestic market positions rather than taking advantage of 
export possibilities. 
The findings suggest that foreign investors consider the long-term aspects of 
profit, and the return on investments is in fact perceived in high market posi- 
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tions Summing up the empirical results regarding FDI determinants, the inves-
tors' strong ambitions for market dominance suggest that the market-seeking as-
pect was the principal driving force that motivated the investment of foreign 
capital in the Hungarian food processing industries. 
The FDI impact analysis was accomplished by a segmentation of Hungarian 
food processors based on their ownership structure and by calculation of the 
performance gap. Both techniques verified the supremacy of foreign-owned food 
processors. 
Calculations of the static performance gap showed foreign-owned companies 
to be superior in the case of seven out of eight performance indicators. Domest-
ically owned companies had the advantage only in asset efficiency, which is 
explained by the differences in age and mix of assets between the two groups. 
The dynamic calculations disclosecl a widening of the performance gap be-
tween 1995 and 1998, i.e. the disparity between foreign-owned and domestically 
owned food- processors is widening in the case of almost ali the profitability, 
productivity and export indicators. In view of the more intensive investment ac-
tivities of the foreign-owned food processors, a further widening of the perform-
ance gap may not he excluded in the future. 
10.4. Concept of the FDI-Concentration Maps 
The most original achievement of the dissertation is the recognition of a relation 
between food industry FDI and market concentration, and it is on the basis of 
this that the concept of FDI-concentration maps was developed. The analysis of 
the Hungarian food industries provided empirical evidence for an interdepend-
ence between market structure and foreign direct investments. FDI-concentra-
tion maps demonstrate the positions and array of the food processing industries 
in a given country at a given time, employing a system of coordinates determined 
by two attributes of the industries, concentration and the proportion of the total 
registered company capital that is in foreign ownership. 
10.4.1. Extending the Directions of the Maps 
The analytical framework of the FDI-concentration map — initially developed for 
the Hungarian food industry — was extended into two directions: 
The dynamic approach involved the construction of industry life-
curves, tracing the route that a particular food processing industry 
has followed in the post-socialist transition up to the last year of 
observation. 
The comparative approach extended the application of FDI-con-
centration maps geographically by using it for a comparative ana-
lysis of food processing sectors within the Central and Eastern 
European region. 
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10.4.1.1. General Trends in Food Industry Life-Curves in 
the CEE Countries 
Life-curves were used to demonstrate the paths taken by given food industries on 
FDI-concentration maps, by plotting the yearly positions of these industries over 
a certain period on the same chart. The discussion of the dynamic approach be-
gan by identifying the forces that move industries on the map from one year to 
the next. The main forces proved to be economic policy measures, privatisation 
policy and the strategies and operations of market players in the given industry. 
The life-curves of the Hungarian food processing industries share certain pecu-
liar similarities, and most of them can be classified into four typical routes. 
As for the CEE food industries, there are two distinct types of path into which 
most of them can be classified (Figure 68): 
Type A Cncompasses industries that have dominant firm or oli-
gopolistic market structures. Foreign investors have been 
strongly motivated to buy the market leaders and large compa-
nies, pushing these industries along the upper path designated as 
A. The tobacco, beer and confectionery industries are the most 
typical examples of type A in Central and Eastern Europe. They 
used to contain one Farge processing company or a small number 
of such companies, and this structure was not changed even by 
privatisation. 
The industries in type B also used to be fairly well concentrated, 
often having one trust, umbrella company or association which 
the paternalistic state had established by administratively merg-
ing most of the processing units operating in the same market or 
with the same group of products.' The first-stage processing in-
dustries in many CEE countries were organised in this way for 
easier control and planning, but during the economic reforms in 
the 1990s the giant companies were split into individual process-
ing units and sold separately within a "decentralised privatisa-
tion" scheme. Market concentration declined steeply as a result, 
but as FDI started to•flow in, these industries were characterised 
by a firm reconcentration and consolidation process and moved 
towards the right on the map. This explains the U-shape charac-
teristic of type B in Figure 68: Industries in different countries 
have proceeded at a different pace and reached different posi-
tions on the U-curve, but the pattern that they have followed re-
mains similar and- characteristic. Type B usually includes the 
most significant first-stage processing industries, such as dairy, 
meat, fish, milling or animal feeds. 
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Figure 68. The two major types of industry life-curve for the food processing 
industries of the CEE countries. 
The history of the food industries in the 1990s and the above main types of 
life-curves can shed some light on the process by which the food industries in ali 
the Central and Eastern European countries have moved to reach a diagonal 
array, as observed on the national maps in this dissertation. 
10.4.1.2. Findings from the Comparative Extension of 
FDI-Concentration Maps 
The discussion on the comparative approach also started with a detailed descrip-
tion of the forces that determine the distribution of industries on national FDI-
concentration maps. The forces were divided into intemal and extemal factors: 
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Internal factors embrace immanent characteristics that prevail in 
the corresponding industries internationally regardless of the coun-
tries they are located in. 
The external factors were further divided into three stages: 
Food industry globalisation and its accompanying phenomena 
are the most important of the determinants exercising an effect 
worldwide. 
National trade and competition policies, market size, transac-
tion costs and economies of scale deserve emphasis among the 
general determinants at the national or macro-regional level. 
Government policy, which regulates FDI inflows and outflows, 
local competition and other special phenomena in the national 
economies, can modify, strengthen or hamper international 
trends in sub-markets of the global food markets at the macro-
regional or national level. 
The CEE-specific factors are characteristic only of the econo- 
mies of the post-socialist transition. A series of such special fac- 
tors can be identified in the CEE region: restructuring and pri-
vatisation of the food processing enterprises, economic and 
trade liberalisation, economic risk and a decrease of food 
demand during the post-socialist transition. Ali of these have an 
influence on the penetration of foreign direct investment and on 
concentration in the food processing industries. 
It is imperative to point out that CEE food markets cannot be detached from 
the context of international mies: i.e. the companies operating in the globally 
concentrated food processing industries will permeate into the respective mar-
kets in Central and Eastern Europe with a high degree of probability. On the 
other hand, several of these popular industries were initially concentrated in the 
CEE host economies at the very beginning of the transition period anyway. The 
horizontal investigation into selected food processing segments, comparing the 
positions of the corresponding industries on the national FDI-concentration 
maps, revealed that foreign investors expressed serious interest and activity even 
in the case of several industries that were not concentrated globally, provided 
that they were concentrated locally.91  
The comparative analysis performed here involved the food processing 
industries of five countries, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The 
findings can be summarised in the following points: 
91  This was evident in the case of meat processing, milling and bakeries in the Baltic countries. 
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1. A close correlation between market concentration and foreign di-
rect investments can he detected in the food processing industry of 
each of these countries, so that the two factors make up a complex 
impact mechanism. On the one hand, the concentrated food indus-
tries attracted foreign investments, while on the other hand, the 
companies themselves consolidated the market structure, once for-
eign investors had acquired them. 
2. The food processing industries of each country can he grouped into 
four distinct clusters, named after their group characteristics on the 
global FDI-concentration map (Figure 69). 
Concentrated industries, which have absorbed high foreign 
direct investment, constituting the global cluster [1] . 
A group of industries of medium concentration with medium 
foreign investment participation, named the middle cluster [2] 
due to their intermediate location on the trend line. 
Industries characterised by an atomised market structure and 
minimal foreign capital involvement, making up the local clus-
ter [3]. 
A transition cluster [4], which encompasses industries with 
discrepant positions, i.e. concentrated industries which have 
absorbed very little foreign direct investment. The notion of 
transition refers to the special post-socialist features of this 
group, and at the same time illustrates the fact that most of the 
industries are expected to leave the cluster after a time, so that 
their position is only temporary, or transitional. 
It is important to note that it is the location of clusters relative to 
each other on each national FDI-concentration map that really mat-
ters in the above classification, while the exact and absolute loca-
tions of the clusters — slightly varying country by country — are of 
secondary importance in this respect. 
3. The trend Iines for the Baltic countries are located above those for 
Hungary and Poland, on account of their manifestly smaller food 
markets and food processing industries. 
4. Although the food processing industries of Poland and Hungary 
follow the same trend, there is one substantial difference between 
the FDI-concentration maps for the two countries. The Hungarian 
food industries tend to gather in the global cluster [1], whereas the 
Polish food industries typically congregate in the direction of the 
local cluster [3]. Reasons can he found both in their different mar-
ket sizes and in the discrepant privatisation strategies. 
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5. Quite a few industries in the Baltic countries and Poland occupied 
positions in the area of the transition cluster [4], which is ascribed 
to the effects of particular administrative, industry-specific or 
policy measures, and to a lesser extent to the incompleteness of pri-
vatisation. 
Based on the findings of the comparative analysis of the FDI-concentration 
maps, the following conclusions can be drawn for the food processing sectors of 
the CEE region: 
Foreign direct investments targeting the food industry in the re-
gion are predominantly of the "market-seeker", or rather "mar-
ket dominance-seeker" kind. 
An important group of determinants of the nature of the FDI-
concentration maps is concerned with the size of the host coun-
tries and the magnitudes of their food processing industries. 
Food industry privatisation constitutes a cardinal determinant in 
the formation of national FDI-concentration maps. 
The political and economic lessons to be drawn from this analysis with regard 
to the Central and Eastern European food processing industries are summarised 
in section 10.6. 
10.4.2. Global Implications of the FDI-Concentration Maps 
The determinants that were listed at the beginning of the previous section shape 
the array of industries on the national FDI-concentration maps and lead to the 
recognition of global economic mies. The single most important worldwide de-
terminant is food industry globalisation, since it concurrently engenders 
a concentration of the local food markets through the effects of 
global concentration, and 
a growth in the influence of foreign capital through the intensi-
fication of international production. 
The two phenomena are tightly interrelated, and they exert their impacts 
concurrently, being propelled by each other. The global growth of food markets 
requires companies to pursue an international strategy and engage in active parti-
cipation abroad, while international production will expand with the growth of 
foreign direct investment, further strengthening globalisation of the food mar-
kets. Thus the causal chain will return to its starting point, i.e. the impact mech-
anism operates in a circular manner. 
The concurrent growth of international production and increase in the con-
centration of food processing and sales may be seen to prevail with different 
intensities in the individual food processing industries. The regularities and 
common patterns discernible in the globalising food markets suggest that the 
world' s food processing industries can be typified by means of a global FDI- 
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concentration map.92 Some industries grow to "global proportions", while others 
typically focus on local markets. There may also be a transitional or middle 
group of industries located between the two extremes on the map of global con-
centration and international production. The main trend line on the global map 
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Figure 69. The clusters offood processing industries on the global FDI-concen-
tration map. 
92 The construction of a global food industry FDI-concentration map, as shown in Figure 69, is 
hampered by several impediments. On the one hand, no appropriate figures are available on 
international production, or on the proportion of the world' s total production in the hands of 
transnational companies, while on the other hand, the diversifying inter-industry processing 
activities of multinational enterprises make calculations of industry-specific concentration on 
a global scale extremely complicated. Empirical verification of the relationship between global 
market concentration and international production in the world' s food processing industries 
appears to present an extraordinarily serious challenge. 
Global 
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Local 
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can with reasonable certainty be anticipated to be located lower down and to be 
less steep than the ones in the national FDI-concentration maps for the CEE 
region (Figure 69).93  
The globalisation of food markets proceeds unequally in the cases of certain 
products and product groups, since individual food markets or food processing 
industries possess inherent characteristics that accelerate or hinder their global-
isation. These discrepancies may stem from technological or demand-based 
differences, such as economies of scale or consumption pattems. 
In order to comprehend the current nature of the global FDI-concentration 
map, we should start out from the pre-globalisation period in the recent history 
of food processing, when ali the food industries were initially located in the 
local cluster. Through globalisation, a polarised rearrangement began in which 
certain industries moved towards the terrain of a global cluster while others 
remained in the area of the local cluster. Due to the different rates of global-
isation, the food industries have made up a looser group, especially over the past 
two or three decades, stretching and expanding their positions from the local 
cluster along the trend area. It is most likely that the major direction of move-
ment for most food industries will be towards the global cluster, provided that 
globalisation continues in the same way as it has in the past decades. The process 
raises an important question: what are the ultimate driving forces that determine 
such a reformation of industry positions on the global FDI-concentration map? 
The answers are to be sought in the inherent attributes of the food processing 
industries: 
Stage of processing — primary or secondary. First-stage processing 
industries are directly connected with typically local raw material 
producers. The risk and danger factors of being exposed to raw ma- 
terial produced by the politically influenced agricultural sector def-
initely hinder the growth of intemational production. Second-stage 
processing industries are flexible and internationally more "mo- 
bile", as they are less dependent on or tied to local agricultural raw 
materials. Therefore, these companies show a greater propensity for 
international production and expansion. The typical first-stage 
processing industries, such as dairy, meat processing and grain 
processing, are located in the area of the local cluster, while the 
second-stage processing industries, including confectionery and 
beverages, are situated in the domain of the global cluster. 
Innovation, product development, R&D and branding. The amount 
of intellectual property and capital embodied in the products has 
rapidly increased in many food processing industries. Intensive in- 
The location of the trend line is obviously determined also by the coverage k of a global CRk 
market concentration indicator. 
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novation supports the production of highly processed foodstuffs. 
Branding and the development of global consumption pattems are 
also of the utmost importance in the same group of industries. The 
high costs of innovation and research and development activities 
imply a necessity for high returns, for which companies are forced 
to seek M&A opportunities in order to exploit synergy advantages 
in the international arena. Consequently, these product groups are 
driven from the local cluster in the direction of the global cluster. 
3. Excise character. Certain food processing industries enjoy a stable 
or even growing total demand on the world market, or else they rep-
resent much more favourable profit prospects than average for the 
food industry. A group of these products can easily be associated 
with the excise tax regulations of national govemments. Owing to 
their market and profit perspectives, international production is 
excessive in these industries, and therefore they are located in the 
areas of the middle and global clusters. Spices, coffee, tobacco and 
alcoholic beverages typically belong to this group of products. 
In summary, the alignment of food processing industries on the global FDI-
concentration map is driven by globalisation and the inherent characteristics of 
the particular industries. 
10.4.3. Further Applications 
The real significance of the global FDI-concentration map lies in its wide poten-
tial applicability. It can be a notable tool for measuring and demonstrating the 
stage of globalisation in any industry in the economy and, by employing the 
dynamic approach, it can facilitate a quantification and comparison of the speed 
of globalisation in any industry. A number of manufacturing industries and ser-
vice fields are globalising rapidly, prominent examples being the automobile, 
computer and telecommunications industries. The exploitation of economies of 
scale, homogeneous products and homogenising global demand and easy trans-
fer of accumulated intellectual capital and knowledge are certainly among the 
determinants that have impelled the globalisation of some industries or services. 
Others, such as furniture production, housing or public utilities are to various 
extents tied to the locations where their products are manufactured and con-
sumed, and hence are globalising only to a moderate extent. These industries 
may therefore be considered local in the terminology used on the global FDI-
concentration map. 
In a sense, the food industry may be looked on as a model for the whole het-
erogeneous sphere of manufacturing and service industries, since it consists of 
sub-industries ranging over the entire continuum from local to global character-
istics. They provide a wide spectrum of clearly distinguishable, yet compact 
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markets of relatively comparable sizes and patterns. These facts have made food 
manufacturing a fascinating area for investigations concerning globalising in-
dustries. The FDI-concentration map, a concept embodying the ultimate accom-
plishment of this dissertation, proved to he a relevant tool for analysing and 
understanding the reasons that make individual markets or groups of products — 
while ali part of a higher category, the food industry — globalise at such largely 
disparate rates. 
10.5. Conclusions for the Hungarian Food Industry 
This research served to reveal the motivational factors that drove foreign direct 
investments in Hungary and in particular in its food industry. The most impor-
tant driving forces for foreign investments were the following: 
rapid corporate restructuring, 
commercially based privatisation of the food industry, 
rapid legal reforms and a predictable economic, legal and political 
environment, 
abundantly available and inexpensive production factors: agricul-
tural raw material, labour, existing food processing capacity, 
tax exemptions. 
The motivational factors exposed here illustrate the power of attraction for 
FDI in two aspects, or two contrasting environments: 
in the international field of the Central and Eastern European food 
sectors, and 
in the group of ali manufacturing industries within the Hungarian 
economy. 
In my own personal viewpoint, a form of food industry privatisation which 
favoured domestic ownership would have been beneficial and expedient, if: 
restructuring of the food industry had been preceded by a restruc-
turing of agriculture, 
opportunities had opened up for solving the immense capital short-
age in the food processing sector by making use of internal public 
or state budget sources or the domestic capital markets, 
domestic ownership had involved a real injection of capital into the 
food industry as opposed to "fictive capital", 
alternative channels had been established for learning modern tech-
nology, know-how, management, marketing and logistic tech-
niques, 
a quite windless period had been available for the long-term devel-
opment of the food industry and it had not been just about to face an 
enormous international challenge, the internal food markets and 
fierce competition of the European Union. 
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Since none of the above conditions was met, the single relevant development 
alternative for the Hungarian food industry under the given set of historical and 
socio-economic conditions was the involvement of external sources of the neces-
sary capital. 
A retrospective appraisal confirms that in the common dilemma facing the 
food processing sectors in Central and Eastern Europe, the Hungarian food in-
dustry privatisation policy chose the right option of "having strong but foreign-
owned or weak but domestically owned food processing industries". It is uncer-
tain, however, to what extent the commercially based food industry privatisation 
was the result of a thorough and conscious policy. In other words, was the priva-
tisation approach influenced by the interests of food processing and the agrifood 
sector, or was it driven by state budgetary interests and a series of ad hoc deci-
sions? Although the real driving forces and government motives are disputable, 
the final outcome is beyond doubt: the privatisation of the Hungarian food indus-
try has been successful by international standards, a statement which is power-
fully supported by the findings in this dissertation. 
The research also addressed the role of foreign owners in the performance of 
the Hungarian food industry. The comparison of performance indicators for pre-
dominantly foreign-owned and predominantly domestically owned food pro-
cessors verifies the economic superiority of foreign ownership. Those Hungari-
an-owned food processors, which have been able to withstand competition from 
foreign companies and have been able to narrow the performance gap, will be 
well prepared for the challenge of the EU' s internal food market in the future. 
10.6. Conclusions for the Central and Eastern European 
Food Industries 
The comparison of the situations in Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania supports the observation that the concept of privatisation and its im-
plementation were direct determinants of the inflows of foreign direct invest-
ment. The contrasts between these countries confirm that the other frequently 
employed alternative for food industry privatisation, which favours the agricul-
tural producers or domestic private persons, does not result in a strong food in-
dustry or an efficient or solid set-up for the agrifood chain, while commercially 
based food industry privatisation, which attracts strategic domestic and foreign 
investors, reinforces the entire agrifood sector. The dilemma of deciding between 
a strong but primarily foreign-owned or weak but domestically owned food in-
dustry is a strategic issue that has to be resolved in ali the Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
An important lesson for the CEE region can be drawn from the example of the 
Hungarian food industry: the foreign-owned food processing companies have 
relied on domestic raw materials. This does not mean an unconditional commit- 
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ment, of course, since they offer a secure demand only for the best and most 
competitive agricultural producers, but they do indirectly impel agricultural pro-
ducers towards improvements in efficiency and collective action. The final bal-
ance of benefits and costs has been positive in terms of the consolidation of ver-
tical relations, and the presence of strong foreign companies has had a favour-
able influence on the future of agriculture. 
Foreign ownership has also had a positive impact on the corporate perform-
ance of food processors. This is attributable partly to the improved technology 
used by foreign companies and partly to the rationalisation of processing capa-
city and the laying off of labour. Experience indicates that financial strength is 
only one reason for the serious performance gap between foreign and domestic-
owned food processors. Besides, there is a significant psychological effect that 
prevents domestically owned companies from exploiting the growth and mod-
emisation opportunities based on corporate rationalisation: i.e., due to a certain 
local, municipal or regional loyalty, and being involved in an interlaced local 
network of threads of interests, they are reluctant to shed labour or implement 
changes that may directly hit the economy of their surrounding region. 
One of the most important lessons of this dissertation for the Central and 
Eastern European countries is the fact that the domestic owner groups who were 
granted shares of the processing companies by administrative means or on pref-
erential terms do not wish, or are not able — for financial reasons — to maintain 
their owner rights in the long run. This statement applies primarily to agricul-
tural raw material producers, but also to some extent to private persons and com-
pany employees who received these shares as a form of compensation. There are 
two options for national governments with regard to the ownership structure of 
the food industry in the future: 
They can continue to assist the financially weak owners who were 
granted shares in the food companies in the initial privatisation. 
This will ensure that the ownership structure of the food industry is 
conserved and postpone resolution of the problems of redundant 
capacity and obsolete technology. 
They can let the capital market work freely and allow the food in-
dustry to go through a process of painful but desirable self-purifica- 
tion, including the elimination of redundant capacity, bankruptcies 
and the concurrent development of vital and efficient companies 
and total modemisation. 
In principle, the rapid development of local capital markets may facilitate 
participation by domestic owners. Domestic corporate investors and manage-
ment have had relatively good chances of becoming strong company owners in 
the food industry, and they may also have access to extemal capital for the devel-
opment of the companies. The capital supply and the creditability of other cat-
egories of domestic owners, such as agricultural producers, private persons and 
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employees, are limited, and their persistence as owners will not result in fast 
prosperity for the companies under the current economic conditions. Develop-
ments in the CEE banking sector and the profitability of the food industry to-
gether suggest that only restricted modernisation of food manufacturing has been 
possible on the basis of internal sources. The most realistic path for food indus-
try modernisation is therefore free evolution of the ownership and market struc-
ture with the involvement of external capital. 
The opportunity to absorb foreign direct investment and utilise the financial 
strength and intellectual capital of foreign investors in order to improve the com-
petitiveness of the national food processing sector represents a notable develop-
ment potential for the CEE countries, and it would be illogical to ignore this 
opportunity. Apart from the direct FDI incentives, the indirect factor of the eco-
nomic environment can also serve as a catalyst, in which context the entire eco-
nomic policy of the host country is an important determinant. 
10.7. Conclusions Concerning the EU Membership of CEE Countries 
The improvement of competitiveness will be of crucial importance both to the 
countries that aspire for EU membership and to those that are likely for the mo-
ment to remain outside the union, as the food processing sectors of the future 
member countries will be put to the test by the fierce internal competition that 
exists in the vast markets of the EU, whereas the countries outside will continue 
to face international competition from the EU. 
Improving the competitiveness of the food industries is a strategic issue for 
the Central and Eastern European countries. The findings of this dissertation 
point to foreign investors as "unexpected allies" who share the same interests 
and are working towards the same goal. Although their participation is directly 
inspired by their own corporate strategy and interests, their activities largely 
contribute to the modernisation of the food processing sector in the CEE coun-
tries. The eventual decision will lie in the hands of the host governments, since 
the present results show that most of the FDI determinants can be influenced. 
The presence and amount of foreign direct investment has important implica-
tions with respect to the future of food processors in the acceding countries. The 
production subsidiaries of foreign parent companies that already have stable and 
well-established positions on the EU markets will have good chances of with-
standing the intensive competition, while the survival of locally owned food 
processors will be determined by the prevailing conditions, the competitive com-
panies being able to survive and perhaps even grow. On the other hand, govern-
ment policies, which postpone the elimination of redundant capacity and pro-
mote inefficient processors, will cause serious adjustment crises in a number of 
industries later. In the worst case, local food production may be partly' or entirely 
replaced by the EU' s internal trading, i.e. "internal imports", upon accession. 
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In order to obtain a proper assessment of the impacts of accession, two facts 
should be noted: 
e The export subsidies that the EU' s foodstuffs enjoy at present will 
be removed in the internal flows of goods; in other words, food 
processors in the EU will have to sell their products on the markets 
of the newly joining eastem countries at internal prices. This factor 
will alleviate the shock for the CEE food processing industries. 
On the other hand, the new member countries will be forced to open 
up their markets entirely and remove ali import duties and regula- 
tions. This process is already at an advanced stage now, before 
accession, and the gradual removal of import tariffs constitutes one 
component of the association agreement and accession agenda for 
each country. 
The domestic food processing industries of the CEE countries will rely on the 
consumers, and indirectly on food wholesalers and retailers. The pattern 
followed in the most recent new EU member countries, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden, proves that the existence of domestic food processing is a function of 
domestic consumer loyalty. Before accession, marketing campaigns were 
launched in all the three countries to accentuate further the initially strong 
consumer loyalty to domestically manufactured foodstuffs. The press and the 
(domestically owned) food wholesale and retail companies played a prominent 
role in these campaigns. Although the price levels of the CEE countries differ 
greatly from those of the most recent members to join the EU, the strategy of 
emulating the western and northem examples and establishing a strong sense of 
consumer loyalty towards domestically produced food items may also be an 
important factor in the survival of the Central and Eastern European food 
economies. 
In principle, a domestically owned agrifood chain in which the individual 
segments were closely interrelated through cross-ownership relations could have 
been established as an ideal solution for the CEE agrifood sectors. Domestic 
ownership would, in fact, be very beneficial for agricultural raw material pro-
ducers, at least in the first-stage processing industries. The structure of corporate 
ownership is well known and has proved feasible in a number of Western and 
Northern European agrifood supply chains, but there is no time to implement 
such a model in the present situation of the CEE countries. 
The recognition of this leads us to the conclusion that if the countries wish to 
protect their agrifood chains and preserve their agricultural and food production 
within the European Union, less importance will have to be attached to emo-
tional and national considerations than to potential economic benefits as far as 
the origins of the major owners in the food industry are concemed. 
From an economic perspective, the attracting of food industry FDI and the 
presence of foreign companies in food manufacturing may be seen as a means, 
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or even a precondition, for resolving the problem of achieving the most rapid 
modemisation and most permanent development possible in the food economies 
of Central and Eastern Europe before accession to the European Union. This 
train of thought boils down to the final conclusion that foreign direct investments 
flowing into the food sectors of the Central and Eastern European countries will 
result in mutual benefits for both the investors and the host economies. 
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Annex 1. NACE Rev 1 classification of food processing activities. 
Denomination, NACE Divisions/Groups/Classes Codes 
Manufacture of food and beverages 15 
Manufacture of meat and meat products 151 
Meat processing and preserving 1511 
Poultry processing and preserving 1512 
Manufacture of meat and poultry products 1513 
Manufacture of fish products 152 
Fruit and vegetable processing and preserving 153 
Potato processing 1531 
Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juices 1532 
Other fruit and vegetable processing 1533 
Manufacture of vegetable and animal fats 154 
Manufacture of oil 1541 
Manufacture of refined oil 1542 
Margarine 1543 
Dairy processing 155 
Dairy processing 1551 
Manufacture of ice cream 1552 
Milling and starches 156 
Manufacture of milling products 1561 
S tarch 1562 
Manufacture of feed 157 
Feed production 1571 
Pet food production 1572 
Manufacture of other foodstuffs 158 
Bread production 1581 
Biscuit production 1582 
Sugar 1583 
Confectionery 1584 
Pasta 1585 
Tea, coffee 1586 
Spices 1587 
Homogenised and diabetic foodstuffs 1588 
Other not specified 1589 
Manufacture of beverages 159 
Distilled alcohol 1591 
Etil alcohol 1592 
Wine making 1593 
Fruit wine 1594 
Other non-distilled beverages 1595 
Manufacture of beer 1596 
Malt production 1597 
Soft drinks 1598 
Tobacco production 16 
Source: NACE Rev. 1 
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Annex 2. The 30 largest food processors in the world in 1998. 
Company Headquarter 
Total 
sales 
(billion 
USD) 
Estimate sales 
of food and 
beverages 
(billion USD) 
Share of 
food industry 
sales in total 
sales (%) 
1. 	Nest16 Switzerland 49.7 47.2 95 
2. 	Philip Morris USA 74.4 32.7 44 
3. 	Unilever Netherlands/ UK 44.9 22.5 50 
4. 	PepsiCo USA 22.3 22.3 100 
5. 	Diageo UK 19.9 19.9 100 
6. 	Coca Cola Co. USA 18.8 18.8 100 
7. 	ConAgra USA 23.8 13.4 56 
8. 	Danone France 14.4 12.2 85 
9. 	Sara Lee Corp. USA 20.0 12.0 60 
10. Mars USA 15.0 12.0 80 
11. IBP Inc. USA 12.8 11.6 91 
12. Asahi Breweries Japan 11.9 11.1 93 
13. Kirin Brewery Japan 11.3 11.0 97 
14. Anheuser-Busch Cos. Inc. USA 11.2 10.7 96 
15. H-J- Heinz Comp. USA 9.2 9.2 100 
16. RJR Nabisco Inc. USA 17.0 8.7 51 
17. Suntory Japan 9.6 8.6 90 
18. Bestfoods USA 8.4 8.4 100 
19. Snow Brand Milk Products Japan 9.4 7.8 83 
20. Tyson Foods USA 7.4 7.4 100 
21. Dairy Farmers of America USA 7.3 7.3 100 
22. Heineken N.V. Netherlands 7.0 7.0 100 
23. General Mills Inc. USA 6.8 6.8 100 
24. Cadbury Schweppes UK 6.8 6.8 100 
25. Kellogg Company USA 6.8 6.8 100 
26. Campbell Soup Comp. USA 6.7 6.7 100 
27. Nippon Meat Packers Japan 6.5 6.5 100 
28. Bunge International Brasilia 13.0 5.9 45 
29. Tate&Lyle UK 7.6 5.7 75 
30. Parmalat Italy 5.7 5.7 100 
Source: RABOBANK International (1999) The World Food Markets, Utrecht; cited by Szabö 
(2000). 
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Annex 3. FDI inward stock in Central and Eastern Europe by geographic origin 
(in percent). 
Region of origin 
Host country 
Central and 	European 	Other 	Developing 	Total 
Eastern Europe 	Union 	developeda  countries and other 
Belorus (1998) 11 65 20 4 100 
Bulgaria (1998) 2 63 11 24 100 
Czech R. (1997) 2 81 9 8 100 
Estonia (1998) 2 77 10 11 100 
Croatia (1998) 3 41 48 8 100 
Poland (1997) 1 77 15 7 100 
Latvia (1998) 13 53 15 19 100 
Lithuania (1998) 3 57 16 24 100 
Hungary (1997) 1 59 20 20 100 
Moldavia (1998) 32 23 25 20 100 
Russia (1998) 0 22 34 44 100 
Romania (1998) 4 60 9 27 100 
Slovakia (1998) 10 71 11 8 100 
Slovenia (1997) 15 75 9 1 100 
Ukraine (1998) 7 25 24 44 100 
Source: UNCTAD (1999, p. 434). al Combined figure of Japan, Switzerland and USA. 
Annex 4. Sectoral distribution of FDI inward stock in Central and Eastern 
Europe (in percent). 
Sector 	. Pnmer sector Host country 
Secondary 
sector Tertiary sector 
Other, non-
specified Total 
Belorus (1998) 54 46 0 0 100 
Bulgaria (1998) 0 54 43 3 100 
Czech R. (1997) 1 45 43 11 100 
Estonia (1998) 2 30 66 2 100 
Croatia (1998) 0 60 18 22 100 
Poland (1997) 1 45 44 10 100 
Latvia (1998) 1 18 79 2 100 
Lithuania (1998) 0 25 67 8 100 
Hungary (1997) 2 39 59 0 100 
Moldavia (1998) 0 33 56 11 100 
Russia (1998) 13 35 40 12 100 
Romania (1998) 11 46 31 12 100 
Slovakia (1998) 1 47 51 1 100 
Slovenia (1997) 0 38 53 9 100 
Ukraine (1998) 4 43 40 13 100 
Source: UNCTAD (1999, p. 435). 
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Germany 
USA 
UK 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
USA 
Netherlands 
USA 
UK/ Netherlands 
UK 
France 
USA/UK 
USA 
Italy 
France 
USA 
Denmark 
USA 
Canada 
Italy 
USA 
USA 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Germany 
UK 
Germany 
Australia 
Belgium 
Spain 
tobacco 
tobacco 
soft drinks 
beer 
confectionery/other 
soft drinks/other 
beer 
confectionery/feed 
margarine/fish/ 
dairy/confectionery 
confectionery 
tobacco 
tobacco 
vegetable oil 
confectionery 
dffiry 
tobacco 
beer 
feed 
potato 
vegetable oil 
potato/other 
chewing gum 
feed 
ice cream 
coffee 
sugar 
sugar 
beer 
beer 
meat 
Annex 11. Top 30 food processing foreign investors in Poland in 1999. 
Rank 
Fo
od
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g  
0 
Investor 
Value of 
investment 
(rnillion 
USD) 
Country of origin Activity/ industry 
1 14 Reemtsma cigarettenfabriken 417.1 
2 16 Philip Morris 372 
3 17 Coca Cola Beverages 360 
4 19 Harbin BV 325.9 
5 21 Nestle S.A. 309 
6 32 PepsiCo 203 
7 39 Heineken 180.7 
8 42 Mars Inc. 163 
9 49 Unilever 105 
10 57 Cadbury's Schweppes 126.5 
11 58 Seita 120 
12 74 British American Tobacco 88 
13 78 Schooner Capital Corp. 40 
14 79 Ferrero Holding 80 
15 80 BSN Gervais Danone 80 
16 89 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 70 
17 90 Carlsberg 69.7 
18 106 Cargill Inc. 60 
19 114 McCain Foods 54 
20 115 EBS Montedison 53.8 
21 118 Bestfoods 52.1 
22 126 Wrigley Jr. Co. 49 
23 127 Provimi Holding BV 48 
24 138 Schoeller 43 
25 140 Tchibo 42 
26 143 British Sugar 41 
27 145 Pfeiffer und Langen 40.6 
28 146 Brewpole Ltd. 40.1 
29 148 Diepensteyn NV 40 
30 165 Campofrio Alimentacion 35 
Source: PAIZ (1999b). 
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Annex 12. Top food processing foreign investors in the Baltic countries in 1997 
and 1998. 
Foreign investor 
Country of 
origin 
Baltic subsidiary Industry 
Value 
(million 
USD) 
Estonia 
Coca-Cola Getranke 
Baltic Beverages Holding 
Gustav Paulig AB 
Procordia Foods AB 
Cultor Oy/Cerealia AS 
Seven Up Netherlands 
Valio Oy 
Austria 
Finland/ 
Sweden 
Finland 
Sweden 
Finland/ 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Estonian Coca-Cola Drinks 
Saku Brewery Ltd. 
Paulig Baltic Ltd. 
Pöltsamaa Felix Ltd. 
Leibur Ltd. 
PepsiCo Estonia Ltd. 
Tapila Ltd. 
soft drinks 
brewery 
coffee, spices 
fruit and 
vegetable 
bakery 
trade/soft drinks 
dairy 
18.7 
5.4 
5.2 
5.1 
4.7 
3.5 
2.6 
Latvia 
Coca Cola Getranke 
Cultor Oy 
Baltic Beverages Holding 
House of Prince 
Cerealia AB/Melia Oy 
AB Chipsi Oy 
Norbiton Assets Inc. 
Rakvere Lihakombinaat 
ABC — CONTI GmbH 
Cultor Oy 
Austria 
Finland 
Finland/ 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Sweden/ 
Finland 
Finland 
USA 
Estonia 
Austria 
Finland 
Coca Cola Dzörieni, SIA 
Hanzas maiznica/Rözeknes 
trade/soft drinks 
bakery 
brewery 
tobacco 
milling 
snacks 
soft drinks 
meat 
bakery 
feed 
16 
11.2 
11 
10 
8.9 
5.2 
3.3 
2.8 
1.5 
1.2 
maiznieks 
Aldaris Brewery 
Rigas tabakas fabrika 
Rigas Dzirnavnieks 
Latfood, A/S 
Gutta, A/S 
Rigas Miesnieks 
DRUVA 
Baltic Feed SIA 
Lithuania 
Philip Morris International 
Carlsberg 
Danisco sugar A/S 
The Coca Cola Co. 
Baltic Beverages Holding 
Kraft Food International 
E1-1-,bM Inc. 
USA 
Denmark 
Denmark 
USA 
Sweden/ 
Finland 
USA 
USA 
Philip Morris Lietuva 
vyturys 
sugar factories 
Coca Cola Bottlers Lietuva 
Kalnapilis and Utena 
Kraft Jacobs Suchard 
Lietuva 
Masterfoods Lietuva 
tobacco 
brewery 
sugar 
trade 
brewery 
confectionery 
feed 
62 
45 
33.8 
31.5 
24 
23.5 
15 
Sources: Estonia: Estonian Food Processing Industry, Eke-Ariko (1998 p. 11); Latvia: Latvian 
Development Agency (http: \\www.lda.gov.lv, ref. October 2000); Lithuania: Country Informa-
tion, Lithuanian Development Agency, 1999, Vol. 2. September-December, p. 8. 
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Annex 13. Agglomeration order and coefficients of cluster analysis — Poland. 
Industry 
Level of 
combining 
Agglomeration order 
Code of 
cluster specification Codes of combined clusters Coefficients 
1 Meat 1 1 3 0.0013 
2 Dairy 2 8 9 0.0025 
3 Sugar 3 1 2 0.0043 
4 Fish 4 4 7 0.0058 
5 Fruit and vegetable 5 5 16 0.0075 
6 Vegetable oil 6 10 17 0.0102 
7 Wine 7 5 15 0.0190 
8 Bakery 8 1 8 0.0252 
9 Milling 9 6 13 0.0321 
10 Distilling 10 4 10 0.0361 
11 Beer 11 12 14 0.0474 
12 Soft drink 12 6 11 0.0600 
13 Tobacco 13 5 12 0.0866 
14 Potato 14 1 4 0.0988 
15 Confectionery 15 1 5 0.1765 
16 Feed 16 1 6 0.5106 
17 Poultry 
Annex 14. Agglomeration order and coefficients of cluster analysis — Estonia. 
Industry 
Level of 
combining 
Agglomeration order 
Code of 
cluster specification Codes of combined clusters Coefficients 
1 Meat 1 5 11 0.0060 
2 Dairy 2 3 8 0.0069 
3 Fish 3 10 12 0.0071 
4 Fruit and vegetable 4 4 10 0.0105 
5 Vegetable oil 5 3 6 0.0187 
6 Feed 6 5 9 0.0202 
7 Bakery 7 2 3 0.0330 
8 Milling 8 1 7 0.0716 
9 Distilling 9 2 5 0.1739 
10 Brewery 10 1 4 0.2086 
11 Confectionery 11 1 2 0.5998 
12 Soft drinks 
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Annex 15. Agglomeration order and coefficients of cluster analysis — Latvia. 
Industry 
Level of 
combilling 
Agglomeration order 
Code of 
cluster specification Codes of combined clusters Coefficients 
1 Meat 1 4 14 0.0282 
2 Sugar 2 6 7 0.0390 
3 Dairy 3 5 6 0.0843 
4 Fish 4 8 13 0.1104 
5 Fruit and vegetable 5 10 15 0.1208 
6 Vegetable oil 6 3 4 0.1235 
7 Starch 7 8 9 0.1385 
8 Bakery 8 5 12 0.1796 
9 Milling 9 1 3 0.2208 
10 Distilling 10 2 10 0.2695 
11 Beer 11 8 11 0.2729 
12 Tobacco 12 1 8 0.4287 
13 Soft drinks 13 1 2 0.4868 
14 Feed 14 1 5 0.6753 
15 Confectionery 
Annex 16. Agglomeration order and coefficients of cluster analysis — Lithuania. 
Industry 
Level of 
combining 
Agglomeration order 
Code of 
cluster specification Codes of combined clusters Coefficients 
1 Meat 1 4 6 0.0009 
2 Sugar 2 4 7 0.0051 
3 Dairy 3 11 12 0.0096 
4 Milling 4 9 13 0.0101 
5 Fruit and vegetable 5 1 4 0.0119 
6 Fish 6 1 11 0.0295 
7 Bakery 7 3 5 0.0427 
8 Distilling 8 1 3 0.0671 
9 Beer 9 2 9 0.0774 
10 Tobacco 10 2 10 0.1044 
11 Soft drinks 11 1 8 0.3619 
12 Feed 12 1 2 0.6805 
13 Confectionery 
311 
312 
> 
00 N •?-; 
. 0  
V
al
ue
  o
f i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
  
tr) 00 en 	ea c)  
0 00 
vzt 
en oN 
0 0 en 
0 	. 
en en 
tr) 
CN 
00 el 
C)  
c•I 
oo 
C; 
r-- en s c> 
d 
' 
en •
03 
00 
CO 
tr) 
\ 
en co 
GO 
C•1 
C=.> 
CN 
00 
00 
to en 
cq 
c3 •-; 
ba
ke
ry
  c
on
fe
ct
io
ne
ry
  d
ist
ill
in
g  
4-4 
Sa
le
s  r
ev
en
ue
s  
00 
CN 
—•1 
k 
00 CN 
00 
00 
0 
"ct 
CNen 
en N 8 
0 	. 
e11 en 00  
N 
c3 
0 
c=1.. 
>.< 
eci 
0 00 e...1 
`.0 
cn
CnN 
ON 
eei 
N 00 
tr) 	. en t-t en 0 
en d• 
0 00  
\ ec) 
00 en 6 \ 
N 
1-4 I 
,.-. 00 tr) 
,- enQ  
' 
en 'f? 
o (0. 
' 
N 
' 
CN 
(D. ' 
co 
en en s 
—•1 
T-1 t=1.. 
CN 
C5, 
trt 
0. 
en 
Maatalouden taloudellisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisuja 
Publications of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute 
No 89 Puurunen, M. 1998. Suomen maa- ja puutarhatalouden sopeutuminen EU-jä-
senyyden alkuvuosina. MATEUS-tutkimusohjelman yhteenvetoraportti. 165 s. 
No 89a Puurunen, M. 1998. Adjustment of the Finnish agriculture and horticulture in 
the first years in the EU. Final report of the MATEUS research programme. 
176 p. 
No 90 Maatalouden ympäristöohjelma 1995-1999:n taloudellinen analyysi. Ympäris- 
tötukijärjestelmä ja tulevaisuus -tutkimuksen loppuraportti. 1999. 159 s. 
Vehkasalo, V., Pentinmälci, J & Aakkula, J. Maatalouden ympäristövaikutusten 
ohjaaminen ympäristötuen avulla. s. 7-41. 
Vehkasalo, V. Ympäristötuen yhteiskunnallinen kannattavuus. s. 42-77. 
Koikkalainen, K., Haataja, K. & Aakkula, J. Maatalouden ympäristötuen pe-
rustuen merkitys maatilojen taloudelle. s. 78-132. 
Peltola, J. Maatalouden ympäristöohjelma 1995-1999:n vaikutus keinolannoit-
teiden käyttöön - ekonometrinen analyysi. s. 133-159. 
No 91 MTTL 1999. Suomen maatalous ja maaseutuelinkeinot 1998. 94s. 
No 91a MTTL 1999. Finnish Agriculture and Rural Industries 1998. 94 p. 
No 92 Aakkula, J.J. 1999. Economic Value of Pro-Environmental Farming - A•Critical 
and Decision-Making Oriented Application of the Contingent Valuation 
Method. 227 p. 
No 93 	Forsman, S. 1999. Erilaistaminen ja hintastrategiat elintarvikealan maaseutu- 
yrityksissä. 166 s. 
No 94 Marttila, J. & Ahlstedt, J. (toim.). 2000. Maataloustieteen päivät 2000. 
Talous ja teknologia. 285 s. 
No 95 MTTL 2000. Suomen maatalous ja maaseutuelinkeinot 1999/2000. 95 s. 
No 95a MTTL 2000. Finnish Agriculture and Rural Industries 1999/2000. 95 p. 
No 96 	Peltola, A. 2000. Viljelijäperheiden monitoimisuus suomalaisilla maatiloilla. 
280 s. 
No 97 MTTL 2001. Suomen maatalous ja maaseutuelinkeinot 2001. 95 s. 
No 97a MTTL 2001. Finnish Agriculture and Rural Industries 2001. 95 p. 
MTT Taloustutkimuksen (MTTL) julkaisuja 
Publications of the Agrifood Research Finland, Economic Research (MTTL) 
No 98 Lehtonen, H. 2001. Principles, structure and application of dynamic regional 
sector model of Finnish agriculture. 265 p. 
No 99 Vihinen, H. 2001. Recognising Choice. A Study of the Changing Politics of 
the Common Agricultural Policy through an Analysis of the MacSharry Reform 
Debate in Ireland and the Netherlands. 247 p. 
No 100 Peltola, J. 2002. Three Approaches to Mathematical Models for Finnish Natural 
Resource Management. 97 p. 
No 101 Niemi, J. & Ahlstedt, J. 2002. Suomen maatalous ja maaseutuelinkeinot 2002. 
94 s. 
No 101a Niemi, J. & Ahlstedt, J. 2002. Finnish Agriculture and Rural Industries 2002. 
94p. 
Hinta 16,50 € (sis. alv-) 
ISBN 951-687-135-6 
ISSN 1458-2996 
MTT 
